[security-discuss] Re: [networking-discuss] Re: Solaris socket bind() behavior

2006-08-08 Thread Kacheong Poon
Chris Elving wrote: > Is it not reasonable to consider the uid of the process that created or > bound the socket? I'd suggest that, by default, a given user should be > able to bind to both INADDR_ANY and a specific address. This preserves > the well established semantics of the bind(2) interface.

[security-discuss] Solaris Viruses

2006-08-08 Thread Darren Reed
Tom Simpson wrote: >Apologies if this is an FAQ, but I've searched the net for a while on this and >can't find a definitive answer. > >Are there viruses/worms in the wild that target Solaris (sparc or intel)? > >By this, I don't mean rootkits, sendmail vulnerabilities etc. Basically, I'm >getti

[security-discuss] Solaris Viruses

2006-08-08 Thread James Carlson
Alan Coopersmith writes: > There have been two worms that I remember in years past - the original > Morris worm, which targeted SunOS finger, and a later worm which targeted > a overflow in the Solaris sadmind and used that to target Windows IIS servers > (see http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001

[security-discuss] Re: [networking-discuss] Re: Solaris socket bind() behavior

2006-08-08 Thread Krishna Yenduri
James Carlson wrote: >Kacheong Poon writes: > > >... > > >> This >>works currently and will not work using the above suggestion. >>Probably there is no such app, but it is better to ask >>first. >> >> > >I'd be surprised if there were an application that worked that way. >It seems pretty o

[security-discuss] A new Trusted Extensions script for managing labeled network interfaces

2006-08-08 Thread Glenn Faden
I have written another zenity-based shell script to simplify the configuration of labeled network interfaces. This one extends the functionality of two CDE actions: Share Physical Interface and Share Logical Interface. It also supports bringing up (and down) multiple logical interfaces, and the

[security-discuss] User notice of last successful or last failed login

2006-08-08 Thread Darren J Moffat
Batey, Everett II NAVSEA wrote: > Darren, > > Will moving from dtlogin to GDM remedy both seeing > "last successful login" and "last UNsuccessful > login"? Only the later and only when lock_after_retires is setup. > Will all the _features_ in dtlogin menu's have to > be added back into the

[security-discuss] DOI for TX43

2006-08-08 Thread Yates, Spencer A.
classification? Thanks for your help . . . Spencer -- next part -- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <http://mail.opensolaris.org/pipermail/security-discuss/attachments/20060808/a8329c68/attachment.html>

[security-discuss] Re: Solaris Viruses

2006-08-08 Thread Henry B. Hotz
Never heard of any viruses myself, but there have been worms that affect things like Apache. Don't forget that the first ever major Internet worm targeted a debug option that was left enabled in SunOS's sendmail. As a point of reference, there *are* a few viruses that affect MacOS X. How

[security-discuss] Solaris Viruses

2006-08-08 Thread Alan Coopersmith
Tom Simpson wrote: > Apologies if this is an FAQ, but I've searched the net for a while on this > and can't find a definitive answer. > > Are there viruses/worms in the wild that target Solaris (sparc or intel)? There have been two worms that I remember in years past - the original Morris worm,

[security-discuss] DOI for TX43

2006-08-08 Thread Glenn Faden
Yates, Spencer A. wrote: > After a jumpstart install of SUNWXCall and TX43, I created the > following local Security Templates with the default domain of > interpretation (DOI): > - ADMIN_LOWDOI=1 (installed by default) > - PUBLICDOI=0 > - CONFIDENTIALDOI=

[security-discuss] New Trusted Extensions utility for managinglabeledzones

2006-08-08 Thread Mike Lewis
>>After creating and cloning the zones (we have 33 of them), the booting of the >>zones will bring our machine to its knees as it attempts to configure >>about 118 services in each zone. Further, with each zone, its >> svc.configd >>runs at about 5~6% of the CPU, which seems like a lot when all t

[security-discuss] New Trusted Extensions utility for managinglabeledzones

2006-08-08 Thread Gary Winiger
> On Tue, Aug 08, 2006 at 09:03:04AM -0500, Mike Lewis wrote: > > > I've also noticed that auditd runs by default in both the global and local > > zones, and that they conflict (you can't run both). I have turned off > > auditd in the local zones and defer to the one running at the global > > lev

[security-discuss] Re: [networking-discuss] Re: Solaris socket bind() behavior

2006-08-08 Thread James Carlson
Kacheong Poon writes: > I guess using the bind() time uid is reasonable. But is > there an app which passes a listening socket to another > process with different uid and that process will open > another socket binding to a more specific address? Yes -- a wait-type inetd service could do that fai

[security-discuss] New Trusted Extensions utility for managinglabeledzones

2006-08-08 Thread Alan Coopersmith
Mike Lewis wrote: > I found the culprit to be the "cde-login" service running in each zone and > attempting (by default) to run X servers with non-existent frame buffers. > The processes were starting and stopping too quickly to be recognized > except by DTrace, who pointed to the culprit. 64451

[security-discuss] New Trusted Extensions utility for managinglabeledzones

2006-08-08 Thread Brent Paulson
On Tue, Aug 08, 2006 at 09:03:04AM -0500, Mike Lewis wrote: > I've also noticed that auditd runs by default in both the global and local > zones, and that they conflict (you can't run both). I have turned off > auditd in the local zones and defer to the one running at the global > level. The 'p

[security-discuss] Re: [networking-discuss] Re: Solaris socket bind() behavior

2006-08-08 Thread James Carlson
Chris Elving writes: > Without the ability to bind to both INADDR_ANY and specific addresses, > Web Server would need to constantly watch the list of configured > interfaces. (The implementation of which would likely require additional > user land synchronization, hurting performance.) Actually

[security-discuss] Re: Adding commands to a rights profile in Sol

2006-08-08 Thread James Hardwick
Just wanted to say I got this working, and it wasn't anything out of the ordinary. The directory which contained the scripts had two very similarly named ones. Well, I added the wrong one of the two to the rights profile, and never even noticed it until this morning. I probably looked right at i

[security-discuss] Re: Solaris Viruses

2006-08-08 Thread Tom Simpson
> Are they asking you to install the AV software to > protect the Solaris > servers or the PCs they serve? They don't serve any PCs. These are purely DB/app servers that are not internet connected, nor connected to any PCs. My understanding is that AV software for Solaris is designed for this

[security-discuss] Solaris Viruses

2006-08-08 Thread Tom Simpson
Apologies if this is an FAQ, but I've searched the net for a while on this and can't find a definitive answer. Are there viruses/worms in the wild that target Solaris (sparc or intel)? By this, I don't mean rootkits, sendmail vulnerabilities etc. Basically, I'm getting pressure from our securi