Given the unpleasant nature of CVE-2016-5195, would an SELinux confined
application that exploited the Dirty COW vulnerability be capable also
of escaping domain enforcement?##SELECTION_END##
Hopefully my question is not ambiguous.
Thanks in advance.
Robert Lee___
On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 2:11 PM, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
> On 10/21/2016 01:47 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> policycoreutils started life as a small set of utilities that were
>> necessary or at least widely used in production on a SELinux system.
>> Over time though it has grown to includ
On 10/21/2016 01:47 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> Hi,
>
> policycoreutils started life as a small set of utilities that were
> necessary or at least widely used in production on a SELinux system.
> Over time though it has grown to include many optional components, and
> even within a given subdire
On 10/21/2016 01:05 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 10/19/2016 08:36 AM, Vit Mojzis wrote:
>> Return column definitions to portsPage (gui fails to load otherwise).
>>
>> fcontextPage:
>> "ftype" dropdown was filled from 2 sources (system-config-selinux.glade
>> and fcontextPage - from seobject
Hi,
policycoreutils started life as a small set of utilities that were
necessary or at least widely used in production on a SELinux system.
Over time though it has grown to include many optional components, and
even within a given subdirectory (e.g. sepolicy) there seem to be a
number of component
On 10/19/2016 08:36 AM, Vit Mojzis wrote:
> Return column definitions to portsPage (gui fails to load otherwise).
>
> fcontextPage:
> "ftype" dropdown was filled from 2 sources (system-config-selinux.glade
> and fcontextPage - from seobject module) which resulted in duplicate
> and invalid o
