Re: Update mechanism for the upcoming trust store

2018-02-23 Thread Fotis Loukos
Hello Sean, On 29/01/2018 04:30 μμ, Fotis Loukos wrote: > On 26/01/2018 11:31 μμ, Sean Mullan wrote: >> On 1/24/18 5:39 AM, Fotis Loukos wrote: >>>> You may not be aware, but the JDK does currently support a mechanism for >>>> blacklisting certificates. The li

Re: Update mechanism for the upcoming trust store

2018-01-29 Thread Fotis Loukos
On 26/01/2018 11:31 μμ, Sean Mullan wrote: > On 1/24/18 5:39 AM, Fotis Loukos wrote: >>> You may not be aware, but the JDK does currently support a mechanism for >>> blacklisting certificates. The lib/security/blacklisted.certs file >>> contains a list of the fingerp

Re: Update mechanism for the upcoming trust store

2018-01-24 Thread Fotis Loukos
uring the update period would be good for starters. As a first step to try a new format, you could even fetch it once during installation and provide a means for the user to update it manually. Regards, Fotis Loukos > > Thanks, > Sean > > On 1/18/18 11:03 AM, Fotis Loukos wrote: &

Update mechanism for the upcoming trust store

2018-01-18 Thread Fotis Loukos
access to a software's trust store, and making an automated mechanism to fetch it would be really useful. Regards, Fotis Loukos -- Fotis Loukos, PhD Director of Security Architecture SSL Corp e: fot...@ssl.com w: https://www.ssl.com

Re: sun.security.x509.DNSName leading dot in name constraints

2015-06-11 Thread Fotis Loukos
s, we believe that our implementation is compliant with RFC 5280. As you noticed, by default the name constraints at the trust anchor are not checked, however we wanted to know if it is possible to successfully validate certificates if they are enforced by the programmer at his application. Regards, Fotis Loukos, PhD HARICA Public Key Infrastructure > --Sean > > >>> >>> Kind Regards, >>> Vyronas Tsingaras, >>> Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, IT Center >>>