Re: JEP 411, removal of finalizers, a path forward.

2021-08-01 Thread Florian Weimer
* Peter Firmstone: > From our discussions, my interpretation is that OpenJDK is constrained > by corporate security policy; any issues with SecurityManager > infrastructure will be treated as confidential security issues and > have to be fixed with internal resources. Community volunteers won't >

Re: JEP 411, removal of finalizers, a path forward.

2021-08-01 Thread Peter Firmstone
On 2/08/2021 4:48 am, Alan Bateman wrote: On 01/08/2021 15:28, Uwe Schindler wrote: : What I figured out: You intend to remove SecurityManager because it does not fit your latest ideas how Java threads should behave. I know the main problem is not "SecurityManager is too complex / too slow /

Re: RFR: 8269130: Replace usages of Collection.toArray() with Collection.toArray(T[]) to avoid redundant array copying

2021-08-01 Thread Sergey Bylokhov
On Mon, 14 Jun 2021 17:00:29 GMT, Andrey Turbanov wrote: > I found few places, where code initially perform `Object[] > Colleciton.toArray()` call and then manually copy array into another array > with required type. > This PR cleanups such places to more shorter call `T[] > Collection.toArra

Re: [jdk17] RFR: 8067223: [TESTBUG] Rename Whitebox API package [v2]

2021-08-01 Thread Jie Fu
On Sat, 31 Jul 2021 20:42:10 GMT, Igor Ignatyev wrote: >> Hi all, >> >> could you please review this big tedious and trivial(-ish) patch which moves >> `sun.hotspot.WhiteBox` and related classes to `jdk.test.whitebox` package? >> >> the majority of the patch is the following substitutions: >>

Re: [jdk17] RFR: 8067223: [TESTBUG] Rename Whitebox API package [v2]

2021-08-01 Thread David Holmes
On Sat, 31 Jul 2021 20:42:10 GMT, Igor Ignatyev wrote: >> Hi all, >> >> could you please review this big tedious and trivial(-ish) patch which moves >> `sun.hotspot.WhiteBox` and related classes to `jdk.test.whitebox` package? >> >> the majority of the patch is the following substitutions: >>

Re: JEP 411, removal of finalizers, a path forward.

2021-08-01 Thread Alan Bateman
On 01/08/2021 15:28, Uwe Schindler wrote: : What I figured out: You intend to remove SecurityManager because it does not fit your latest ideas how Java threads should behave. I know the main problem is not "SecurityManager is too complex / too slow / wrongly used /..." -- the main problem of so

Re: JEP 411, removal of finalizers, a path forward.

2021-08-01 Thread Michael Bien
On 01.08.21 16:28, Uwe Schindler wrote: The problem is: you deprecate for removal without offering any API to replace the main pain points: ... - Disable damn java serialization completely JDK 9+ JVM flag / security property, see JEP 290 -Djdk.serialFilter=!* regards, michael

Re: JEP 411, removal of finalizers, a path forward.

2021-08-01 Thread Ron Pressler
Hi Peter. - JEP 411, like every spec-changing JEP, is meant to allow those that use the removed functionality a migration path forward. The API elements that are deprecated for removal have some years before they are actually removed, so there’s nothing too urgent other than beginning to think

Re: JEP 411, removal of finalizers, a path forward.

2021-08-01 Thread Michael Bien
On 01.08.21 18:35, Michael Bien wrote: On 01.08.21 16:28, Uwe Schindler wrote: The problem is: you deprecate for removal without offering any API to replace the main pain points: ... - Disable damn java serialization completely JDK 9+ JVM flag / security property, see JEP 290 -Djdk.serialFil

RE: JEP 411, removal of finalizers, a path forward.

2021-08-01 Thread Uwe Schindler
Hi Andrew, > > I'm working on the assumption that OpenJDK will close any external holes > > currently defended by permission checks. It would be good if the JDK > > was secure by default, with properties required to be set for allowing > > such things as agents, management, parsing xml and serial

Re: JEP 411, removal of finalizers, a path forward.

2021-08-01 Thread Andrew Dinn
On 01/08/2021 03:14, Peter Firmstone wrote: I'm working on the assumption that OpenJDK will close any external holes currently defended by permission checks.  It would be good if the JDK was secure by default, with properties required to be set for allowing such things as agents, management, pa