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Scusate. Sbagliato soggetto. Ecco di nuovo lo stesso articolo e commento.

--
Importante articolo sul new york times sul filosofo egiziano che ha insiprato la
rinascita del pensiero (fondamentalista? qualcuno  disputa il senso della
catgoria per cio' che concerne l'islam) pensiero islamico nell'ultimo secolo.
Ideologo della muslim brotherood egiziana, e' diventato punto di rifermiemnto
per Al Queda.
La potenza di questo pensiero mi ha colpito cosi' come ha colpito il
commentatore. Sembra quasi un hegel del ventesimo secolo. Ed intendo questo
parallelo in senso forte, mettendo un accento su quanto di reazionario c'e'
nell'utopia conservatrice di Hegel.
Unica cosa certa e' che i trascendentali quali bene e male che informano il
pensiero alla wolfowitz sembrano un giochetto da asilo infantile a confronto.
Gli imbecilli alla wolfowitz e tutti coloro che pensano di poter esportare i
valori liberali promossi dalla democrazia occidentale manu militari in un mondo
che non condivide i presupposti culturali sono destinati ad un amaro risveglio.
Tutto cio' mi fa pensare che la risposta politico-filosofica ad un pensiero di
questa magnitudine non possa che venire dal movimento e dalla tradizione
materialista occidentale, spinoza in primis. Le nostre elites con il loro
manichesimo afasico non ne hanno la capacita'.

Il problema e' finalmente posto. 
Buona lettura.





--------------------
The Philosopher of Islamic Terror
By PAUL BERMAN

I In the days after Sept. 11, 2001, many people anticipated a quick and
satisfying American victory over Al Qaeda. The terrorist army was thought to be
no bigger than a pirate ship, and the newly vigilant police forces of the entire
world were going to sink the ship with swift arrests and dark maneuvers. Al
Qaeda was driven from its bases in Afghanistan. Arrests and maneuvers duly
occurred and are still occurring. Just this month, one of Osama bin Laden's top
lieutenants was nabbed in Pakistan. Police agents, as I write, seem to be hot on

the trail of bin Laden himself, or so reports suggest.
Advertisement


Yet Al Qaeda has seemed unfazed. Its popularity, which was hard to imagine at
first, has turned out to be large and genuine in more than a few countries. Al
Qaeda upholds a paranoid and apocalyptic worldview, according to which
''Crusaders and Zionists'' have been conspiring for centuries to destroy Islam.
And this worldview turns out to be widely accepted in many places -- a worldview
that allowed many millions of people to regard the Sept. 11 attacks as an
Israeli conspiracy, or perhaps a C.I.A. conspiracy, to undo Islam. Bin Laden's
soulful, bearded face peers out from T-shirts and posters in a number of
countries, quite as if he were the new Che Guevara, the mythic righter of cosmic
wrongs.

The vigilant police in many countries, applying themselves at last, have raided
a number of Muslim charities and Islamic banks, which stand accused of
subsidizing the terrorists. These raids have advanced the war on still another
front, which has been good to see. But the raids have also shown that Al Qaeda
is not only popular; it is also institutionally solid, with a worldwide network
of clandestine resources. This is not the Symbionese Liberation Army. This is an
organization with ties to the ruling elites in a number of countries; an
organization that, were it given the chance to strike up an alliance with Saddam
Hussein's Baath movement, would be doubly terrifying; an organization that, in
any case, will surely survive the outcome in Iraq.

To anyone who has looked closely enough, Al Qaeda and its sister organizations
plainly enjoy yet another strength, arguably the greatest strength of all,
something truly imposing -- though in the Western press this final strength has
received very little attention. Bin Laden is a Saudi plutocrat with Yemeni
ancestors, and most of the suicide warriors of Sept. 11 were likewise Saudis,
and the provenance of those people has focused everyone's attention on the
Arabian peninsula. But Al Qaeda has broader roots. The organization was created
in the late 1980's by an affiliation of three armed factions -- bin Laden's
circle of ''Afghan'' Arabs, together with two factions from Egypt, the Islamic
Group and Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the latter led by Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al
Qaeda's top theoretician. The Egyptian factions emerged from an older current, a
school of thought from within Egypt's fundamentalist movement, the Muslim
Brotherhood, in the 1950's and 60's. And at the heart of that single school of
thought stood, until his execution in 1966, a philosopher named Sayyid Qutb --
the intellectual hero of every one of the groups that eventually went into Al
Qaeda, their Karl Marx (to put it that way), their guide.

Qutb (pronounced KUH-tahb) wrote a book called ''Milestones,'' and that book was
cited at his trial, which gave it immense publicity, especially after its author
was hanged. ''Milestones'' became a classic manifesto of the terrorist wing of
Islamic fundamentalism. A number of journalists have dutifully turned the pages
of ''Milestones,'' trying to decipher the otherwise inscrutable terrorist point
of view.

I have been reading some of Qutb's other books, and I think that ''Milestones''
may have misled the journalists. ''Milestones'' is a fairly shallow book, judged
in isolation. But ''Milestones'' was drawn from his vast commentary on the Koran
called ''In the Shade of the Qur'an.'' One of the many volumes of this giant
work was translated into English in the 1970's and published by the World
Assembly of Muslim Youth, an organization later widely suspected of
participation in terrorist attacks -- and an organization whose Washington
office was run by a brother of bin Laden's. In the last four years a big effort
has been mounted by another organization, the Islamic Foundation in England, to
bring out the rest, in what will eventually be an edition of 15 fat
English-language volumes, handsomely ornamented with Arabic script from the
Koran. Just in these past few weeks a number of new volumes in this edition have
made their way into the Arab bookshops of Brooklyn, and I have gobbled them up.
By now I have made my way through a little less than half of ''In the Shade of
the Qur'an,'' which I think is all that exists so far in English, together with
three other books by Qutb. And I have something to report.

Qutb is not shallow. Qutb is deep. ''In the Shade of the Qur'an'' is, in its
fashion, a masterwork. Al Qaeda and its sister organizations are not merely
popular, wealthy, global, well connected and institutionally sophisticated.
These groups stand on a set of ideas too, and some of those ideas may be
pathological, which is an old story in modern politics; yet even so, the ideas
are powerful. We should have known that, of course. But we should have known
many things.

II Qutb's special ability as a writer came from the fact that, as a young boy,
he received a traditional Muslim education -- he committed the Koran to memory
by the age of 10 -- yet he went on, at a college in Cairo, to receive a modern,
secular education. He was born in 1906, and in the 1920's and 30's he took up
socialism and literature. He wrote novels, poems and a book that is still said
to be well regarded called ''Literary Criticism: Its Principles and
Methodology.'' His writings reflected -- here I quote one of his admirers and
translators, Hamid Algar of the University of California at Berkeley -- a
''Western-tinged outlook on cultural and literary questions.'' Qutb displayed
''traces of individualism and existentialism.'' He even traveled to the United
States in the late 1940's, enrolled at the Colorado State College of Education
and earned a master's degree. In some of the accounts of Qutb's life, this trip
to America is pictured as a ghastly trauma, mostly because of America's sexual
freedoms, which sent him reeling back to Egypt in a mood of hatred and fear.

I am skeptical of that interpretation, though. His book from the 1940's,
''Social Justice and Islam,'' shows that, even before his voyage to America, he
was pretty well set in his Islamic fundamentalism. It is true that, after his
return to Egypt, he veered into ever more radical directions. But in the early
1950's, everyone in Egypt was veering in radical directions. Gamal Abdel Nasser
and a group of nationalist army officers overthrew the old king in 1952 and
launched a nationalist revolution on Pan-Arabist grounds. And, as the
Pan-Arabists went about promoting their revolution, Sayyid Qutb went about
promoting his own, somewhat different revolution. His idea was ''Islamist.'' He
wanted to turn Islam into a political movement to create a new society, to be
based on ancient Koranic principles. Qutb joined the Muslim Brotherhood, became
the editor of its journal and established himself right away as Islamism's
principal theoretician in the Arab world.

The Islamists and the Pan-Arabists tried to cooperate with one another in Egypt
in those days, and there was some basis for doing so. Both movements dreamed of
rescuing the Arab world from the legacies of European imperialism. Both groups
dreamed of crushing Zionism and the brand-new Jewish state. Both groups dreamed
of fashioning a new kind of modernity, which was not going to be liberal and
freethinking in the Western style but, even so, was going to be up-to-date on
economic and scientific issues. And both movements dreamed of doing all this by
returning in some fashion to the glories of the Arab past. Both movements wanted
to resurrect, in a modern version, the ancient Islamic caliphate of the seventh
century, when the Arabs were conquering the world.

The Islamists and the Pan-Arabists could be compared, in these ambitions, with
the Italian Fascists of Mussolini's time, who wanted to resurrect the Roman
Empire, and to the Nazis, who likewise wanted to resurrect ancient Rome, except
in a German version. The most radical of the Pan-Arabists openly admired the
Nazis and pictured their proposed new caliphate as a racial victory of the Arabs
over all other ethnic groups. Qutb and the Islamists, by way of contrast,
pictured the resurrected caliphate as a theocracy, strictly enforcing shariah,
the legal code of the Koran. The Islamists and the Pan-Arabists had their
similarities then, and their differences. (And today those two movements still
have their similarities and differences -- as shown by bin Laden's Qaeda, which
represents the most violent wing of Islamism, and Saddam Hussein's Baath Party,
which represents the most violent wing of Pan-Arabism.)

In 1952, in the days before staging his coup d'etat, Colonel Nasser is said to
have paid a visit to Qutb at his home, presumably to get his backing. Some
people expected that, after taking power, Nasser would appoint Qutb to be the
new revolutionary minister of education. But once the Pan-Arabists had thrown
out the old king, the differences between the two movements began to overwhelm
the similarities, and Qutb was not appointed. Instead, Nasser cracked down on
the Muslim Brotherhood, and after someone tried to assassinate him, he blamed
the Brotherhood and cracked down even harder. Some of the Muslim Brotherhood's
most distinguished intellectuals and theologians escaped into exile. Sayyid
Qutb's brother, Muhammad Qutb, was one of those people. He fled to Saudi Arabia
and ended up as a distinguished Saudi professor of Islamic Studies. Many years
later, Osama bin Laden would be one of Muhammad Qutb's students.

But Sayyid Qutb stayed put and paid dearly for his stubbornness. Nasser jailed
him in 1954, briefly released him, jailed him again for 10 years, released him
for a few months and finally hanged him in 1966. Conditions during the first
years of prison were especially bad. Qutb was tortured. Even in better times,
according to his followers, he was locked in a ward with 40 people, most of them
criminals, with a tape recorder broadcasting the speeches of Nasser 20 hours a
day. Still, by smuggling papers in and out of jail, he managed to continue with
his writings, no longer in the ''Western tinged'' vein of his early, literary
days but now as a full-fledged Islamist revolutionary. And somehow, he produced
his ''In the Shade of the Qur'an,'' this gigantic study, which must surely count
as one of the most remarkable works of prison literature ever produced.

Readers without a Muslim education who try to make their way unaided through the
Koran tend to find it, as I have, a little dry and forbidding. But Qutb's
commentaries are not at all like that. He quotes passages from the chapters, or
suras, of the Koran, and he pores over the quoted passages, observing the
prosodic qualities of the text, the rhythm, tone and musicality of the words,
sometimes the images. The suras lead him to discuss dietary regulations, the
proper direction to pray, the rules of divorce, the question of when a man may
propose marriage to a widow (four months and 10 days after the death of her
husband, unless she is pregnant, in which case after delivery), the rules
concerning a Muslim man who wishes to marry a Christian or a Jew (very
complicated), the obligations of charity, the punishment for crimes and for
breaking your word, the prohibition on liquor and intoxicants, the proper
clothing to wear, the rules on usury, moneylending and a thousand other themes.

The Koran tells stories, and Qutb recounts some of these and remarks on their
wisdom and significance. His tone is always lucid and plain. Yet the total
effect of his writing is almost sensual in its measured pace. The very title
''In the Shade of the Qur'an'' conveys a vivid desert image, as if the Koran
were a leafy palm tree, and we have only to open Qutb's pages to escape the hot
sun and refresh ourselves in the shade. As he makes his way through the suras
and proposes his other commentaries, he slowly constructs an enormous
theological criticism of modern life, and not just in Egypt.

III Qutb wrote that, all over the world, humans had reached a moment of
unbearable crisis. The human race had lost touch with human nature. Man's
inspiration, intelligence and morality were degenerating. Sexual relations were
deteriorating ''to a level lower than the beasts.'' Man was miserable, anxious
and skeptical, sinking into idiocy, insanity and crime. People were turning, in
their unhappiness, to drugs, alcohol and existentialism. Qutb admired economic
productivity and scientific knowledge. But he did not think that wealth and
science were rescuing the human race. He figured that, on the contrary, the
richest countries were the unhappiest of all. And what was the cause of this
unhappiness -- this wretched split between man's truest nature and modern life?

A great many cultural critics in Europe and America asked this question in the
middle years of the 20th century, and a great many of them, following Nietzsche
and other philosophers, pointed to the origins of Western civilization in
ancient Greece, where man was said to have made his fatal error. This error was
philosophical. It consisted of placing an arrogant and deluded faith in the
power of human reason -- an arrogant faith that, after many centuries, had
created in modern times a tyranny of technology over life.

Qutb shared that analysis, somewhat. Only instead of locating the error in
ancient Greece, he located it in ancient Jerusalem. In the Muslim fashion, Qutb
looked on the teachings of Judaism as being divinely revealed by God to Moses
and the other prophets. Judaism instructed man to worship one God and to
forswear all others. Judaism instructed man on how to behave in every sphere of
life -- how to live a worldly existence that was also a life at one with God.
This could be done by obeying a system of divinely mandated laws, the code of
Moses. In Qutb's view, however, Judaism withered into what he called ''a system
of rigid and lifeless ritual.''

God sent another prophet, though. That prophet, in Qutb's Muslim way of
thinking, was Jesus, who proposed a few useful reforms -- lifting some no-longer
necessary restrictions in the Jewish dietary code, for example -- and also an
admirable new spirituality. But something terrible occurred. The relation
between Jesus' followers and the Jews took, in Qutb's view, ''a deplorable
course.'' Jesus' followers squabbled with the old-line Jews, and amid the mutual
recriminations, Jesus' message ended up being diluted and even perverted. Jesus'
disciples and followers were persecuted, which meant that, in their sufferings,
the disciples were never able to provide an adequate or systematic exposition of
Jesus' message.

Who but Sayyid Qutb, from his miserable prison in Nasser's Egypt, could have
zeroed in so plausibly on the difficulties encountered by Jesus' disciples in
getting out the word? Qutb figured that, as a result, the Christian Gospels were
badly garbled, and should not be regarded as accurate or reliable. The Gospels
declared Jesus to be divine, but in Qutb's Muslim account, Jesus was a mere
human -- a prophet of God, not a messiah. The larger catastrophe, however, was
this: Jesus' disciples, owing to what Qutb called ''this unpleasant separation
of the two parties,'' went too far in rejecting the Jewish teachings.

Jesus' disciples and followers, the Christians, emphasized Jesus' divine message
of spirituality and love. But they rejected Judaism's legal system, the code of
Moses, which regulated every jot and tittle of daily life. Instead, the early
Christians imported into Christianity the philosophy of the Greeks -- the belief
in a spiritual existence completely separate from physical life, a zone of pure
spirit.

In the fourth century of the Christian era, Emperor Constantine converted the
Roman Empire to Christianity. But Constantine, in Qutb's interpretation, did
this in a spirit of pagan hypocrisy, dominated by scenes of wantonness,
half-naked girls, gems and precious metals. Christianity, having abandoned the
Mosaic code, could put up no defense. And so, in their horror at Roman morals,
the Christians did as best they could and countered the imperial debaucheries
with a cult of monastic asceticism.

But this was no good at all. Monastic asceticism stands at odds with the
physical quality of human nature. In this manner, in Qutb's view, Christianity
lost touch with the physical world. The old code of Moses, with its laws for
diet, dress, marriage, sex and everything else, had enfolded the divine and the
worldly into a single concept, which was the worship of God. But Christianity
divided these things into two, the sacred and the secular. Christianity said,
''Render unto Caesar what is Caesar's and unto God what is God's.'' Christianity
put the physical world in one corner and the spiritual world in another corner:
Constantine's debauches over here, monastic renunciation over there. In Qutb's
view there was a ''hideous schizophrenia'' in this approach to life. And things
got worse.

A series of Christian religious councils adopted what Qutb thought to be
irrational principles on Christianity's behalf -- principles regarding the
nature of Jesus, the Eucharist, transubstantiation and other questions, all of
which were, in Qutb's view, ''absolutely incomprehensible, inconceivable and
incredible.'' Church teachings froze the irrational principles into dogma. And
then the ultimate crisis struck.

IV Qutb's story now shifts to Arabia. In the seventh century, God delivered a
new revelation to his prophet Muhammad, who established the correct,
nondistorted relation to human nature that had always eluded the Christians.
Muhammad dictated a strict new legal code, which put religion once more at ease
in the physical world, except in a better way than ever before. Muhammad's
prophecies, in the Koran, instructed man to be God's ''vice regent'' on earth --
to take charge of the physical world, and not simply to see it as something
alien to spirituality or as a way station on the road to a Christian afterlife.
Muslim scientists in the Middle Ages took this instruction seriously and went
about inquiring into the nature of physical reality. And, in the Islamic
universities of Andalusia and the East, the Muslim scientists, deepening their
inquiry, hit upon the inductive or scientific method -- which opened the door to
all further scientific and technological progress. In this and many other ways,
Islam seized the leadership of mankind. Unfortunately, the Muslims came under
attack from Crusaders, Mongols and other enemies. And, because the Muslims
proved not faithful enough to Muhammad's revelations, they were unable to fend
off these attacks. They were unable to capitalize on their brilliant discovery
of the scientific method.

The Muslim discoveries were exported instead into Christian Europe. And there,
in Europe in the 16th century, Islam's scientific method began to generate
results, and modern science emerged. But Christianity, with its insistence on
putting the physical world and the spiritual world in different corners, could
not cope with scientific progress. And so Christianity's inability to
acknowledge or respect the physical quality of daily life spread into the realm
of culture and shaped society's attitude toward science.

As Qutb saw it, Europeans, under Christianity's influence, began to picture God
on one side and science on the other. Religion over here; intellectual inquiry
over there. On one side, the natural human yearning for God and for a divinely
ordered life; on the other side, the natural human desire for knowledge of the
physical universe. The church against science; the scientists against the
church. Everything that Islam knew to be one, the Christian Church divided into
two. And, under these terrible pressures, the European mind split finally
asunder. The break became total. Christianity, over here; atheism, over there.
It was the fateful divorce between the sacred and the secular.

Europe's scientific and technical achievements allowed the Europeans to dominate
the world. And the Europeans inflicted their ''hideous schizophrenia'' on
peoples and cultures in every corner of the globe. That was the origin of modern
misery -- the anxiety in contemporary society, the sense of drift, the
purposelessness, the craving for false pleasures. The crisis of modern life was
felt by every thinking person in the Christian West. But then again, Europe's
leadership of mankind inflicted that crisis on every thinking person in the
Muslim world as well. Here Qutb was on to something original. The Christians of
the West underwent the crisis of modern life as a consequence, he thought, of
their own theological tradition -- a result of nearly 2,000 years of
ecclesiastical error. But in Qutb's account, the Muslims had to undergo that
same experience because it had been imposed on them by Christians from abroad,
which could only make the experience doubly painful -- an alienation that was
also a humiliation.

That was Qutb's analysis. In writing about modern life, he put his finger on
something that every thinking person can recognize, if only vaguely -- the
feeling that human nature and modern life are somehow at odds. But Qutb evoked
this feeling in a specifically Muslim fashion. It is easy to imagine that, in
expounding on these themes back in the 1950's and 60's, Qutb had already
identified the kind of personal agony that Mohamed Atta and the suicide warriors
of Sept. 11 must have experienced in our own time. It was the agony of
inhabiting a modern world of liberal ideas and achievements while feeling that
true life exists somewhere else. It was the agony of walking down a modern
sidewalk while dreaming of a different universe altogether, located in the
Koranic past -- the agony of being pulled this way and that. The present, the
past. The secular, the sacred. The freely chosen, the religiously mandated -- a
life of confusion unto madness brought on, Qutb ventured, by Christian error.


Sitting in a wretched Egyptian prison, surrounded by criminals and composing his
Koranic commentaries with Nasser's speeches blaring in the background on the
infuriating tape recorder, Qutb knew whom to blame. He blamed the early
Christians. He blamed Christianity's modern legacy, which was the liberal idea
that religion should stay in one corner and secular life in another corner. He
blamed the Jews. In his interpretation, the Jews had shown themselves to be
eternally ungrateful to God. Early in their history, during their Egyptian
captivity (Qutb thought he knew a thing or two about Egyptian captivity), the
Jews acquired a slavish character, he believed. As a result they became craven
and unprincipled when powerless, and vicious and arrogant when powerful. And
these traits were eternal. The Jews occupy huge portions of Qutb's Koranic
commentary -- their perfidy, greed, hatefulness, diabolical impulses,
never-ending conspiracies and plots against Muhammad and Islam. Qutb was
relentless on these themes. He looked on Zionism as part of the eternal campaign
by the Jews to destroy Islam.

And Qutb blamed one other party. He blamed the Muslims who had gone along with
Christianity's errors -- the treacherous Muslims who had inflicted
Christianity's ''schizophrenia'' on the world of Islam. And, because he was
willing to blame, Qutb was able to recommend a course of action too -- a
revolutionary program that was going to relieve the psychological pressure of
modern life and was going to put man at ease with the natural world and with God.

v Qutb's analysis was soulful and heartfelt. It was a theological analysis, but
in its cultural emphases, it reflected the style of 20th-century philosophy. The
analysis asked some genuinely perplexing questions -- about the division between
mind and body in Western thought; about the difficulties in striking a balance
between sensual experience and spiritual elevation; about the steely
impersonality of modern power and technological innovation; about social
injustice. But, though Qutb plainly followed some main trends of 20th-century
Western social criticism and philosophy, he poured his ideas through a filter of
Koranic commentary, and the filter gave his commentary a grainy new texture,
authentically Muslim, which allowed him to make a series of points that no
Western thinker was likely to propose.

One of those points had to do with women's role in society -- and these passages
in his writings have been misinterpreted, I think, in some of the Western
commentaries on Qutb. His attitude was prudish in the extreme, judged from a
Western perspective of today. But prudishness was not his motivation. He
understood quite clearly that, in a liberal society, women were free to consult
their own hearts and to pursue careers in quest of material wealth. But from his
point of view, this could only mean that women had shucked their responsibility
to shape the human character, through child-rearing. The Western notion of
women's freedom could only mean that God and the natural order of life had been
set aside in favor of a belief in other sources of authority, like one's own heart.

But what did it mean to recognize the existence of more than one source of
authority? It meant paganism -- a backward step, into the heathen primitivism of
the past. It meant life without reference to God -- a life with no prospect of
being satisfactory or fulfilling. And why had the liberal societies of the West
lost sight of the natural harmony of gender roles and of women's place in the
family and the home? This was because of the ''hideous schizophrenia'' of modern
life -- the Western outlook that led people to picture God's domain in one place

and the ordinary business of daily life in some other place.

Qutb wrote bitterly about European imperialism, which he regarded as nothing
more than a continuation of the medieval Crusades against Islam. He denounced
American foreign policy. He complained about America's decision in the time of
Harry Truman to support the Zionists, a strange decision that he attributed, in
part, to America's loss of moral values. But I must point out that, in Qutb's
writings, at least in the many volumes that I have read, the complaints about
American policy are relatively few and fleeting. International politics was
simply not his main concern. Sometimes he complained about the hypocrisy in
America's endless boasts about freedom and democracy. He mentioned America's
extermination of its Indian population. He noted the racial prejudice against
blacks. But those were not Qutb's themes, finally. American hypocrisy exercised
him, but only slightly. His deepest quarrel was not with America's failure to
uphold its principles. His quarrel was with the principles. He opposed the
United States because it was a liberal society, not because the United States
failed to be a liberal society.

The truly dangerous element in American life, in his estimation, was not
capitalism or foreign policy or racism or the unfortunate cult of women's
independence. The truly dangerous element lay in America's separation of church
and state -- the modern political legacy of Christianity's ancient division
between the sacred and the secular. This was not a political criticism. This was
theological -- though Qutb, or perhaps his translators, preferred the word
''ideological.''

The conflict between the Western liberal countries and the world of Islam, he
explained, ''remains in essence one of ideology, although over the years it has
appeared in various guises and has grown more sophisticated and, at times, more
insidious.'' The sophisticated and insidious disguises tended to be worldly -- a
camouflage that was intended to make the conflict appear to be economic,
political or military, and that was intended to make Muslims like himself who
insisted on speaking about religion appear to be, in his words, ''fanatics'' and
''backward people.''

''But in reality,'' he explained, ''the confrontation is not over control of
territory or economic resources, or for military domination. If we believed
that, we would play into our enemies' hands and would have no one but ourselves
to blame for the consequences.''

The true confrontation, the deepest confrontation of all, was over Islam and
nothing but Islam. Religion was the issue. Qutb could hardly be clearer on this
topic. The confrontation arose from the effort by Crusaders and world Zionism to
annihilate Islam. The Crusaders and Zionists knew that Christianity and Judaism
were inferior to Islam and had led to lives of misery. They needed to annihilate
Islam in order to rescue their own doctrines from extinction. And so the
Crusaders and Zionists went on the attack.

But this attack was not, at bottom, military. At least Qutb did not devote his
energies to warning against such a danger. Nor did he spend much time worrying
about the ins and outs of Israel's struggle with the Palestinians. Border
disputes did not concern him. He was focused on something cosmically larger. He
worried, instead, that people with liberal ideas were mounting a gigantic
campaign against Islam -- ''an effort to confine Islam to the emotional and
ritual circles, and to bar it from participating in the activity of life, and to
check its complete predominance over every human secular activity, a
pre-eminence it earns by virtue of its nature and function.''

He trembled with rage at that effort. And he cited good historical evidence for
his trembling rage. Turkey, an authentic Muslim country, had embraced secular
ideas back in 1924. Turkey's revolutionary leader at that time, Kemal Ataturk,
abolished the institutional remnants of the ancient caliphate -- the caliphate
that Qutb so fervently wanted to resurrect. The Turks in this fashion had tried
to abolish the very idea and memory of an Islamic state. Qutb worried that, if
secular reformers in other Muslim countries had any success, Islam was going to
be pushed into a corner, separate from the state. True Islam was going to end up
as partial Islam. But partial Islam, in his view, did not exist.

The secular reformers were already at work, throughout the Muslim world. They
were mounting their offensive -- ''a final offensive which is actually taking
place now in all the Muslim countries. . . . It is an effort to exterminate this
religion as even a basic creed and to replace it with secular conceptions having
their own implications, values, institutions and organizations.''

''To exterminate'' -- that was Qutb's phrase. Hysteria cried out from every
syllable. But he did not want to be hysterical. He wanted to respond. How?

VI That one question dominated Qutb's life. It was a theological question, and
he answered it with his volumes on the Koran. But he intended his theology to be
practical too -- to offer a revolutionary program to save mankind. The first
step was to open people's eyes. He wanted Muslims to recognize the nature of the
danger -- to recognize that Islam had come under assault from outside the Muslim
world and also from inside the Muslim world. The assault from outside was led by
Crusaders and world Zionism (though sometimes he also mentioned Communism).

But the assault from inside was conducted by Muslims themselves -- that is, by
people who called themselves Muslims but who polluted the Muslim world with
incompatible ideas derived from elsewhere. These several enemies, internal and
external, the false Muslims together with the Crusaders and Zionists, ruled the
earth. But Qutb considered that Islam's strength was, even so, huger yet. ''We
are certain,'' he wrote, ''that this religion of Islam is so intrinsically
genuine, so colossal and deeply rooted that all such efforts and brutal
concussions will avail nothing.''

Islam's apparent weakness was mere appearance. Islam's true champions seemed to
be few, but numbers meant nothing. The few had to gather themselves together
into what Qutb in ''Milestones'' called a vanguard -- a term that he must have
borrowed from Lenin, though Qutb had in mind a tiny group animated by the spirit
of Muhammad and his Companions from the dawn of Islam. This vanguard of true
Muslims was going to undertake the renovation of Islam and of civilization all
over the world. The vanguard was going to turn against the false Muslims and
''hypocrites'' and do as Muhammad had done, which was to found a new state,
based on the Koran. And from there, the vanguard was going to resurrect the
caliphate and take Islam to all the world, just as Muhammad had done.

Qutb's vanguard was going to reinstate shariah, the Muslim code, as the legal
code for all of society. Shariah implied some fairly severe rules. Qutb cited
the Koran on the punishments for killing or wounding: ''a life for a life, an
eye for an eye, a nose for a nose, an ear for an ear.'' Fornication, too, was a
serious crime because, in his words, ''it involves an attack on honor and a
contempt for sanctity and an encouragement of profligacy in society.'' Shariah
specified the punishments here as well. ''The penalty for this must be severe;
for married men and women it is stoning to death; for unmarried men and women it
is flogging, a hundred lashes, which in cases is fatal.'' False accusations were
likewise serious. ''A punishment of 80 lashes is fixed for those who falsely
accuse chaste women.'' As for those who threaten the general security of
society, their punishment is to be put to death, to be crucified, to have their
hands and feet cut off, or to be banished from the country.''

But Qutb refused to regard these punishments as barbarous or primitive. Shariah,
in his view, meant liberation. Other societies, drawing on non-Koranic
principles, forced people to obey haughty masters and man-made law. Those other
societies forced people to worship their own rulers and to do as the rulers said
-- even if the rulers were democratically chosen. Under shariah, no one was
going to be forced to obey mere humans. Shariah, in Qutb's view, meant ''the
abolition of man-made laws.'' In the resurrected caliphate, every person was
going to be ''free from servitude to others.'' The true Islamic system meant
''the complete and true freedom of every person and the full dignity of every
individual of the society. On the other hand, in a society in which some people
are lords who legislate and some others are slaves who obey, then there is no
freedom in the real sense, nor dignity for each and every individual.''

He insisted that shariah meant freedom of conscience -- though freedom of
conscience, in his interpretation, meant freedom from false doctrines that
failed to recognize God, freedom from the modern schizophrenia. Shariah, in a
word, was utopia for Sayyid Qutb. It was perfection. It was the natural order in
the universal. It was freedom, justice, humanity and divinity in a single
system. It was a vision as grand or grander than Communism or any of the other
totalitarian doctrines of the 20th century. It was, in his words, ''the total
liberation of man from enslavement by others.'' It was an impossible vision -- a
vision that was plainly going to require a total dictatorship in order to
enforce: a vision that, by claiming not to rely on man-made laws, was going to
have to rely, instead, on theocrats, who would interpret God's laws to the
masses. The most extreme despotism was all too visible in Qutb's revolutionary
program. That much should have been obvious to anyone who knew the history of
the other grand totalitarian revolutionary projects of the 20th century, the
projects of the Nazis, the Fascists and the Communists.

Still, for Qutb, utopia was not the main thing. Utopia was for the future, and
Qutb was not a dreamer. Islam, in his interpretation, was a way of life. He
wanted his Muslim vanguard to live according to pious Islamic principles in the
here and now. He wanted the vanguard to observe the rules of Muslim charity and
all the other rules of daily life. He wanted the true Muslims to engage in a
lifelong study of the Koran -- the lifelong study that his own gigantic
commentary was designed to enhance. But most of all, he wanted his vanguard to
accept the obligations of ''jihad,'' which is to say, the struggle for Islam.
And what would that mean, to engage in jihad in the present and not just in the
sci-fi utopian future?

Qutb began Volume 1 of ''In the Shade of the Qur'an'' by saying: ''To live 'in
the shade of the Qur'an' is a great blessing which can only be fully appreciated
by those who experience it. It is a rich experience that gives meaning to life
and makes it worth living. I am deeply thankful to God Almighty for blessing me
with this uplifting experience for a considerable time, which was the happiest
and most fruitful period of my life -- a privilege for which I am eternally
grateful.''

He does not identify that happy and fruitful period of his life -- a period that
lasted, as he says, a considerable time. Perhaps his brother and other intimates
would have known exactly what he had in mind -- some very pleasant period,
conceivably the childhood years when he was memorizing the Koran. But an
ordinary reader who picks up Qutb's books can only imagine that he was writing
about his years of torture and prison.

One of his Indian publishers has highlighted this point in a remarkably gruesome
manner by attaching an unsigned preface to a 1998 edition of ''Milestones.'' The
preface declares: ''The ultimate price for working to please God Almighty and to
propagate his ways in this world is often one's own life. The author'' -- Qutb,
that is -- ''tried to do it; he paid for it with his life. If you and I try to
do it, there is every likelihood we will be called upon to do the same. But for
those who truly believe in God, what other choice is there?''

You are meant to suppose that a true reader of Sayyid Qutb is someone who, in
the degree that he properly digests Qutb's message, will act on what has been
digested. And action may well bring on a martyr's death. To read is to glide
forward toward death; and gliding toward death means you have understood what
you are reading. Qutb's writings do vibrate to that morbid tone -- not always,
but sometimes. The work that he left behind, his Koranic commentary, is vast,
vividly written, wise, broad, indignant, sometimes demented, bristly with
hatred, medieval, modern, tolerant, intolerant, paranoid, cruel, urgent, cranky,
tranquil, grave, poetic, learned and analytic. Sometimes it is moving. It is a
work large and solid enough to create its own shade, where Qutb's vanguard and
other readers could repose and turn his pages, as he advised the students of the
Koran to do, in the earnest spirit of loyal soldiers reading their daily
bulletin. But there is, in this commentary, something otherworldly too -- an
atmosphere of death. At the very least, it is impossible to read the work
without remembering that, in 1966, Qutb, in the phrase of one of his
biographers, ''kissed the gallows.''

Martyrdom was among his themes. He discusses passages in the Koran's sura ''The
Cow,'' and he explains that death as a martyr is nothing to fear. Yes, some
people will have to be sacrificed. ''Those who risk their lives and go out to
fight, and who are prepared to lay down their lives for the cause of God are
honorable people, pure of heart and blessed of soul. But the great surprise is
that those among them who are killed in the struggle must not be considered or
described as dead. They continue to live, as God Himself clearly states.''

Qutb wrote: ''To all intents and purposes, those people may very well appear
lifeless, but life and death are not judged by superficial physical means alone.
Life is chiefly characterized by activity, growth and persistence, while death
is a state of total loss of function, of complete inertia and lifelessness. But
the death of those who are killed for the cause of God gives more impetus to the
cause, which continues to thrive on their blood. Their influence on those they
leave behind also grows and spreads. Thus after their death they remain an
active force in shaping the life of their community and giving it direction. It
is in this sense that such people, having sacrificed their lives for the sake of
God, retain their active existence in everyday life. . . .

''There is no real sense of loss in their death, since they continue to live.''

And so it was with Sayyid Qutb. In the period before his final arrest and
execution, diplomats from Iraq and Libya offered him the chance to flee to
safety in their countries. But he declined to go, on the ground that 3,000 young
men and women in Egypt were his followers, and he did not want to undo a
lifetime of teaching by refusing to give those 3,000 people an example of true
martyrdom. And, in fact, some of those followers went on to form the Egyptian
terrorist movement in the next decade, the 1970's -- the groups that massacred
tourists and Coptic Christians and that assassinated Egypt's president, Anwar
Sadat, after he made peace with Israel; the groups that, in still later years,
ended up merging with bin Laden's group and supplying Al Qaeda with its
fundamental doctrines. The people in those groups were not stupid or lacking in
education.

On the contrary, we keep learning how well educated these people are, how many
of them come from the upper class, how wealthy they are. And there is no reason
for us to be surprised. These people are in possession of a powerful philosophy,
which is Sayyid Qutb's. They are in possession of a gigantic work of literature,
which is his ''In the Shade of the Qur'an.'' These people feel that, by
consulting their own doctrines, they can explain the unhappiness of the world.
They feel that, with an intense study of the Koran, as directed by Qutb and his
fellow thinkers, they can make sense of thousands of years of theological error.
They feel that, in Qutb's notion of shariah, they command the principles of a
perfect society.

These people believe that, in the entire world, they alone are preserving Islam
from extinction. They feel they are benefiting the world, even if they are
committing random massacres. They are certainly not worried about death. Qutb
gave these people a reason to yearn for death. Wisdom, piety, death and
immortality are, in his vision of the world, the same. For a pious life is a
life of struggle or jihad for Islam, and struggle means martyrdom. We may think:
those are creepy ideas. And yes, the ideas are creepy. But there is, in Qutb's
presentation, a weird allure in those ideas.

VII It would be nice to think that, in the war against terror, our side, too,
speaks of deep philosophical ideas -- it would be nice to think that someone is
arguing with the terrorists and with the readers of Sayyid Qutb. But here I have
my worries. The followers of Qutb speak, in their wild fashion, of enormous
human problems, and they urge one another to death and to murder. But the
enemies of these people speak of what? The political leaders speak of United
Nations resolutions, of unilateralism, of multilateralism, of weapons
inspectors, of coercion and noncoercion. This is no answer to the terrorists.
The terrorists speak insanely of deep things. The antiterrorists had better
speak sanely of equally deep things. Presidents will not do this. Presidents
will dispatch armies, or decline to dispatch armies, for better and for worse.

But who will speak of the sacred and the secular, of the physical world and the
spiritual world? Who will defend liberal ideas against the enemies of liberal
ideas? Who will defend liberal principles in spite of liberal society's every
failure? President George W. Bush, in his speech to Congress a few days after
the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, announced that he was going to wage a war of ideas.
He has done no such thing. He is not the man for that.

Philosophers and religious leaders will have to do this on their own. Are they
doing so? Armies are in motion, but are the philosophers and religious leaders,
the liberal thinkers, likewise in motion? There is something to worry about
here, an aspect of the war that liberal society seems to have trouble
understanding -- one more worry, on top of all the others, and possibly the
greatest worry of all.

Paul Berman has written for the magazine about Vaclav Havel, Vicente Fox and
other subjects. He is the author of the coming ''Terror and Liberalism'' (W.W.
Norton), from which this essay is adapted.

----- End forwarded message -----


-- 

Vittorio Marchi
Product Development Director
Art Science Research Laboratory
email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
voice: 212 925 8812


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