HOSANNA-TABOR EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH ( )
597 F. 3d 769, reversed.
Syllabus
Opinion
[Roberts]
Concurrence
[Thomas]
Concurrence
[Alito]
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being
done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The
syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared
by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United
States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
HOSANNA-TABOR EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH AND SCHOOL v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit
No. 10–553. Argued October 5, 2011—Decided January 11, 2012
Petitioner Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School is a member
congregation of the Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod. The Synod classifies its
school teachers into two categories: “called” and “lay.” “Called” teachers are
regarded as having been called to their vocation by God. To be eligible to be
considered “called,” a teacher must complete certain academic requirements,
including a course of theological study. Once called, a teacher receives the
formal title “Minister of Religion, Commissioned.” “Lay” teachers, by contrast,
are not required to be trained by the Synod or even to be Lutheran. Although
lay and called teachers at Hosanna-Tabor generally performed the same duties,
lay teachers were hired only when called teachers were unavailable.
After respondent Cheryl Perich completed the required training,
Hosanna-Tabor asked her to become a called teacher. Perich accepted the call
and was designated a commissioned minister. In addition to teaching secular
subjects, Perich taught a religion class, led her students in daily prayer and
devotional exercises, and took her students to a weekly school-wide chapel
service. Perich led the chapel service herself about twice a year.
Perich developed narcolepsy and began the 2004–2005 school year on
disability leave. In January 2005, she notified the school principal that she
would be able to report to work in February. The principal responded that the
school had already contracted with a lay teacher to fill Perich’s position for
the remainder of the school year. The principal also expressed concern that
Perich was not yet ready to return to the classroom. The congregation
subsequently offered to pay a portion of Perich’s health insurance premiums in
exchange for her resignation as a called teacher. Perich refused to resign. In
February, Perich presented herself at the school and refused to leave until she
received written documentation that she had reported to work. The principal
later called Perich and told her that she would likely be fired. Perich
responded that she had spoken with an attorney and intended to assert her legal
rights. In a subsequent letter, the chairman of the school board advised Perich
that the congregation would consider whether to rescind her call at its next
meeting. As grounds for termination, the letter cited Perich’s “insubordination
and disruptive behavior,” as well as the damage she had done to her “working
relationship” with the school by “threatening to take legal action.” The
congregation voted to rescind Perich’s call, and Hosanna-Tabor sent her a
letter of termination.
Perich filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, claiming that her employment had been terminated in violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act. The EEOC brought suit against
Hosanna-Tabor, alleging that Perich had been fired in retaliation for
threatening to file an ADA lawsuit. Perich intervened in the litigation.
Invoking what is known as the “ministerial exception,” Hosanna-Tabor argued
that the suit was barred by the First Amendment because the claims concerned
the employment relationship between a religious institution and one of its
ministers. The District Court agreed and granted summary judgment in
Hosanna-Tabor’s favor. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. It recognized
the existence of a ministerial exception rooted in the First Amendment , but
concluded that Perich did not qualify as a “minister” under the exception.
Held:
1. The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment bar
suits brought on behalf of ministers against their churches, claiming
termination in violation of employment discrimination laws. Pp. 6–15.
(a) The First Amendment provides, in part, that “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.” Familiar with life under the established Church of England,
the founding generation sought to foreclose the possibility of a national
church. By forbidding the “establishment of religion” and guaranteeing the
“free exercise thereof,” the Religion Clauses ensured that the new Federal
Government—unlike the English Crown—would have no role in filling
ecclesiastical offices. Pp. 6–10.
(b) This Court first considered the issue of government interference
with a church’s ability to select its own ministers in the context of disputes
over church property. This Court’s decisions in that area confirm that it is
impermissible for the government to contradict a church’s determination of who
can act as its ministers. See Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679; Kedroff v. Saint
Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U. S. 94 ;
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich,
426 U. S. 696 . Pp. 10–12.
(c) Since the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and other employment discrimination laws, the Courts of Appeals have uniformly
recognized the existence of a “ministerial exception,” grounded in the First
Amendment , that precludes application of such legislation to claims concerning
the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers.
The Court agrees that there is such a ministerial exception. Requiring a church
to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to
do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision. Such action
interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of
control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs. By imposing
an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which
protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through
its appointments. According the state the power to determine which individuals
will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which
prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.
The EEOC and Perich contend that religious organizations can defend
against employment discrimination claims by invoking their First Amendment
right to freedom of association. They thus see no need—and no basis—for a
special rule for ministers grounded in the Religion Clauses themselves. Their
position, however, is hard to square with the text of the First Amendment
itself, which gives special solicitude to the rights of religious
organizations. The Court cannot accept the remarkable view that the Religion
Clauses have nothing to say about a religious organization’s freedom to select
its own ministers.
The EEOC and Perich also contend that Employment Div., Dept. of Human
Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 , precludes recognition of a
ministerial exception. But Smith involved government regulation of only outward
physical acts. The present case, in contrast, concerns government interference
with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the
church itself. Pp. 13–15.
2. Because Perich was a minister within the meaning of the ministerial
exception, the First Amendment requires dismissal of this employment
discrimination suit against her religious employer. Pp. 15–21.
(a) The ministerial exception is not limited to the head of a
religious congregation. The Court, however, does not adopt a rigid formula for
deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister. Here, it is enough to
conclude that the exception covers Perich, given all the circumstances of her
employment. Hosanna-Tabor held her out as a minister, with a role distinct from
that of most of its members. That title represented a significant degree of
religious training followed by a formal process of commissioning. Perich also
held herself out as a minister by, for example, accepting the formal call to
religious service. And her job duties reflected a role in conveying the
Church’s message and carrying out its mission: As a source of religious
instruction, Perich played an important part in transmitting the Lutheran
faith.
In concluding that Perich was not a minister under the exception, the
Sixth Circuit committed three errors. First, it failed to see any relevance in
the fact that Perich was a commissioned minister. Although such a title, by
itself, does not automatically ensure coverage, the fact that an employee has
been ordained or commissioned as a minister is surely relevant, as is the fact
that significant religious training and a recognized religious mission underlie
the description of the employee’s position. Second, the Sixth Circuit gave too
much weight to the fact that lay teachers at the school performed the same
religious duties as Perich. Though relevant, it cannot be dispositive that
others not formally recognized as ministers by the church perform the same
functions—particularly when, as here, they did so only because commissioned
ministers were unavailable. Third, the Sixth Circuit placed too much emphasis
on Perich’s performance of secular duties. Although the amount of time an
employee spends on particular activities is relevant in assessing that
employee’s status, that factor cannot be considered in isolation, without
regard to the other considerations discussed above. Pp. 15–19.
(b) Because Perich was a minister for purposes of the exception, this
suit must be dismissed. An order reinstating Perich as a called teacher would
have plainly violated the Church’s freedom under the Religion Clauses to select
its own ministers. Though Perich no longer seeks reinstatement, she continues
to seek frontpay, backpay, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s
fees. An award of such relief would operate as a penalty on the Church for
terminating an unwanted minister, and would be no less prohibited by the First
Amendment than an order overturning the termination. Such relief would depend
on a determination that Hosanna-Tabor was wrong to have relieved Perich of her
position, and it is precisely such a ruling that is barred by the ministerial
exception.
Any suggestion that Hosanna-Tabor’s asserted religious reason for firing
Perich was pretextual misses the point of the ministerial exception. The
purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a
minister only when it is made for a religious reason. The exception instead
ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister to the
faithful is the church’s alone. Pp. 19–20.
(c) Today the Court holds only that the ministerial exception bars an
employment discrimination suit brought on behalf of a minister, challenging her
church’s decision to fire her. The Court expresses no view on whether the
exception bars other types of suits. Pp. 20–21.
597 F. 3d 769, reversed.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Thomas, J.,
filed a concurring opinion. Alito, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which
Kagan, J., joined.
Joel L. Sogol
Attorney at Law
811 21st Ave.
Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35401
ph (205) 345-0966
fx (205) 345-0971
email: jlsa...@wwisp.com
website: www.joelsogol.com
Ben Franklin observed that truth wins a fair fight - which is why we have
evidence rules in U.S. courts.
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