I think Mrs. Loretto would succeed to the rights of her transferor.
Depriving her of rights that her transferor held would effectively limit the
rights of the transferor, by eliminating his or her right to transfer title
free of the cable company's intrusion. True "prospectivity" would involve
enfo
Eugene may be right that prospective limitations would be treated
differently -- but I'm not sure. If I remember correctly, the cable box
was already on the roof when Mrs. Loretto bought the apartment building.
That didn't seem to matter to the Court. But I've never seen a case
involving newly priv
JUDGES' RELIGION NOT AN ISSUE, PRYOR SAYS
Jurist Takes on Questions About Catholics on the Bench
BY STEPHANIE FRANCIS WARD
William H. Pryor Jr., a judge on the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals,
is no stranger to controversy. His 2003 nomination was filibustered by
Democrats. And he was put on t
Following up on Doug's post:
from
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/02/10/italy.christ.ap/index.html
Did Jesus exist? Case dismissed
ROME, Italy (AP) -- An Italian judge has dismissed an atheist's
petition that a small-town priest should stand trial for asserting that
Jesus Christ existed, b
Alan is certainly right that this is so as to limitations on
real property. Even there, though, I wonder if there would be a taking
if the limitations were *prospective* (to the extent that such a thing
is possible for real property, much of which has already been doled out)
-- if the stat
I always thought the most common legislative (or executive) restrictions
on long standing common law rights involve limitations on the ability of
a property owner to exclude a third party from entering or occupying his
property without the owner's consent. The courts have often, but not
always,
An interesting story from Howard Friedman's excellent blog.
Finnish gov't withholds private school licenses
10.2.2006 at 10:58
Christian schools expressed their disappointed in the Finnish government's
decision on school licenses on Thursday. In its Thursday session the government
decided to
Thought I'd pass along this book announcement:
-Original Message-
Announcing a new title on religious freedom from Oxford University Press
Religious Freedom in the Liberal State
Rex Ahdar, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Otago and
Ian Leigh, Professor of Law, Unive
A few thoughts on Marc's point about limits on common law
rights:
1) I may be mistaken, but my recollection is that the New York
right to control commercial use of one's likeness is a creature of
statute, not common law; New York courts refused to recognize such a
right when it wa
This is fascinating. We've talked before about the idea that these hidden
state-action issues -- about whether the First Amendment (or RLUIPA) could
be used against private developers attempting to enforce restrictive
covenants (analogizing to Shelley), or whether the First Amendment could
tru
This seems to me to be very consistant with the
general tendency in the courts to treat free exercise rights as a subsidiary of
free speech rights (i.e. Rosenberger). I agree with Marc that in one sense
it appears insensitive to not at least acknowledge the religious free exercise
interest
I do not disagree that ordinarily consent is
not required .Perhaps because of that consent should not be required when the artist
would have no reason to think that a particular subject would have religious objections
to being photographed. I do find it curious that the court seems to assu
I think that one can limit
the "practice of one's faith" to a refusal consciously to be photographed.
(This, obviously, arises in the drivers' license cases.) I am not
persuaded that a serious art or news photographer must get the consent of
everyone he/she surreptitiously photographs,
A state statute immunizes the photographer from what would otherwise be
a common-law right. Why is not that state action?
Marc Stern
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Samuel V
Sent: Friday, February 10, 2006 9:37 AM
To: Law & Religion issues
Would "allowing the reproduction of his image without his consent"
really be "state interference?" Government inaction in failing to
protect someone's alleged private rights is pretty consistently deemed
not to be state action, isn't it? That is, absent some equal
protection violation.
The claim
Today's NY Law journal reports on Nussenzweig
v. di Corcia in which a Hassidic Jew with religious objections to be
photographed sued a photographer who took a surreptitious picture of the
plaintiff and sold 10 prints for between 20-3 dollars. New York law permits artists to use other
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