The sentence has to be read in context.  The issue is the reach or ambit
of claims of "religious associational autonomy and privacy."  To the
extent that the law recognizes or grants or accommodates the claim, the
law is declaring the claim to be "religious."  I suppose one could say
that we accommodate some religious claims and not others.  But it is not
unheard of, in legal analysis and discourse, to say that if we grant a
claim then the claim is "X" and if we do not grant or enforce a claim
then the claim is "not X."  My use of quotation marks clearly indicates
that I was using the term in precisely that sense.    

-----Original Message-----
From: Volokh, Eugene [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Sent: Thursday, March 23, 2006 2:26 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: "Oppression should never qualify as 'religious'"

        I'm puzzled here; I can certainly understand a rule under which
the government may have a compelling interest in stopping oppressive
conduct, though then the question is what constitutes oppression.  But
at the threshold, where we're deciding whether conduct is religious or
not, how can it make sense to treat conduct that (say) an actor believes
to be mandated by his religious belief system as "not religious" simply
because we think this conduct is "oppressive"?

        Eugene



Michael Newsom writes: 

 Ed, we are largely together here.  We need to understand, however, what
"within the confines of those organizations" means.  But that, in turn,
invites an inquiry more generally into the reach or ambit of religious
associational autonomy and privacy.  The difficulty largely concerns
activities conducted by religious organizations that, to use Noonan and
Gaffney's felicitous term, do double duty, that is, serve both religious
and secular purposes.  The Court has indicated some unwillingness, at
least in Title VII cases, to probe too deeply into the boundary, if any,
that might exist between the religious and the secular.  See Amos.  But
it would be difficult to argue that the courts should never consider the
boundary question, regardless of circumstances.
 
It would be fair to consider, given the history of oppression, whether a
claim that an activity is "religious" might merely in reality be a sham,
a cover for continued oppression.  Oppression should never qualify as
"religious."
 
We won't get neat and tidy results, using such and approach, but we
stand a good chance of getting fair and defensible results if we do. 
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