Fwd: Proposal: Implementing signing process for official tarballs (try #1)

2010-06-13 Thread Joanna Rutkowska
-- Subject: Proposal: Implementing signing process for official tarballs (try #1) Date: Wed, 26 May 2010 14:25:27 +0200 From: Joanna Rutkowska To: kde-de...@kde.org, release-team@kde.org For background discussion see this thread on kde-devel: http://lists.kde.org/?t=12747932026&r=1&w=2

Re: Proposal: Implementing signing process for official tarballs (try #1)

2010-05-30 Thread Tom Albers
On Fri, 28 May 2010 23:32:58 +0200, Dirk Mueller wrote: > I'm fine with providing a signature again, but fact is that nobody > requested > them again so far. Just providing the md5sums on the website was enough so > far > - people are mostly concerned about incomplete/wrong downloads rather tha

Re: Proposal: Implementing signing process for official tarballs (try #1)

2010-05-28 Thread Dirk Mueller
On Wednesday 26 May 2010, Joanna Rutkowska wrote: > Digital Signatures do *not* prove any other property, e.g. that the file > is not malicious. In fact there is nothing that could stop people from > signing a malicious program, and it even happens from time to time in > reality. Well,in fact we

Re: Proposal: Implementing signing process for official tarballs (try #1)

2010-05-26 Thread Joanna Rutkowska
On 05/26/2010 02:55 PM, Tobias Ellinghaus wrote: > Am Mittwoch, 26. Mai 2010 schrub Joanna Rutkowska: > > [...] > >> Digital Signatures can prove that a given file is authentic, i.e. that >> is has been indeed created by a person that signed it (e.g. KDE release >> manager), and that its contents

Proposal: Implementing signing process for official tarballs (try #1)

2010-05-26 Thread Joanna Rutkowska
For background discussion see this thread on kde-devel: http://lists.kde.org/?t=12747932026&r=1&w=2 I. The Incentive = Digital Signatures can prove that a given file is authentic, i.e. that is has been indeed created by a person that signed it (e.g. KDE release manager), and t