[SC-L] WSJ.com - Tech Companies Check Software Earlier for Flaws

2006-05-05 Thread Kenneth R. van Wyk
I saw an interesting Wall Street Journal article today that talks about companies adopting software security practices. Complete story can be found at: http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB114670277515443282-B59kll7qXrkxOXId1uF0txp8NFs_20070504.html? The article cites a couple of companies t

Re: [SC-L] By default, the Verifier is disabled on .Net and Java

2006-05-05 Thread Gary McGraw
An interesting experiment on cracking verifiers was performed about ten years ago by brian bershad at the university of washington. The paradigm used comparative testing on multiple verifiers to find discrepancies. This is covered in securing java as well. Funny how I became interested in so

Re: [SC-L] HNS - Biggest X Window security hole since 2000

2006-05-05 Thread ljknews
At 11:12 AM -0400 5/4/06, Kenneth R. van Wyk wrote: > Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="nextPart1887150.2DlSXmIMA5"; > protocol="application/pgp-signature"; micalg=pgp-sha1 > Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit > > Stories about this (below) X bug and the DHS-sponsored project that found

Re: [SC-L] By default, the Verifier is disabled on .Net and Java

2006-05-05 Thread Stephen de Vries
David Eisner wrote: > > What determines when access to a private member is illegal? Is it, in > fact, the bytecode verifier? Yes, it's done by the fourth pass of the verifier as described here: http://java.sun.com/sfaq/verifier.html#HEADING13 Interestingly, Sun have posted a contest to try a

RE: [SC-L] By default, the Verifier is disabled on .Net and Java

2006-05-05 Thread Stephen de Vries
Jim Halfpenny on the Webappsec list has discovered that BEA's JRockit JDK _does_ use verification by default, his complete post quoted below (the test was to access private methods on a class): Hi, BEA JRockit verifies by default and as far as I am aware does not offer a -noverify option. $ jav

Re: [SC-L] HNS - Biggest X Window security hole since 2000

2006-05-05 Thread Greenarrow 1
I noticed quite a lot of Linux distros have already patched this or are as I write. Do not know if X Org has yet but remember a post by Securnia about this a day or so. Regards, George Greenarrow1 InNetInvestigations-Forensic - Original Message - From: "Kenneth R. van Wyk" <[EMAIL PR

Re: [Owasp-dotnet] Re: [SC-L] By default, the Verifier is disabled on .Net and Java

2006-05-05 Thread Michael Silk
Two important clarifications for Java (based on my experiments): 1) The verifier IS enabled for the classes that come with the Java platform, such as those in rt.jar. So, for example, if you create a class that tries to set System.security (the private variable that points to the SecurityManag

Re: [SC-L] By default, the Verifier is disabled on .Net and Java

2006-05-05 Thread David Eisner
Tim Hollebeek wrote: > The fact that editing the .class file allows you to produce one that > causes the JVM to crash is pretty strong evidence the verifier was > NOT used to validate the file. > Right. What follows is a summary of what we know so far, and what I think is going on. The detail