I agree with Eugene that what government (including Senators acting in their
official capacities) should do is different than individuals should or may do,
and I would not want anyone to think that I believe there should be some sort
of government restraint on individual expression of disapproval of any or all
religious views.
That said, my personal feeling would be that the relevant guiding principle in
dealing with others should be whether that person engages in reasoned dialogue.
In that respect, I thought Eugene's use of the word "crank" very appropriate.
A crank is someone who doesn't engage others in reasoned argument--he either
won't even speak to those who disagree, or when he does he will refuse to
listen to counterarguments. Someone who responds to the questions and
arguments of others, even if he does not end up agreeing with the
counterarguments, is not a crank. Thus a firmly held belief, no matter how
odd, is not sufficient to make someone a crank; failure to engage others in
reasoned argument (including about one's religious beliefs) would be.
An example. A lot of people, maybe most people, think my client Jose Merced in
our Texas Santeria case is wrong-headed because he wants to sacrifice goats,
turtles, chickens and other animals to orishas (household gods) in order to
ensure that the orishas receive the life-force ashe and do not pass out of the
world. But I don't think many of those disagreeing with Jose would ever think
him a "crank" if they met him and had a conversation with him. He uses reason
when talking with others and has some empathy for and insight into the views of
others, including those who strongly disagree with his religious beliefs or
practices. The real distinguishing factor is again not the content of the
beliefs, but the way in which Jose engages the rest of the world that disagrees
with those beliefs. I should think any of us would be happy to interact with
him.
On a broader level, I think the level of public discourse in this country would
be elevated if more people recognized philosophy's role as a kind of mediatory
genre of thought between science and religion. Right now there are people on
both sides of the contentious social and religious questions of the day who
seem to think that science and religion should be pitted one against the other,
and there are some who have profited from sharpening the conflict. I take it
that Sam Harris's argument against Collins is that Collins is not skeptical
enough of the claims of Christianity in non-scientific questions. If one
examines this argument, however, it is revealed as an essentially philosophical
(and specifically epistemological) claim--knowledge is restricted to those
things science can prove or disprove, and we should disbelieve other truth
claims. This argument is hardly dispositive if one situates it in the full
spectrum and history of philosophical debate. No philosopher !
has "proven" that one must adopt this very specific form of skeptical
philosophy. Nor is there any evidence that having any particular philosophical
approach automatically affects one's performance as a scientist (though a true
Nietzschean might have issues with science's truth claims). The fundamental
problem with how Harris couches his argument is that it obscures the
philosophical assumptions that underlie it, either through ignorance of those
assumptions, or as part of a rhetorical strategy. His argument would be
clearer, and would lead to better dialogue, if those issues that are scientific
were distinguished from those that are philosophical in nature. Talking about
the philosophical questions also has the advantage of creating common ground
where those with religious beliefs and those without them can meet and reason
together. But creating common ground may not be Mr. Harris's goal.
Eric
________________________________________
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene [vol...@law.ucla.edu]
Sent: Friday, August 07, 2009 6:43 PM
To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics'
Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
I appreciate Eric's points, and I think there's much truth to them.
But I do think that it might be helpful to distinguish what the government as
an institution should do, and what we as voters (who may try to influence
Senators) should do.
I certainly don't quiz my doctors about their views on elephants and
turtles, but if I learned that a doctor whom I was considering really,
genuinely thought that the world did indeed rest on the elephants and turtles,
I would probably find another doctor (even if I thought that the government
shouldn't fire him for such beliefs). Likewise, I probably wouldn't support
someone for head of the NIH if he had this belief. Again, if I thought that
many educated devout Hindus today did believe this, then I might have a
different view; but I assume that they don't believe it, which leads me to view
the elephant/turtle guy much as we'd likely view a flat earther: Someone who
seems like a crank, and who's crankness might well apply to other aspects of
his life. Or is that a mistake?
Finally, I should note that my argument wasn't based on the perceived
inconsistency between hypothetical people's current statements and past ones;
I'm sorry if I wasn't clear about this. Rather, it's that when we evaluate
whether someone is likely to have good policy judgment on various issues,
knowing that he accepts certain factual assertions that are deeply inconsistent
with our understanding of how the world actually works may (or may not,
depending on our experience with people who accept those particular assertions)
lead us to doubt his judgment more broadly.
Eugene
> -----Original Message-----
> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-
> boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Eric Rassbach
> Sent: Friday, August 07, 2009 3:26 PM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
>
>
> I think the issue comes down to what epistemological assumptions the
> government is working from. The scientific method accepts as true only those
> factual hypotheses that can be observed, tested, and repeated. It remains
> agnostic as to other factual assertions. Those other kinds of factual
> assertions
> can't be observed, tested, or repeated, but can still be subject to reasoned
> inquiry,
> especially inductive reasoning.
>
> Going back to Eugene's response email, there really is a difference between
> the
> assertion of "turtles now" (subject to scientific inquiry) and the assertion
> of "turtles
> at some unobservable point far in the past" (not subject to scientific
> inquiry). If
> the person responds to objections to a "turtles now" assertion by saying that
> he
> still believes in the turtles but that they are in some way unobservable,
> then the
> factual assertion he is making has changed (call it "ineffable turtles") and
> the
> question is no longer within the realm of science. As an example, I think
> most
> scientists would agree that whether humans have "souls" simply is not a
> scientific
> question.
>
> I take Eugene's earlier email to say that he would have "pretty negative
> views" of
> someone who would not agree to have his factual assertions (based on
> traditional
> Hindu beliefs) tested scientifically where those views were in fact amenable
> to
> scientific investigation. Holding "pretty negative views" of someone for that
> reason seems overly harsh to me, but a scientist's refusal to accept
> scientific
> inquiry into scientific questions seems like a factor one could take into
> account in
> hiring/appointing.
>
> The question is more difficult when you consider other, non-scientific factual
> assertions. Sometimes the factual assertions would be clearly disqualifying
> because they are in fact "antithetical" to the purpose of the government
> institution.
> No problem with the government not appointing a Holocaust denier as the head
> of
> the Holocaust Museum.
>
> Most religious beliefs, however, (incl. non-monotheistic belief systems like
> Buddhism, Hinduism and Santeria) aren't in direct conflict with the purpose of
> government institutions. And the factual assertions of those beliefs only
> become
> problematic if the government chooses to adopt an epistemological approach
> like
> Hume's in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. But I don't see why the
> government is compelled to adopt Hume's epistemology in evaluating religious
> officials and employees. As long as the person does their job adequately,
> experience shows that the government should not care about the factual
> implications of a person's religious beliefs. And experience also shows that
> historically religious tests for office or state employment have often had
> pernicious effects. So the wisest course is for the government to avoid
> adopting a
> state epistemology that forces it to evaluate its citizens' religious beliefs.
>
> For the same reason, despite the example of the amusing werewolf-identifying
> doctor, I doubt Eugene systematically inquires into the religious beliefs of
> his
> doctors to determine whether he thinks they are foolish or not; he trusts in
> their
> credentials and his experiences with them. I would also be surprised if
> Eugene
> dropped a doctor simply because he found out the doctor had traditional Hindu
> beliefs. The reason the werewolf-identifying doctor is disturbing is
> precisely
> because he feels comfortable proclaiming his thoughts without explaining them
> using reason -- and he is unaware of the effects of his proclamation on
> others.
> Similarly, the inconsistency of the person who first claims the turtles are
> there but
> then changes his story to claim "ineffable turtles" might cause one to doubt
> the
> person's sincerity, as Eugene pointed out in his email. That goes not to the
> content of the beliefs, however, but whether they are truly held. (I note
> that
> Eugene's reliance on consi!
> stency here is in some tension with what Eugene has said before about whether
> courts should use consistency to determine a religious plaintiff's sincerity.)
>
> Regarding Collins himself I thought the list would be interested in this
> exchange
> he had with the Pew folks: http://pewforum.org/events/?EventID=217. I think
> the
> exchange demonstrates reasoned thought, applied to both religious and non-
> religious issues, though I can't claim to have read enough of what Collins has
> written to assess whether he typically uses reason to examine his faith. But
> I
> think the onus is on others to show that he has "seemingly unsound
> *scientific*
> views."
>
> Finally, I should mention that the musings in this string are mine alone, and
> not
> the Becket Fund's!
>
> Eric
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-
> boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
> Sent: Friday, August 07, 2009 10:33 AM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
>
> Indeed, which is good reason not to try and convict those who wrongly
> reject
> the theories we view as sound. But that doesn't tell us much, I think, about
> whether we should appoint them to head NIH. In fact, it seems to me obviously
> true that we *should* consider people's scientific theories in deciding
> whether to
> appoint them heads of NIH (the closest analogy to Galileo). The question is
> whether we should also consider their factual assertions that they say are
> merely
> matters of religious faith.
>
>
>
> Eugene
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-
> > boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Lisa A. Runquist
> > Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 5:54 PM
> > To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> > Subject: Re: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
> >
> > Wasn't Galileo was tried and convicted by those who wrongly rejected his
> > theories, as they conflicted with the scientific and religious beliefs
> > of the day?
> >
> > Lisa
> >
> > Volokh, Eugene wrote:
> >
> > > As to the aether theory, I don't know what the view was at
> > > the time; I suspect that it wasn't viewed so firmly that anyone who
> > > disagreed would be seen as a crank. But say that it was, and that
> > > therefore people who rejected the theory were wrongly condemned and
> > > discriminated against. That's surely bad. Yet does our uncertainty
> > > about what's right, and our recognition that time has upset many
> > > fighting faiths, mean that we just have to categorically ignore a
> > > person's seemingly unsound scientific views when he's being considered
> > > for a high government post? Remember, the question isn't whether to
> > > throw someone in prison for his views about elephants and turtles
> > > (though in extreme cases, we do lock someone up as insane if we see his
> > > views as "delusions," for instance if the person really believes that
> > > he's Napoleon) - it's whether we should consider the views in deciding
> > > whether to trust the person with a great deal of discretionary authority.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Eugene
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
> > > [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Eric Rassbach
> > > *Sent:* Thursday, August 06, 2009 3:51 PM
> > > *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> > > *Subject:* RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Isn't one of the lines to draw whether the idea is scientifically
> > > testable or not? We can make scientific observations now about whether
> > > the world rests upon turtles, but we cannot observe the birth of Christ.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Also query whether the "natural order" we've been discussing isn't
> > > overly Newtonian in its assumptions. Quantum mechanics allows us to
> > > calculate the non-zero probabilities, however infinitesimal, of events
> > > we might otherwise hold to be outside the standard rules of nature.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Finally, would it have been right for someone in the late 19^th century
> > > to take pretty negative views of someone who didn't buy into an aether
> > > theory? For the government to impose legal detriments on that person?
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
> > > [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Volokh, Eugene
> > > *Sent:* Thursday, August 06, 2009 5:54 PM
> > > *To:* 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics'
> > > *Subject:* RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > I do think this raises a troublesome question for those of
> > > us who recognize the importance of religious toleration, and yet have to
> > > evaluate people's qualities for various purposes. Say someone sincerely
> > > tells us that he thinks the world literally rests on the back of four
> > > elephants, which rest on the back of a turtle. When told that this is
> > > inconsistent with various facts about the world, elephants, and turtles,
> > > he says that this is an artifact of some special treatment by divine
> > > forces, which allows evasion of the normal rules of the universe. I
> > > take it that our first reaction would be to take a pretty negative view
> > > of the person.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > And that the person believes this for religious reasons wouldn't
> > > displace our doubts, I think. Even if we have reason to think that he's
> > > been a perfectly good geneticist, we might wonder whether he's the best
> > > person to promote to a rather different job that involves a broad range
> > > of choices about health science funding. Maybe we have some sort of
> > > ethical or constitutional obligation to set aside our worries, and draw
> > > a sharp line between beliefs that a person says are "outside the natural
> > > order" and those that he says relate to the natural order. But it seems
> > > to me that setting them aside at least runs against our first
> > > common-sense reactions, and might in fact not be sound.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > >From there we can shift the hypothetical. What if the
> > > person believes the world is 6000 years old, and that people used to
> > > live nearly 1000 years, and that all the contrary evidence is miracles
> > > produced by God to test our faith? What if he doesn't take such a view,
> > > but believes that there have been several departures from the standard
> > > rules of nature in the past several thousand years, such as a virgin
> > > birth, a resurrection, and the like?
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > My sense is that we would indeed draw lines between these
> > > examples. It is certainly significant to me that very many smart,
> > > thoughtful, and suitably scientific skeptical people are believing
> > > Christians, and that (I suspect) many fewer such smart, thoughtful, and
> > > skeptical people are Young-Earthers or people who literally accept
> > > certain Hindu creation myths. But it's not easy for me to figure out
> > > how to translate that sort of sensible distinction into a legal or
> > > constitutional rule, or even a broadly acceptable principle of political
> > > ethics.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Eugene
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
> > > [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Anthony
> > > Decinque
> > > *Sent:* Thursday, August 06, 2009 2:26 PM
> > > *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> > > *Subject:* Re: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > To be clear, I did not make that characterization. I was repeating Mr.
> > > Harris's argument. (My view would be different.)
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Again, I don't want to get into a religious argument (I don't think it's
> > > the point of this list) but Mr. Harris's argument was different: Even
> > > if the virgin birth is outside the natural order, the question Mr.
> > > Harris pushes on is "how does Mr. Collins know that X event happened?"
> > > In other words, since Mr. Collins is claiming that the natural order was
> > > suspended on a certain date at a certain place, he is the one who should
> > > have to provide evidence for that assertion. I think that this the
> > > "failure of skepticism" Mr. Harris is referring to.... I refer you to
> > > his piece for his arguments instead of my clumsy paraphrasing.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > All that aside, I wanted to assume that "his views [are] antithetical to
> > > the values underlying science," not just characterize them that way.
> > > Assuming that they are, what result? Is it discrimination to say that
> > > someone's religious views undercut values that are needed in a job?
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > I think the faith-healer hypothetical was more on target, but doesn't
> > > have the full flavor of the argument. A faith-healer, I suppose, never
> > > accepts conventional medicine. (Mr. Harris is arguing that) Mr. Collins
> > > is like a part-time faith healer.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > The doctor-who-prays response is helpful. What about a doctor who was
> > > excellent on the job, but sometimes denounced accepted fields of
> > > medicine off the job?
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > A
> > >
> > > On Thu, Aug 6, 2009 at 5:03 PM, Douglas Laycock <layco...@umich.edu
> > > <mailto:layco...@umich.edu>> wrote:
> > >
> > > It is you who are begging the question. The question is whether
> > > religious faith and scientific commitment are inherently inconsistent.
> > > You assumed the answer to that question when you characterized his views
> > > as antithetical to the values underlying science.
> > >
> > > The virgin birth, if it happened, was outside the natural order. Has
> > > any said or done anything unscientific in or about the course of his
> > > scientific work, when he is talking about things within the natural
> > > order? Has he said or done anything allegedly anithetical to science
> > > other than state and promote his religious beliefs?
> > >
> > > A faith healer who refuses medical treatment could not be Surgeon
> > > General. An excellent physician who does everything medically
> > > indicated, and also prays for cures and believes that God sometimes
> > > answers those prayers, could be Surgeon General.
> > >
> > >
> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
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> > can
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> >
> > --
> > Lisa A. Runquist
> > Runquist & Associates
> > Attorneys at Law
> > 17554 Community Street
> > Northridge, CA 91325
> > (818)609-7761
> > (818)609-7794 (fax)
> > l...@runquist.com
> > http://www.runquist.com
> >
> >
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