Re: New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-06 Thread Adrian Bunk
On Sat, Apr 06, 2024 at 03:54:51PM +0200, kpcyrd wrote: >... > autotools pre-processed source code is clearly not "the preferred form of > the work for making modifications", which is specifically what I'm saying > Debian shouldn't consider a "source code input" either, to eliminate this > vector

Re: New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-06 Thread Adrian Bunk
On Sat, Apr 06, 2024 at 07:13:22PM +0800, Sean Whitton wrote: > Hello, > > On Fri 05 Apr 2024 at 01:31am +03, Adrian Bunk wrote: > > > > > Right now the preferred form of source in Debian is an upstream-signed > > release tarball, NOT anything from git. > >

Re: New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-04 Thread Adrian Bunk
On Fri, Apr 05, 2024 at 01:30:51AM +0200, kpcyrd wrote: > On 4/5/24 12:31 AM, Adrian Bunk wrote: > > Hashes of "git archive" tarballs are anyway not stable, > > so whatever a maintainer generates is not worse than what is on Github. > > > > An

Re: New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-04 Thread Adrian Bunk
On Thu, Apr 04, 2024 at 09:39:51PM +0200, kpcyrd wrote: >... > I've checked both, upstreams github release page and their website[1], but > couldn't find any mention of .tar.xz, so I think my claim of Debian doing > the compression is fair. > > [1]: https://www.vim.org/download.php >... Perhaps

Re: New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-02 Thread Adrian Bunk
On Wed, Apr 03, 2024 at 02:31:11AM +0200, kpcyrd wrote: >... > I figured out a somewhat straight-forward way to check if a given `git > archive` output is cryptographically claimed to be the source input of a > given binary package in either Arch Linux or Debian (or both). For Debian the proper