Fn.23 of /Larson/ seems to distinguish disparate impact from
deliberate gerrymandering. The footnote is nearly a page long but
the heart of it is this:
The statute "is not simply a facially neutral statute, the
provisions of which happen to have a 'disparate impact' upon
different religious
Rick, with all respect, I think you're simply ignoring the rationale of the
Colorado statute and constitution.
Yes, Colorado permits *some* religiously affiliated colleges to participate in
the programs -- it allows, e.g., aid to Regis University and the Univ. of
Denver -- because *some of thos
Marty: I don't think Locke controls the much different Free Ex issue in this
case, but setting aside Locke, Colorado has still engaged in denominational
discrimination in a Zelman-like, true private choice scholarship program.
Under the EC, it is not only permissible to include pervasivlely
OK, I've now read the whole opinion, and I think the court's judgment is
plainly correct under governing doctrine.
The crucial point is that CCU's education necessarily invovles inculcation of
religious truths and "spiritual transformation." "A substantial portion of the
'secular' instruction
Doug Laycock writes:
"I don't know much about this case, but certainly as Rick describes it, it is
just the state disagreeing with the federal rule on denominational
discrimination."
Doug and others, the CCU case is a very interesting and (I think) very
important case making its way
You might argue that the "secular purpose" test in Lemon plays a role similar
to the "compelling interest" test in expression or equal protection cases. A
secular purpose (or interest) is a compelling one-- a religious purpose (or
interest) never is. The second strand of Lemon-- "primary effec
I wrote:
In the case of a holiday display, one could view this as a case
involving a willing speaker (the county govt) and a willing audience
(those who wish to enjoy the holiday expression) who are being censored
by a heckler's veto under the EC. I think it is important that govt
speech
