Bob,
Because an applicant may believe that he can perform the essential job
functions with reasonable accommodations (e.g., a voluntary job swap),
or in some cases that working on his sabbath is not actually
essential, I don't think his answer would be fraudulent or given in
bad faith. I
Mike, I totally agree with the way you stated the issue -- it's the candidate's
ability to perform the essential requirements of the job, not their religion
that is the issue. Consequently, the employer need only ask: "Can you work
Saturdays?"
What is absent from this discussion, is the candidat
Why, short of religious bias, would an employer ask about an
applicant's religious observances or practices? Applicants may have
many reasons for preferring not to work on Saturday, or Sunday, or
whatever day is in question.
An employer who wishes to ascertain whether an employee can perfo
Mike,
Why isn't the failure to disclose incapacity to perform essential duties of the
job a form of fraud by the applicant upon the prospective employer (putting
aside the fact that employers aren't allowed to ask the candidate his/her
religion)?
Bob Ritter
On July 26, 2012 at 4:31 PM Michael M
Marc, you state: "no employer with any choice at all will hire such a person"
and call it discrimination. If an applicant cannot fulfill the responsibilities
of the job, the employer shouldn't hire the candidate. That's not
discrimination, rather its sound judgment. I'm sorry if the idiosyncrasies
The Court rejected the argument that the employee has a duty to disclose his
religion, and then not to change it, in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n
(1986 or 87). That was a constitutional case, not a Title VII case.
On Thu, 26 Jul 2012 16:31:01 -0400
Michael Masinter wrote:
>Marc,
>
>I
Marc,
I previously characterized the panel discussion of Fouche's good faith
as improper; I did so because I agree that an employee has no
obligation to disclose his religious beliefs (or his disability) when
applying for a job. But I am not convinced the court erred on the
merits for tw
The District Court missed an obvious possible accommodation: swapping shifts
voluntarily with other employees. in fact, cases very similar to this one get
resolved by such swaps. See, eg, Myer v NYCTA, 674 NE2d 305 (1996). So not
only did the courts ignore this possibility, but they added the