I didn't have time to write a short email... so I wrote a long one ;)
I think it is important to keep in mind the value we are adding to
Qubes by implementing a log subsystem:
1. integrity guarantee by immediate sending to and storage in separate VM
- inability to modify previous logs
- inabi
Hi! It's me again!
I tried to take account of all your recent comments. So, here's what I'm
thinking about the project acccording to them.
> Not all the VMs are running Fedora, there are also Debian-based and some
> people use also Arch. Not to mention also Windows, but I think we can
> not care
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On Sun, Mar 26, 2017 at 6:21 PM, Rusty Bird wrote:
> When the attacker is infecting the user's computer, they could add some
> code to copy the sealed encrypted keyfile into the nooks and crannies
> (firmware, reserved disk sectors, ...) of that com
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Patrik Hagara:
> I'm thinking about applying to the GSoC program and working on
> the Anti Evil Maid shoulder surfing and video surveillance
> resistance project idea.
Awesome!
> However, I've got a question regarding the proposed
> solution which
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Hi!
I'm thinking about applying to the GSoC program and working on
the Anti Evil Maid shoulder surfing and video surveillance
resistance project idea.
However, I've got a question regarding the proposed
solution which requires implementing both TOT
