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(*Please* do not create duplicate threads. Copying my reply below.)
On 2016-12-27 12:02, 'David Shleifman' via qubes-devel wrote:
> One of the great things about Qubes OS is the reduction of the surface
> exposed to attacks [1]. The road to achieve
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On 2016-12-27 11:38, 'David Shleifman' via qubes-devel wrote:
> One of the great things about Qubes OS is the reduction of the surface
> exposed to attacks [1]. The road to achieve this is discussed elsewhere [2].
>
> Individual virtual machines su
One of the great things about Qubes OS is the reduction of the surface
exposed to attacks [1]. The road to achieve this is discussed elsewhere [2].
Individual virtual machines such as sys-net, sys-firewall, and sys-usb
indeed limit the exposed surface. In Qubes 3.2 they are based on the
Fedora
Will PV SCSI support writing backups to a DVD-RAM that is connected to the same
SATA controller as the system HDDs?
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One of the great things about Qubes OS is the reduction of the surface
exposed to attacks [1]. The road to achieve this is discussed elsewhere [2].
Individual virtual machines such as sys-net, sys-firewall, and sys-usb
indeed limit the exposed surface. In Qubes 3.2 they are based on the
Fedora t
OK, I understand you prefer investing the effort in Qubes to selling T-shirts
and I am OK with this. But there are some services (I know
https://www.redbubble.com/ , but there might be some others) that do all for
you, including T-shirts printing, shipping etc.
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On Tue, Dec 27, 2016 at 05:20:37AM -0800, Vít Šesták wrote:
> Cool. Are you planning to make them available also for those that don't
> attend CCC?
We don't have specific plans, mainly because of logistic reasons (we have
neither have time nor expe
Cool. Are you planning to make them available also for those that don't attend
CCC?
Regards,
Vít Šesták 'v6ak'
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to q
I asgree.
I've realized two potential issues of accessible Qubes:
First, VM could try to temporarily DoS dom0 sound output, e.g. by requesting
much memory and opening many windows and issuing some expensive RPC calls. This
could be an issue when dom0 has to notify something important, e.g. chan
I'd not depend on VM-not-knowing-the-sound. While it could be achieved
initially, I think it will eventually leak into VM. For example when
user assign a microphone to a VM.
at least the issue of data leaking via microphone could be fixed by
disabling microphones during playback.
but i gues
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On Tue, Dec 27, 2016 at 12:32:01AM +, john.david.r.smith wrote:
>
> > I agree that filtering the trusted sound is very fragile, especially if you
> > don't want to add a latency. I'd say this is virtually no way.
>
> this problem maybe could b
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