[qubes-users] vPro and Qubes

2016-11-16 Thread neznaika
If i have intel processor with the vPro technology - should i afraid some "factory vulnerabilities" of that technology and some manipulation with my BIOS. Or security of Qubes is higher of that level? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" gr

Re: [qubes-users] vPro and Qubes

2018-03-12 Thread mrp2pp
On Saturday, November 19, 2016 at 5:47:33 PM UTC+7, Andrew David Wong wrote: > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA512 > > On 2016-11-16 00:03, nezna...@xy9ce.tk wrote: > > If i have intel processor with the vPro technology - should i afraid some > > "factory vulnerabilities" of that te

Re: [qubes-users] vPro and Qubes

2018-03-13 Thread sevas
vPro = bad. That GitHub page does not recommend vPro. It states that AEM uses a feature of vPro to detect if vPro software (BIOS) has been tampered with while you were away. Then you can throw your computer in the trash when AEM throws up a red flag. -- You received this message because you

Re: [qubes-users] vPro and Qubes

2018-03-13 Thread mrp2pp
On Tuesday, March 13, 2018 at 11:43:21 PM UTC+7, sevas wrote: > vPro = bad. > > That GitHub page does not recommend vPro. It states that AEM uses a feature > of vPro to detect if vPro software (BIOS) has been tampered with while you > were away. Then you can throw your computer in the trash when

Re: [qubes-users] vPro and Qubes

2018-03-13 Thread taii...@gmx.com
vPro is a set of ME programs for insecure remote management (vs the secure owner controlled remote management of OpenBMC) but ME is always on, always capable of remote access and impossible to disable no matter what - possibly the best industrial espionage utility ever invented and not really y

Re: [qubes-users] vPro and Qubes

2018-03-13 Thread mrp2pp
I hope the authors of https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2FQubesOS%2Fqubes-antievilmaid%2Fblob%2Fmaster%2Fanti-evil-maid%2FREADME&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNHdTSlMQuiFYmS9hEEQkF8C_fwjIQ would say something here. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google

Re: [qubes-users] vPro and Qubes

2018-03-13 Thread mrp2pp
I hope the authors of https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-antievilmaid/blob/master/anti-evil-maid/README would say something here. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, se

Re: [qubes-users] vPro and Qubes

2018-03-13 Thread mrp2pp
Some Intel processors have Intel TXT without vPro. https://ark.intel.com/products/93339/Intel-Core-i7-6785R-Processor-8M-Cache-up-to-3_90-GHz And the GitHub page also says "http://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/09/07/anti-evil-maid.html (Note that this article is somewhat outdated, e.g. AEM uses I

Re: [qubes-users] vPro and Qubes

2016-11-16 Thread taii...@gmx.com
Intel ME (2006+ systems)/AMD PSP (for FM2/AM4), malicious firmware, exploits for the various devices on your system (the IOMMU is initialized too late on x86 to protect the host from DMA exploits in the pre-OS boot window) The sky truly is the limit. If you want *reasonably* secure computing y

Re: [qubes-users] vPro and Qubes

2016-11-16 Thread taii...@gmx.com
Accidentally sent before I was finished, didn't include: https://www.crowdsupply.com/raptorcs/talos - open source hardware, thus making it more difficult for unaccountable hardware backdoors (ME = software supported by hardware VS a true hardware backdoor) There are ARM devices like the Novena

Re: [qubes-users] vPro and Qubes

2016-11-19 Thread Andrew David Wong
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On 2016-11-16 00:03, nezna...@xy9ce.tk wrote: > If i have intel processor with the vPro technology - should i afraid some > "factory vulnerabilities" of that technology and some manipulation with my > BIOS. Or security of Qubes is higher of that le