Re: [ntp:questions] better rate limiting against amplification attacks?

2014-01-15 Thread David Woolley
On 27/12/13 10:24, Rob wrote: What is the NTP developers position on implementation of better rate limiting options in ntpd? There are more and more amplification attacks against ntp servers, similar to those against open DNS resolvers. A small packet sent with a spoofed source address

[ntp:questions] need option to ignore 'leap not in sync error'

2014-01-15 Thread Sanal, Arjun (NSN - IN/Bangalore)
Hi, I understand that whenever the server sets the Leap Indicator flag to 11 [not synchronized] the default behavior of ntp client is to reject the server time stamp. Is there any configuration option for ntpd by which I can make the ntp client to trust the server even in this case? -- Arjun

Re: [ntp:questions] better rate limiting against amplification attacks?

2014-01-15 Thread Steve Kostecke
On 2014-01-15, David Woolley wrote: On 27/12/13 10:24, Rob wrote: There are more and more amplification attacks against ntp servers, similar to those against open DNS resolvers. A small packet sent with a spoofed source address (allowed by a lame ISP) results in a large reply from ntpd,

Re: [ntp:questions] need option to ignore 'leap not in sync error'

2014-01-15 Thread David Taylor
On 14/01/2014 14:58, Sanal, Arjun (NSN - IN/Bangalore) wrote: Hi, I understand that whenever the server sets the Leap Indicator flag to 11 [not synchronized] the default behavior of ntp client is to reject the server time stamp. Is there any configuration option for ntpd by which I can make

Re: [ntp:questions] better rate limiting against amplification attacks?

2014-01-15 Thread William Unruh
On 2014-01-15, Steve Kostecke koste...@ntp.org wrote: On 2014-01-15, David Woolley wrote: On 27/12/13 10:24, Rob wrote: There are more and more amplification attacks against ntp servers, similar to those against open DNS resolvers. A small packet sent with a spoofed source address (allowed

Re: [ntp:questions] better rate limiting against amplification attacks?

2014-01-15 Thread Rob
William Unruh un...@invalid.ca wrote: On 2014-01-15, Steve Kostecke koste...@ntp.org wrote: On 2014-01-15, David Woolley wrote: On 27/12/13 10:24, Rob wrote: There are more and more amplification attacks against ntp servers, similar to those against open DNS resolvers. A small packet sent

Re: [ntp:questions] better rate limiting against amplification attacks?

2014-01-15 Thread Steve Kostecke
On 2014-01-15, Rob nom...@example.com wrote: William Unruh un...@invalid.ca wrote: On 2014-01-15, Steve Kostecke koste...@ntp.org wrote: On 2014-01-15, David Woolley wrote: CERT have just issued an alert about the monlist attack: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-013A (TA14-013A:

Re: [ntp:questions] How is the NTP build tested?

2014-01-15 Thread Jochen Bern
On 14.01.2014 18:53, William Unruh wrote: On 2014-01-14, Terje Mathisen terje.mathi...@tmsw.no wrote: The entire NTP ensemble, from the current machine and up to all its sources, constitute a distributed control loop, right? This means that the stability and eventual precision of any given

Re: [ntp:questions] better rate limiting against amplification attacks?

2014-01-15 Thread William Unruh
On 2014-01-15, Rob nom...@example.com wrote: William Unruh un...@invalid.ca wrote: On 2014-01-15, Steve Kostecke koste...@ntp.org wrote: On 2014-01-15, David Woolley wrote: On 27/12/13 10:24, Rob wrote: There are more and more amplification attacks against ntp servers, similar to those

Re: [ntp:questions] better rate limiting against amplification attacks?

2014-01-15 Thread Harlan Stenn
Rob writes: The default config shipped with ntpd, usually mostly provided by the distributor, is often terrible. (remember the LOCAL clock?) Yes, because there is no default configuration in the distribution. That is left to the vendor to provide, as they know more about their client base

Re: [ntp:questions] better rate limiting against amplification attacks?

2014-01-15 Thread Rob
William Unruh un...@invalid.ca wrote: On 2014-01-15, Rob nom...@example.com wrote: William Unruh un...@invalid.ca wrote: On 2014-01-15, Steve Kostecke koste...@ntp.org wrote: On 2014-01-15, David Woolley wrote: On 27/12/13 10:24, Rob wrote: There are more and more amplification attacks

Re: [ntp:questions] better rate limiting against amplification attacks?

2014-01-15 Thread Harlan Stenn
William Unruh writes: Why does nptd not disable external monitoring or command by default. That way if someone wants to allow it, they have to actively do so, presumably knowing what they are doing. Because there is clear value in the monitoring information being made generally available. We

Re: [ntp:questions] better rate limiting against amplification attacks?

2014-01-15 Thread Steve Kostecke
On 2014-01-15, Harlan Stenn st...@ntp.org wrote: Rob writes: The default config shipped with ntpd, usually mostly provided by the distributor, is often terrible. (remember the LOCAL clock?) Yes, because there is no default configuration in the distribution. That is left to the vendor to

Re: [ntp:questions] better rate limiting against amplification attacks?

2014-01-15 Thread Steve Kostecke
On 2014-01-15, Rob nom...@example.com wrote: William Unruh un...@invalid.ca wrote: I do not mean the default in the config file, I mean the default if there is no config file or if nothing is set in the config file. That only becomes meaningful when ntpd starts to actually work without

Re: [ntp:questions] better rate limiting against amplification attacks?

2014-01-15 Thread Rob
Steve Kostecke koste...@ntp.org wrote: On 2014-01-15, Rob nom...@example.com wrote: William Unruh un...@invalid.ca wrote: I do not mean the default in the config file, I mean the default if there is no config file or if nothing is set in the config file. That only becomes meaningful when

Re: [ntp:questions] better rate limiting against amplification attacks?

2014-01-15 Thread Harlan Stenn
William Unruh writes: I do not mean the default in the config file, I mean the default if there is no config file or if nothing is set in the config file. Then ntpd won't connect to anything and there will be no data to report. -- Harlan Stenn st...@ntp.org http://networktimefoundation.org -

Re: [ntp:questions] better rate limiting against amplification attacks?

2014-01-15 Thread William Unruh
On 2014-01-15, Harlan Stenn st...@ntp.org wrote: William Unruh writes: Why does nptd not disable external monitoring or command by default. That way if someone wants to allow it, they have to actively do so, presumably knowing what they are doing. Because there is clear value in the

Re: [ntp:questions] better rate limiting against amplification attacks?

2014-01-15 Thread William Unruh
On 2014-01-15, Harlan Stenn st...@ntp.org wrote: William Unruh writes: I do not mean the default in the config file, I mean the default if there is no config file or if nothing is set in the config file. Then ntpd won't connect to anything and there will be no data to report. That was why

Re: [ntp:questions] Determine from logfiles if PPS/NMEA was discarded?

2014-01-15 Thread Ralph Aichinger
Hal Murray hal-use...@ip-64-139-1-69.sjc.megapath.net wrote: Try something like: statsdir /var/log/ntp/ filegen protostats type day link That will get you things like: 56672 78792.947 PPS(0) 8054 84 reachable 56672 80327.947 GPS_NMEA(0) 80a3 83 unreachable 56672 80391.944 GPS_NMEA(0)

Re: [ntp:questions] better rate limiting against amplification attacks?

2014-01-15 Thread Greg Troxel
[invalid William has been trimmed from the cc list] Harlan Stenn st...@ntp.org writes: William Unruh writes: I do not mean the default in the config file, I mean the default if there is no config file or if nothing is set in the config file. Then ntpd won't connect to anything and there

Re: [ntp:questions] better rate limiting against amplification attacks?

2014-01-15 Thread Brian Utterback
On 1/15/2014 7:18 PM, Greg Troxel wrote: [invalid William has been trimmed from the cc list] Harlan Stenn st...@ntp.org writes: William Unruh writes: I do not mean the default in the config file, I mean the default if there is no config file or if nothing is set in the config file. Then

Re: [ntp:questions] better rate limiting against amplification attacks?

2014-01-15 Thread Greg Troxel
Brian Utterback brian.utterb...@oracle.com writes: On 1/15/2014 7:18 PM, Greg Troxel wrote: [invalid William has been trimmed from the cc list] Harlan Stenn st...@ntp.org writes: William Unruh writes: I do not mean the default in the config file, I mean the default if there is no config

Re: [ntp:questions] better rate limiting against amplification attacks?

2014-01-15 Thread Harlan Stenn
Bill, For me, your information/attitude ratio (similar to a sigal/noise ratio) skews towards trolldom enough that I often just don't bother responding to what you write. I would have sent this privately but I have no idea what your real email address is. H -- William Unruh writes: On

Re: [ntp:questions] better rate limiting against amplification attacks?

2014-01-15 Thread Harlan Stenn
Greg Troxel writes: Harlan Stenn st...@ntp.org writes: William Unruh writes: I do not mean the default in the config file, I mean the default if there is no config file or if nothing is set in the config file. Then ntpd won't connect to anything and there will be no data to report.

Re: [ntp:questions] need option to ignore 'leap not in sync error'

2014-01-15 Thread Sanal, Arjun (NSN - IN/Bangalore)
On 14/01/2014 14:58, Sanal, Arjun (NSN - IN/Bangalore) wrote: Hi, I understand that whenever the server sets the Leap Indicator flag to 11 [not synchronized] the default behavior of ntp client is to reject the server time stamp. Is there any configuration option for ntpd by which I can