> On 2016-08-30 01:16, johnyju...@sigaint.org wrote:
>> Say someone compromises the dom0 encrypted drive password, and
>> then goes shuffling through the private.img file of the AppVM's to
>> get at Firefox's passwords...? The VM itself wouldn't have to be
>> running corrupt code for that, and
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On Fri, Aug 19, 2016 at 08:56:38PM -, johnyju...@sigaint.org wrote:
> > On 2016-08-19 05:11, johnyju...@sigaint.org wrote:
> >> When I try to run qvm-run from within an AppVM, I get "Request refused."
> >>
> >> Is this by design, for security
> On 2016-08-19 05:11, johnyju...@sigaint.org wrote:
>> When I try to run qvm-run from within an AppVM, I get "Request refused."
>>
>> Is this by design, for security reasons? If so, I guess that's
>> perfectly
>> reasonable. I just don't see that fact documented anywhere.
>>
>
> Yes, but it's
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On 2016-08-19 05:11, johnyju...@sigaint.org wrote:
> When I try to run qvm-run from within an AppVM, I get "Request refused."
>
> Is this by design, for security reasons? If so, I guess that's perfectly
> reasonable. I just don't see that fact
When I try to run qvm-run from within an AppVM, I get "Request refused."
Is this by design, for security reasons? If so, I guess that's perfectly
reasonable. I just don't see that fact documented anywhere.
(The demonstration of one of the Xen exploits executes a qvm-run of xcalc
in dom0 from
