Re: [SC-L] Re: Java sandboxing not used much

2004-03-15 Thread Louis Solomon [SteelBytes]
... from MS-DOS) to a UNIX ... Setting everything 777 sad, but very believable. the opposite sort of silly things also happens ... eg mysql (for win32) requring it's my.ini to be in either c:\ (yes, root) or %windir% how brain dead is that ? and the php docs (for win32) says to stick all the .

[SC-L] Re: Java sandboxing not used much

2004-03-11 Thread Jared W. Robinson
My company outsourced a C to Java porting project to India, and we ended up having to help them salvage the project. It was obvious that the engineers were inexperienced. All user data (including authentication credentials) was stored in an application directory, completely world-writable. When I

RE: [SC-L] Re: Java sandboxing not used much

2004-03-11 Thread Alun Jones
> -Original Message- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Bill Cheswick > Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2004 2:04 PM > > User client-level applications should come with recommended > sandbox.conf > files that will contain them appropriately. There's already >

RE: [SC-L] Re: Java sandboxing not used much

2004-03-11 Thread Jeremy Epstein
IL PROTECTED] > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Behalf Of Bill Cheswick > Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2004 3:04 PM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: [SC-L] Re: Java sandboxing not used much > > > > Complex security systems are often completely ignored. > > This is def

[SC-L] Re: Java sandboxing not used much

2004-03-11 Thread Bill Cheswick
> Complex security systems are often completely ignored. This is definitely a problem with with more-involved security systems. At one point I obtained a system that had obtained B1 certification to implement a firewall. The firewall worked fine, but I never got the hang of the system administrat

Re: [SC-L] Re: Java sandboxing not used much

2004-03-11 Thread Kenneth R. van Wyk
Jared W. Robinson wrote: Complex security systems are often completely ignored. I agree, but I wouldn't stop there... The simplicity of the traditional UNIX permission model means that it is more likely to be used than abused. Well, I've seen at least one pretty spectacular exception to this. An

[SC-L] Re: Java sandboxing not used much

2004-03-11 Thread Jared W. Robinson
> I'd go futher - I think it is extremley rare that anyone configures their > sandbox properly. I "do" Java development, and I would guess that less than > 10% of application server deployments are done with the Java security > manager enabled. Complex security systems are often completely ignored