Thank you Simon for the informative reply. Good to hear there is some
progress on Spectre variant 1. I hope something similar to Respectre will
be available in the future.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"qubes-users" group.
To unsubscribe from this
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 2019-09-09 9:45 AM, Simon Gaiser wrote:
> [Now with Inline-PGP such that google group doesn't break the signature]
>
> sergei.puti...@gmail.com:
>> Is Qubes affected by the SWAPGS attack?
>
> From the Bitdefender "white paper" [1] (They reported
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
[Now with Inline-PGP such that google group doesn't break the signature]
sergei.puti...@gmail.com:
> Is Qubes affected by the SWAPGS attack?
- From the Bitdefender "white paper" [1] (They reported this vuln.):
"A quick analysis of the Hyper-V kern
sergei.puti...@gmail.com:
> Is Qubes affected by the SWAPGS attack?
>From the Bitdefender "white paper" [1] (They reported this vuln.):
"A quick analysis of the Hyper-V kernel and of the Xen hypervisor kernel
revealed that the SWAPGS instruction is not used, so exploitation is
impossible."
[1]:
Is Qubes affected by the SWAPGS attack?
I haven’t found a statement or Security Advisory from Xen. But it seems Xen
still hasn’t even fixed the original Spectre v1 yet:
https://xenproject.org/2018/01/04/xen-project-spectremeltdown-faq/
At the time of original Spectre, v1 was deemed very hard to e
