On 09/19/2017 02:23 PM, taii...@gmx.com wrote:> It is impossible to have
storage communication between VM's, that would
> be a separate security issue.
> On timing attacks or w/e - you may be able to avoid cross communication
> by putting every AppVM on a separate core of a many core CPU such as an
Well considering the OP is using gmail I think that this is the least of
his worries.
If the browsers in two AppVM's are exactly the same then you can easily
correlate them which is the whole point of browser fingerprinting, they
will appear exactly the same to an observer.
It is impossible
Dnia Monday, September 18, 2017 8:23:46 PM CEST Ted Brenner pisze:
> Not sure if Chromium is free of Google or not.
Me neither, but this does not build confidence:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=500922
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9724409
They fixed it soon after it
I thought I read somewhere that VMs make it harder to fingerprint using the
CPU, graphics card, etc. Did anyone else read that? That would be a feather
in Qubes's hat if true.
Any suggestions for a good anonymizing browser (besides the Tor browser of
course)? I would assume Firefox would have the
Roger that, thank you Leo so it sounds as though Qubes ought to be up to snuff
for all contemporary ad instustry practices that Google, Facebook, Doubleclick
etc are liable to try but that Qubes + anonymizing browser is a better bet
against more sophisticated tracking in case that were a concern
On 09/18/2017 09:27 PM, jes...@gmail.com wrote:
> Thank you Micah and Michał, but I am not actually asking about a standard as
> strong as 100% bulletproof anonymity or anything. I really am just concerned
> about whether any of the methods on that list that I linked to would be
> enough to leak
Hey,
Dnia Monday, September 18, 2017 12:27:21 PM CEST jes...@gmail.com pisze:
> My only concern is working to ensure that to an outside observer such as
> webservers and ad networks nothing short of the shared IP address (and via
> Tor or VPN or different IPs honestly allocated to different domain
Thank you Micah and Michał, but I am not actually asking about a standard as
strong as 100% bulletproof anonymity or anything. I really am just concerned
about whether any of the methods on that list that I linked to would be enough
to leak cookie-like reference data between two separate Qubes s
Dnia Monday, September 18, 2017 10:56:33 AM CEST Micah Lee pisze:
> Qubes security domains don't necessarily help solve this problem because
> really the problem is how your web browsers are configured.
>
> So a tracking company can't link your browsing activity between Qubes
> domains -- your "pe
Hey,
Dnia Monday, September 18, 2017 9:43:15 AM CEST jes...@gmail.com pisze:
> In the past I have used a Firefox plugin called "Better Privacy" to try to
> push back against multi-front user fingerprinting and analysis mechanisms
> such as the kind used by large advertising and user demographics c
Qubes security domains don't necessarily help solve this problem because
really the problem is how your web browsers are configured.
So a tracking company can't link your browsing activity between Qubes
domains -- your "personal" traffic and "work" traffic might look like
two separate people -- bu
In the past I have used a Firefox plugin called "Better Privacy" to try to push
back against multi-front user fingerprinting and analysis mechanisms such as
the kind used by large advertising and user demographics companies which
include the abuse of Flash LSOs, HTML5 local storage, Silverlight,
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