hitespace fixes (inherited from
code you cut n' pasted). Please remember to run your patches through
scripts/checkpatch.pl before submission.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
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present,
> +* copy the MLS field of the associated default context.
> +* Used for upgrading to MLS systems where objects may lack
> +* MLS fields.
> +*/
> + struct context *defcon;
> +
> + rc = -EINVAL;
&g
5,9 +1425,35 @@ static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb
> > *pol,
> >
> > ctx->type = typdatum->value;
> >
> > - rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid);
> > - if (rc)
> > - goto out;
&
this logic inside of sidtab_search() instead of
> > splitting it out.
>
> My intention was to not hide too much complexity under sidtab, but
> rethinking it now I agree it would probably make sense to just hide
> isidtab under sidtab. It would need to have a separate insert functio
> - add reproducer to commit message
> - update e-mail address of James Morris
> - better Cc also the old SELinux ML
You know what they say: sixth time is the charm :)
Merged into selinux/next, thanks all.
--
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xProject/selinux/jobs/442750208
>
> Build fail with gcc:
>
> policydb.c:2839:31: error: comparison is always false due to limited
> range of data type [-Werror=type-limits]
> if (c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey > 0x ||
>^
> policydb.c:2840:31: error: comparison is always false due to limited
> range of data type [-Werror=type-limits]
> c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey > 0x)
--
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ges up to 073c1a781e4a1217d572506621434cd6d750969b:
MAINTAINERS: update the SELinux mailing list location
(2018-10-10 01:50:15 -0400)
selinux/stable-4.19 PR 20181015
-------
d subvert those. The only capability I
> know of that lets you bypass LSM checks by design (if no LSM blocks
> the capability itself) is CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
>
> > One more thing. Citing from [1]
> >
> > > I think there's a security problem here. Imagine the following scenario:
&
On Wed, Oct 10, 2018 at 1:55 AM Paul Moore wrote:
>
> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
> ---
> MAINTAINERS |2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Since we want to get everyone on to the new list as soon as possible,
I've merged this into the selinux/stable-4.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
---
MAINTAINERS |2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 67e4c4f92ba9..fd060218baa8 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -12775,7 +12775,7 @@ SELINUX SECURITY MODULE
M: Paul Moore
M
The overlayfs tests require setfattr and getfattr which are part of
the attr package in Fedora.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
---
README.md |4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 2c871d3..cf90ef6 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
On Tue, Sep 25, 2018 at 9:58 AM Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 09/25/2018 01:45 AM, Taras Kondratiuk wrote:
> > Quoting Paul Moore (2018-09-24 20:46:57)
> >> On Fri, Sep 21, 2018 at 10:39 AM Stephen Smalley
> >> wrote:
> >>> On 09/20/2018 06:59 PM, Taras K
On Tue, Sep 25, 2018 at 1:45 AM Taras Kondratiuk wrote:
> Quoting Paul Moore (2018-09-24 20:46:57)
> > On Fri, Sep 21, 2018 at 10:39 AM Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > > On 09/20/2018 06:59 PM, Taras Kondratiuk wrote:
> > > > Quoting Stephen Smalley (2018-09-20 07:49:12
n the
filesystem is mounted. We could add a toggle somewhere in selinuxfs,
but I really dislike that idea, and would prefer to find a different
solution if possible. I'm not sure how much flak we would get for
introducing a new mount option, but perhaps
isec->sclass =
> inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
> + isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
> + isec->initialized = 1;
> + }
> + rc = 0;
> + }
> + }
> +
A quick note that my @redhat.com email address is going to stop
working in the next day or two, so if you are using my Red Hat email
address to reach me please start using my @paul-moore.com address.
Everything else, e.g. my community involvement, will remain unaffected.
--
paul moore
www.paul
On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 5:52 PM Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 2:38 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> > The infrastructure bits aren't really my concern; in fact I *like*
> > that the infrastructure is always exercised, it makes
> > testing/debugging easier. I also
On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 4:58 PM Jordan Glover
wrote:
>
> On Thursday, September 13, 2018 9:12 PM, Paul Moore
> wrote:
>
> > On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 11:19 AM Kees Cook keesc...@chromium.org wrote:
> >
> > > On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 6:16 AM, Paul Moore p...@paul-
On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 5:01 PM Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 12:12 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> > None of the above deals with the user experience or support burden a
> > distro would have by forcing stacking on. If we make it an option the
>
> Just to make sure w
On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 8:55 AM peter enderborg
wrote:
> On 09/13/2018 01:11 PM, Michal Hocko wrote:
> > On Thu 13-09-18 09:12:04, peter enderborg wrote:
> >> On 09/13/2018 08:26 AM, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> >>> On 2018/09/13 12:02, Paul Moore wrote:
> >>&g
On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 3:12 AM peter enderborg
wrote:
> On 09/13/2018 08:26 AM, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> > On 2018/09/13 12:02, Paul Moore wrote:
> >> On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 12:43 PM Tetsuo Handa
> >> wrote:
> >>> syzbot is hitting warning at str_read() [1]
On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 2:26 AM Tetsuo Handa
wrote:
> On 2018/09/13 12:02, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 12:43 PM Tetsuo Handa
> > wrote:
> >> syzbot is hitting warning at str_read() [1] because len parameter can
> >> become larger than KMALLO
On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 11:19 AM Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 6:16 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 12:19 AM Kees Cook wrote:
> >> On Tue, Sep 11, 2018 at 9:42 AM, Casey Schaufler
> >> wrote:
> >> > Two proposed
how to answer this question, answer N.
>
> I don't see a good reason to make this a config. Why shouldn't this
> always be enabled?
I do. From a user perspective it is sometimes difficult to determine
the reason behind a failed operation; its is a DAC based denial, the
LSM, or som
always does
the right thing based on size of the allocation and the different slab
allocators ... are we sure that this will always return NULL when (len
+ 1) is greater than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE for the different slab allocator
configurations?
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
__
id *), GFP_KERNEL);
> > > if (!h->htable)
> > > return -ENOMEM;
> > >
> >
> > kvmalloc_array() does not imply __GFP_ZERO.
>
> Thanks, fixed
When you resubmit this patch, please make sure you submit it to the
SELinux
On Fri, Aug 31, 2018 at 11:47 AM Jann Horn wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 3:56 AM Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Mon, Aug 6, 2018 at 5:19 PM Jann Horn wrote:
...
> > In the case where we have a MLS policy loaded (pol->mls_enabled != 0)
> > and scontext is empty (scontext[
rule in policy to
just mark the inode unlabeled and not return an error to the caller.
This permits mounting and access if allowed by policy, e.g. to
unconfined domains.
I also considered changing the behavior of security_genfs_sid() to
never return -ENOENT, but the current behavior is relied upon by
other callers to perform caller-specific handling.
Fixes: 901ef845fa2469c ("selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs")
CC:
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov
Reported-by: Waiman Long
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Tested-by: Waiman Long
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
--
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On Tue, Sep 4, 2018 at 6:18 PM Paul Moore wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 4, 2018 at 4:49 PM Stephen Smalley wrote:
> >
> > commit 901ef845fa2469c ("selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs")
> > broke mounting of cgroup2 under older SELinux policies which lacked
> &g
if (rc == -ENOENT) {
> + /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */
> + *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
> + rc = 0;
> + }
> }
> free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
> return rc;
> --
DEFCONTEXT_STR "defcontext="
> -#define LABELSUPP_STR "seclabel"
> +#define CONTEXT_STR "context="
> +#define FSCONTEXT_STR "fscontext="
> +#define ROOTCONTEXT_STR "rootcontext="
> +#define DEFCONTEXT_STR "defcon
018-08-07 17:26:25 -0400)
selinux/stable-4.18 PR 20180814
Eric Biggers (1):
selinux: constify write_op[]
Paul Moore (1):
MAINTAINERS: update the LSM and SELi
On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 7:01 PM Jann Horn wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 4:07 AM Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Wed, Aug 8, 2018 at 9:56 PM Paul Moore wrote:
> > > On Mon, Aug 6, 2018 at 5:19 PM Jann Horn wrote:
> > > >
> > > > The intended behavior
On Wed, Aug 8, 2018 at 9:56 PM Paul Moore wrote:
>
> On Mon, Aug 6, 2018 at 5:19 PM Jann Horn wrote:
> >
> > The intended behavior change for this patch is to reject any MLS strings
> > that contain (trailing) garbage if p->mls_enabled is true.
> >
>
On Mon, Aug 6, 2018 at 5:19 PM Jann Horn wrote:
>
> The intended behavior change for this patch is to reject any MLS strings
> that contain (trailing) garbage if p->mls_enabled is true.
>
> As suggested by Paul Moore, change mls_context_to_sid() so that the two
> parts of th
On Tue, Aug 7, 2018 at 5:35 PM Paul Moore wrote:
>
> On Sun, Aug 5, 2018 at 5:48 AM nixiaoming wrote:
> > If the resource requested by d_alloc_name is not added to the linked
> > list through d_add, then dput needs to be called to release the
> > subsequent abnormal
inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO);
> - if (!inode)
> + if (!inode) {
> + dput(dentry);
> goto err;
> + }
>
> inode->i_ino = ++fsi->last_ino;
> isec = (struct inode_security_struct
ss/mls.c
> @@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *pol,
> break;
> }
> }
> - if (delim == '-') {
> + if (delim == '-' && l == 0) {
> /
_make_bools
> Sel_make_avc_files
> Sel_make_initcon_files
> Sel_make_perm_files
> Sel_make_class_dir_entries
> Sel_make_policycap
> Sel_fill_super
> Sel_make_policy_nodes
> Sel_make_classes
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
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*, char *, size_t) = {
> [SEL_ACCESS] = sel_write_access,
> [SEL_CREATE] = sel_write_create,
> [SEL_RELABEL] = sel_write_relabel,
> --
> 2.18.0.203.gfac676dfb9-goog
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
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From: Paul Moore
At present the ipv6_renew_options_kern() function ends up calling into
access_ok() which is problematic if done from inside an interrupt as
access_ok() calls WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() on some (all?) architectures
(x86-64 is affected). Example warning/backtrace is shown below:
WARNING
On Wed, Jul 4, 2018 at 1:29 AM David Miller wrote:
> From: Paul Moore
> Date: Mon, 02 Jul 2018 14:20:52 -0400
>
> > -static int ipv6_renew_option(void *ohdr,
> > - struct ipv6_opt_hdr __user *newopt, int
> > newoptlen,
> > -
On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 10:10 PM Joe Perches wrote:
> On Mon, 2018-07-02 at 21:15 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 5:31 PM Joe Perches wrote:
> > > On Mon, 2018-07-02 at 16:51 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 2:39 AM Joe Pe
On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 5:31 PM Joe Perches wrote:
> On Mon, 2018-07-02 at 16:51 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 2:39 AM Joe Perches wrote:
> > > pr_fmt can be used with the pr_ macros to prefix
> > > arbitrary content to logging messages.
> &g
gt; (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
> + mount_options[i],
> + sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
> goto inval;
> }
What tree did you base your patch on? Please base SELinux pa
From: Paul Moore
At present the ipv6_renew_options_kern() function ends up calling into
access_ok() which is problematic if done from inside an interrupt as
access_ok() calls WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() on some (all?) architectures
(x86-64 is affected). Example warning/backtrace is shown below:
WARNING
On July 1, 2018 11:01:04 PM Paul Moore wrote:
> From: Paul Moore
>
> At present the ipv6_renew_options_kern() function ends up calling into
> access_ok() which is problematic if done from inside an interrupt as
> access_ok() calls WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() on some (all?) architectur
From: Paul Moore
At present the ipv6_renew_options_kern() function ends up calling into
access_ok() which is problematic if done from inside an interrupt as
access_ok() calls WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() on some (all?) architectures
(x86-64 is affected). Example warning/backtrace is shown below:
WARNING
Jann Horn (1):
selinux: move user accesses in selinuxfs out of locked regions
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 78 +---
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 8:38 PM Paul Moore wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 8:23 PM Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 8:15 AM Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > > On 06/25/2018 12:34 PM, Jann Horn wrote:
> > > > If a user is accessing a file in selinuxfs
On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 8:23 PM Paul Moore wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 8:15 AM Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > On 06/25/2018 12:34 PM, Jann Horn wrote:
> > > If a user is accessing a file in selinuxfs with a pointer to a userspace
> > > buffer that is backed by e.g. a
d. Even the RHEL-5.x
based systems are at least on v2.6.18.
Regardless, I think this is fine to merge as-is; thanks everyone.
> Otherwise, you can add my
> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
--
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www.paul-moore.com
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On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 6:40 PM Jann Horn wrote:
>
> On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 12:36 AM Paul Moore wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 12:34 PM Jann Horn wrote:
> > > If a user is accessing a file in selinuxfs with a pointer to a userspace
> > > buffer that
c ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file
> *filep,
> if (length)
> goto out;
>
> - length = -ENOMEM;
> - if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
> - goto out;
> -
> - /* No partial writes. */
> - length = -EINVAL;
&g
to ipv6_renew_option() and have it
> do this pointer dance instead?
>
> That's going to definitely be easier to read.
I agree, that struck me as a little odd. I'll rework that too. I'll
send you guys something this week to take a look at.
Thanks.
> I don't know
On Sat, Jun 23, 2018 at 8:16 AM David Miller wrote:
>
> From: Paul Moore
> Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2018 17:18:20 -0400
>
> > From: Paul Moore
> >
> > The ipv6_renew_options_kern() function eventually called into
> > copy_from_user(), despite it not using
From: Paul Moore
The ipv6_renew_options_kern() function eventually called into
copy_from_user(), despite it not using any userspace buffers, which
was problematic as that ended up calling access_ok() which emited
a warning on x86 (and likely other arches as well).
ipv6_renew_options_kern
work interface label (%d)\n",
> - ifindex);
> + pr_warn("SELinux: failure in %s(), unable to determine
> network interface label (%d)\n",
> + __func__, ifindex);
> kfree(new);
> }
>
est_notif %d\n",
>seqno, avc->avc_cache.latest_notif);
> ret = -EAGAIN;
> }
> --
> 2.15.1
>
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
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pr_warn("SELinux: failure in %s(), unable to determine
> network port label\n",
> + __func__);
> kfree(new);
> }
> return ret;
> --
> 2.15.1
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
pr_warn("SELinux: failure in %s(), unable to determine
> network node label\n",
> + __func__);
> kfree(new);
> }
> return ret;
> --
> 2.15.1
>
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
_
rintk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest "
> + pr_debug("%s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest "
> "chain length %d\n", tag, h->nel, slots_used, SIDTAB_SIZE,
>max_chain_len);
> }
>
kb(skb);
> oom:
> - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: OOM in %s\n", __func__);
> + pr_err("SELinux: OOM in %s\n", __func__);
> goto out;
> }
>
> --
> 2.15.1
>
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
__
atic int __init init_sel_fs(void)
>
> selinux_null.mnt = selinuxfs_mount = kern_mount(&sel_fs_type);
> if (IS_ERR(selinuxfs_mount)) {
> - printk(KERN_ERR "selinuxfs: could not mount!\n");
> + pr_err("selinuxfs: c
e *state,
> rc = -EINVAL;
> context1 = sidtab_search(sidtab, sid);
> if (!context1) {
> - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
> + pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
>
return insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
> @@ -562,12 +563,12 @@ int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct
> policydb *pol)
>
> rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
> if (rc < 0) {
> - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab:
);
> goto bad;
> @@ -426,7 +425,7 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
>
> rc = next_entry(&map, fp, sizeof(u64));
> if (rc < 0) {
> - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: ebitmap: truncated map\n"
ot;);
> + pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
> else
> - printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
> + pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
>
>
On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:45 PM Joe Perches wrote:
>
> On Tue, 2018-06-19 at 12:41 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Tue, Jun 12, 2018 at 4:09 AM Peter Enderborg
> > wrote:
> > >
> > > Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings and
> >
pr_err("SELinux: security policydb version %d "
> "(MLS) not backwards compatible\n",
> p->policyvers);
> goto bad;
> @@ -2381,7 +2382,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
> rc = -EINVAL;
> info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
> if (!info) {
> - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to find policy compat info "
> + pr_err("SELinux: unable to find policy compat info "
>"for version %d\n", p->policyvers);
> goto bad;
> }
> @@ -2389,7 +2390,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
> rc = -EINVAL;
> if (le32_to_cpu(buf[2]) != info->sym_num ||
> le32_to_cpu(buf[3]) != info->ocon_num) {
> - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: policydb table sizes (%d,%d) do "
> + pr_err("SELinux: policydb table sizes (%d,%d) do "
>"not match mine (%d,%d)\n", le32_to_cpu(buf[2]),
> le32_to_cpu(buf[3]),
>info->sym_num, info->ocon_num);
> @@ -3417,7 +3418,7 @@ int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
> * careful if you ever try to remove this restriction
> */
> if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) {
> - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: refusing to write policy version
> %d."
> + pr_err("SELinux: refusing to write policy version %d."
>" Because it is less than version %d\n",
> p->policyvers,
>POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB);
> return -EINVAL;
> @@ -3446,7 +3447,7 @@ int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
> /* Write the version, config, and table sizes. */
> info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
> if (!info) {
> - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: compatibility lookup failed for
> policy "
> + pr_err("SELinux: compatibility lookup failed for policy "
> "version %d", p->policyvers);
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> --
> 2.15.1
>
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
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others have mentioned, I think this patch is still a step forward
so I'm going to go ahead and merge it; thanks Peter.
As far as the prefix, or lack of, is concerned, that's probably an
oversight that we should fix at some point, but we would need to look
at each instance to verify.
--
pau
From: Paul Moore
The SELinux code, security/selinux/, already has a MAINTAINERS entry
so exclude it from the security subsystem entry in an effort to better
reflect current practices.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
---
MAINTAINERS |1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS
/blog/d/2017/07/kernel_repo_process.html
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
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On Wed, Jun 13, 2018 at 5:14 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 6/13/2018 12:57 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
>> On Wed, Jun 13, 2018 at 3:30 PM, Joe Perches wrote:
>>> On Wed, 2018-06-13 at 12:19 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
>>>> On Wed, Jun 13, 2018 at 12:04 PM, Joe Perches w
On Wed, Jun 13, 2018 at 3:30 PM, Joe Perches wrote:
> On Wed, 2018-06-13 at 12:19 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
>> On Wed, Jun 13, 2018 at 12:04 PM, Joe Perches wrote:
>> > On Wed, 2018-06-13 at 11:49 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
>> > > On Tue, Jun 12, 2018 at 8:29 PM, Joe P
On Wed, Jun 13, 2018 at 12:46 PM, Richard Haines
wrote:
> On Tue, 2018-06-12 at 18:02 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
>> On Fri, Apr 13, 2018 at 6:13 AM, Richard Haines via Selinux
>> wrote:
>> > Enhance the tests as follows:
>> > 1) Determine number of tests to run
On Wed, Jun 13, 2018 at 12:04 PM, Joe Perches wrote:
> On Wed, 2018-06-13 at 11:49 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
>> On Tue, Jun 12, 2018 at 8:29 PM, Joe Perches wrote:
>> > On Tue, 2018-06-12 at 17:12 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
>> > > Joe, in general I really appreciate
On Tue, Jun 12, 2018 at 8:29 PM, Joe Perches wrote:
> On Tue, 2018-06-12 at 17:12 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
>> Joe, in general I really appreciate the fixes you send, but these
>> patches that cross a lot of subsystem boundaries (this isn't the first
>> one that doe
ame for the
AppArmor patches, but take his work for it, not mine.
Joe, in general I really appreciate the fixes you send, but these
patches that cross a lot of subsystem boundaries (this isn't the first
one that does this) causes unnecessary conflicts in -next and during
the merge window. Could y
s.
> -$result = system
> - "runcon -t test_inet_client_t $basedir/client -e nopeer dgram ::1 65535";
> -ok( $result eq 0 );
> +# This test now passes.
> +$result = system
> + "runcon -t test_inet_client_t $basedir/client -e nopeer dgram ::1
> 6
On Sun, Jun 10, 2018 at 11:55 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Sat, Jun 9, 2018 at 1:12 AM, Sgeeta Dhundale wrote:
>> Thank you Paul for looking at the issue.
>> Yes I am using RHEL6.9/6.10 and OL6.9/6.10.
>> I would wait for the fix, hope it will be fixed soon.
>
> As a FY
From: Paul Moore
Ensure that we apply MCS constraints to the test_inet_server_t domain,
this was causing test failures on RHEL-6.x based systems.
Thanks to Stephen Smalley and Lukas Vrabec for some off-list discussion
related to this problem and its solution.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
tsuites's SELinux policy, I don't believe this is a
problem with the kernel or userspace on RHEL-6.x based systems.
I have some time set aside on Monday and Tuesday to work on SELinux
policy, I'm hopeful that I'll have a fix then.
> On Fri, Jun 8, 2018 at 10:11 PM, Paul M
On Fri, Jun 8, 2018 at 12:35 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 8, 2018 at 9:17 AM, Sgeeta Dhundale wrote:
>> Hi,
>> While running selinux testsuits I am seeing some of the inet_socket tests
>> failure.
>> Googled alotbut couldnt see any similler issue reported as
at what RHEL-6.x based
kernels are currently doing to ensure they are "correct" (I'm going to
assume yes, but that is an assumption), and perhaps update the test
suite to reflect the RHEL-6.x behavior.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
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n my test system now so that's good :)
Thanks again for all the time and effort that went into the SCTP
patches/tests, I know how difficult stuff like this can be at times.
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Selinux@tyc
Guy Briggs (2):
audit: normalize MAC_STATUS record
audit: normalize MAC_POLICY_LOAD record
Souptick Joarder (1):
security: selinux: Change return type to vm_fault_t
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 18 --
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--
paul moore
dr
show up scope global' and using that instead of 'hostname -I'.
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inux/stable-4.17 PR 20180530
Sachin Grover (1):
selinux: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xattr_getsecurity
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
___
On Wed, May 30, 2018 at 11:23 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 05/30/2018 11:19 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
>> On Fri, May 25, 2018 at 4:31 AM, Sachin Grover
>> wrote:
>>> Call trace:
>>> [] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x428
>>> [] show_sta
&context, def_sid);
> if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
> context.str = str;
> - context.len = scontext_len;
> + context.len = strlen(str) + 1;
> str = NULL;
> } else if (rc)
>
From: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
---
tests/binder/test |0
1 file changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
mode change 100644 => 100755 tests/binder/test
diff --git a/tests/binder/test b/tests/binder/test
old mode 100644
new mode 100
From: Paul Moore
Fixes done by 'tools/check-syntax -f'.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
---
tests/binder/test_binder.c |2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tests/binder/test_binder.c b/tests/binder/test_binder.c
index 0d10a58..11fa358 100644
--- a/te
On Tue, May 22, 2018 at 3:52 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Tue, May 22, 2018 at 10:35 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>> On 05/22/2018 07:37 AM, Richard Haines wrote:
>>> Add binder tests. See tests/binder/test_binder.c for details on
>>> message flows to test s
look. I'll merge this now
...
>> +brexit:
I found this bit particularly amusing considering your email domain :)
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www.paul-moore.com
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audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
>
> @@ -2071,8 +2104,8 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
> sessionid = (unsigned
> int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
> }
>
> - task->sessionid = sessionid;
> - task->loginuid = loginuid;
> + task->audit->sessionid = sessionid;
> + task->audit->loginuid = loginuid;
> out:
> audit_log_set_loginuid(oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid,
> sessionid, rc);
> return rc;
> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> index cd18448..92ab849 100644
> --- a/kernel/fork.c
> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
> @@ -1713,7 +1713,7 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct
> *copy_process(
> p->start_time = ktime_get_ns();
> p->real_start_time = ktime_get_boot_ns();
> p->io_context = NULL;
> - audit_set_context(p, NULL);
> + p->audit = NULL;
> cgroup_fork(p);
> #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
> p->mempolicy = mpol_dup(p->mempolicy);
> --
> 1.8.3.1
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
t; (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
> sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2)) {
> audit_sig_pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
> - if (uid_valid(current->loginuid))
> - audit_sig_uid = current->loginuid;
> + auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
> + if (uid_valid(auid))
> + audit_sig_uid = auid;
> else
> audit_sig_uid = uid;
> security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid);
> --
> 1.8.3.1
>
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
t, GFP_KERNEL,
> + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
> AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
> if (unlikely(!ab))
> return;
> --
> 1.8.3.1
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
On Wed, May 16, 2018 at 9:05 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 5/16/2018 5:19 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
>> On Wed, May 16, 2018 at 1:42 PM, Casey Schaufler
>> wrote:
>>> On 5/15/2018 2:49 PM, James Morris wrote:
>>>> On Tue, 15 May 2018, Casey Schaufler wrote:
&
On Wed, May 16, 2018 at 8:48 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 05/16/2018 03:31 AM, Petr Lautrbach wrote:
>> On Tue, May 15, 2018 at 05:03:42PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
>>> From: Paul Moore
>>>
>>> If expand-check is non-zero in semanage.conf the policy lo
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