Subsequent patches will add RO hardening to LSM hooks, however, SELinux
still needs to be able to perform runtime disablement after init to handle
architectures where init-time disablement via boot parameters is not feasible.
Introduce a new kernel configuration parameter CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_
James Morris wrote:
> > Loadable kernel modules used by antivirus software temporarily modify
> > syscall tables
> > (
> > http://stackoverflow.com/questions/13876369/system-call-interception-in-linux-kernel-module-kernel-3-5
> > )
> > in order to register hooks for execve()/open()/close(). It i
On Tue, 14 Feb 2017, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> > diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> > index 118f454..f6f90c4 100644
> > --- a/security/Kconfig
> > +++ b/security/Kconfig
> > @@ -31,6 +31,11 @@ config SECURITY
> >
> > If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
> >
James Morris wrote:
> On Tue, 14 Feb 2017, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
>
> > > diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> > > index 118f454..f6f90c4 100644
> > > --- a/security/Kconfig
> > > +++ b/security/Kconfig
> > > @@ -31,6 +31,11 @@ config SECURITY
> > >
> > > If you are unsure how to
On 2/15/2017 6:42 AM, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> James Morris wrote:
>> On Tue, 14 Feb 2017, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
>>
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 118f454..f6f90c4 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -31,6 +31,11 @@ config SECURITY
>>>
Casey Schaufler wrote:
> I can't say that I'm buying the value of the additional
> complexity here. Sure, you're protecting part of the data
> all the time, but you're exposing part all the time, too.
Will you explain it in detail? As far as I know, __ro_after_init
annotation makes the kernel to c
On Wed, 2017-02-15 at 00:17 +1100, James Morris wrote:
> Subsequent patches will add RO hardening to LSM hooks, however,
> SELinux
> still needs to be able to perform runtime disablement after init to
> handle
> architectures where init-time disablement via boot parameters is not
> feasible.
>
> I
On 2/16/2017 3:00 AM, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> I can't say that I'm buying the value of the additional
>> complexity here. Sure, you're protecting part of the data
>> all the time, but you're exposing part all the time, too.
> Will you explain it in detail? As far as I know,
> > At least one antivirus software (which allows
> > anonymous download of LKM source code) is using LSM hooks since
> > Linux 2.6.32
> > instead of rewriting syscall tables. We are already allowing
> > multiple concurrent
> > LSM modules (up to one fully armored module which uses "struct
> > cre
Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 2/16/2017 3:00 AM, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> > Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >> I can't say that I'm buying the value of the additional
> >> complexity here. Sure, you're protecting part of the data
> >> all the time, but you're exposing part all the time, too.
> > Will you expla
On 2/17/2017 7:05 AM, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 2/16/2017 3:00 AM, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
>>> Casey Schaufler wrote:
I can't say that I'm buying the value of the additional
complexity here. Sure, you're protecting part of the data
all the time, but you're exposi
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