There are defined keyboard scancodes for copy:
0x7BKeyboard Cut
0x7CKeyboard Copy
0x7DKeyboard Paste
Source: http://www.freebsddiary.org/APC/usb_hid_usages.php
i am not sure how much they are supported. If they are, it might be the way.
However, copying might
Well, blockchain could be probably also used as a proof of freshness: Just add
some Blockchain-related data to the signed message.
Regards,
Vít Šesták 'v6ak'
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As Joanna has already noted, qubes-secpack is not advertised as solving all
problems related to distribution security, but "the best we can do"
currently.
I'd like to suggest a practical improvement of qubes-secpack that I believe
can protect against a (rather limited) class of threats
I don't see any extra exposure for dom0 there. Yes, there is some qrexec call
managed by dom0 (but handles by another AppVM) and this adds some (very very
marginal, thanks to qrexec simplicity) risk compared to not allowing any qrexec
call. However, there already are some other qrexec calls
On Tuesday, 14 February 2017 14:49:11 UTC+8, M. Dietrich wrote:
> i created a poc of a file-sharing-between-VMs-concept. it
> utilizes fuse and qubes-rpc to make a whole directory from one
> VM visible in another VM.
In terms of security policy, would this be considered safer than the
