http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/2014/05/the-destruction-of-ukraine.html


THE DESTRUCTION OF UKRAINE


by Patrick Armstrong

The Ukraine that existed last summer, was a space on the map whose boundaries 
were drawn by Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev. Not, perhaps, the people you'd pick 
to draw the boundaries of your country, but that's what happened. In this space 
lived people who certainly regarded themselves as “Ukrainians” but also people 
who regarded themselves as “Russians”, “Tatars”, “Greeks”, “Hungarians” and all 
the other nationalities recognised by the Soviet system. The Russian Empire of 
1917 had possessed much but not all of the territory known as Last Summer's 
Ukraine. In particular, St Petersburg possessed most of central Ukraine as well 
as south and east Ukraine (a territory known as Novorossiya when the Empress 
Catherine conquered it from the Ottomans). The west was then part of the 
Austrian Empire. But, after the collapse of the Russian Empire and the First 
World War, it was taken by Poland. After the attack on Poland in 1939 Stalin 
incorporated it into the Ukrainian SSR. Some small territories were taken from 
Romania and added as well. Krushchev's addition of Crimea rounded out the 
territory the world recognised as independent Ukraine in December 1991.

In simple terms, the present effect of these completely different histories of 
the parts of Last Summer's Ukraine is that the south and east tend to look 
towards Russia while the west looks towards Europe and the centre has a certain 
ambivalence. And so, if you wanted to keep Last Summer's Ukraine together, 
there was a central prohibition, a “First Rule of Ukraine”: “do not attempt to 
force a choice between east and west” or, more plainly, “do not demand that one 
half of the country swallow what only the other half wants”. Violate that rule 
and the whole thing could tear apart. Ukraine could stay together so long as, 
for example, no government in Kiev tried to make Ukraine a formal military ally 
of Russia. Such an idea would be welcomed by many in the east and south but 
would be anathema in the west and, to a lesser degree, in the centre. In short, 
the only choice for a stable Ukraine would be neutrality, or, more grandly, to 
proclaim itself a bridge between Russia and NATO. Likewise an exclusive trade 
agreement with Russia would be welcome in the south and east but unacceptable 
in the west. So, again, the correct stance, the one that would preserve 
Ukraine, would be to advocate trade agreements with both. The “bridge” concept 
again. Everyone who knows anything about the realities of Ukraine knew this. I 
can't stress this enough: this sort of understanding would have been Lecture 1 
of Ukraine 1011. So long as one half did not have the other half's preference 
shoved down its throat, the two halves could rub along together. But that is 
precisely what the West did. Twice. The West pushed the NATO option in the 
so-called “Orange Revolution” of 2005 and pushed an exclusive trade deal with 
the EU in 2013. If one wanted to tear Ukraine apart, two more explosive issues 
than military alliances and exclusive trade could not be found. When last 
Summer's Ukraine survived the first Western attempt to blow it up, the West 
tried again2, this time with trade.3

The second attempt to destroy Ukraine succeeded: Last Summer's Ukraine will 
never appear on a world map again. Crimea is gone forever and, by all accounts, 
quite happy to be back in Russia (where, it should be noted, it was for 171 
years until Khrushchev's whimsical gift). Donetsk and Lugansk have indicated 
their unwillingness to follow Kiev in its present form. They will, no doubt, 
soon be followed by other oblasts in Novorossiya unless Kiev changes its 
behaviour4.

And the probabilities of Kiev changing its behaviour are, at present sight, 
very low; its use of the absurd word “terrorist” to describe the resistance, 
apart from the cringing obeisance to Washington, is all that we need to know. 
People with a different opinion of the constitutional structure who noted that 
the very first thing the new power in Kiev did was  
<http://rt.com/news/ukraine-language-lavrov-asselborn-627/> ban their language5 
are not “terrorists”. Thus the end of 2014 is likely to find a good chunk of 
the south and east of former Ukraine either independent de facto or part of the 
Russian Federation. There is a very good chance that Rump Ukraine will be in 
civil strife – not everyone in central Ukraine is as enamoured of  
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stepan_Bandera> Stepan Bandera and the  
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Division_Galicia> SS Galician Division as the 
members of  <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25571805> Pravy Sektor and 
Svoboda. Added to which there will be some level of fighting along the border 
of Novorossiya and Rump Ukraine because the “opinion border” is not clear-cut. 
The economic future of Rump Ukraine is hardly brighter. Today's Ukraine is 
broke, the east and south are its most productive parts; if they're gone to 
independence or to Russia, then what's left? Ukraine's neighbours are starting 
to eye territory – the leaders of Hungary are  
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/10/us-hungary-orban-idUSBREA4904X20140510>
 speaking about the rights of Hungarophones in Ukraine; others will no doubt 
follow as the prospects of profit grow higher. After all, Rump Ukraine is full 
of bits of what were in other countries only a century ago and, if its leaders 
are lost in a Ukrainian super-nationalist dream, many of its inhabitants are 
not. In that part of the world, the Second World War was only a few moments ago 
and emotions set then are still strong.

Not that Rump Ukraine's new friends are offering it much money. The USA and the 
EU between them have offered  
<http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1435976/china-sues-ukraine-breach-us3b-loan-grain-agreement>
 about as much as China is suing Ukraine for. The IMF only gives loans; and, if 
there is any reality to these loans, much of them will have to cover the 
billions Gazprom is owed . But, in reality, that money is likely gone. Gazprom 
understands this and, starting next month, further gas will be on a cash in 
advance arrangement. I am amused to see the BBC saying: “ 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/business-27420856> There is a danger for EU nations 
that Ukraine will start taking the gas Russia had earmarked for its European 
clients, something it did when it was cut off from Russian gas during previous 
disputes in 2006 and 2009.” I say “amused” because my memory last time was that 
the  <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7240462.stm> BBC was reporting on the 
sinister “Russian gas weapon6 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7240462.stm> 
”; not that the Ukrainians were stealing Europe-bound Russian gas. But, and 
this is easy to predict: Gazprom will demand cash in advance; Kiev will 
promise, bluster, but pay nothing; Gazprom will cut Rump Ukraine's share of the 
supplies going west; Kiev will siphon off what it needs7; Europe suffers. Will 
Europe this time blame Moscow? If it does, we know, thanks to the BBC's 
admission, not only that it it's lying but that it knows it's lying. Perhaps it 
will “lend” Rump Ukraine the cash to pay Gazprom. Which would be ironic. In 
short, the West broke Ukraine, it now owns it. Or, to put it more precisely, it 
owns that part that Moscow doesn't want. And what part that is is entirely up 
to Moscow to choose. So, an operation that may have had its origin in a desire 
to weaken Moscow (see Brzezinski's argument below) has actually strengthened 
Moscow by adding to its territory, influence and security. And, also – this 
will be the next shoe to drop – adding to its influence and respect in the 
world8.

In 1997 Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote “Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a 
Eurasian empire”. And Brzezinski keeps it up today: in a March piece in the  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/zbigniew-brzezinski-after-putins-aggression-in-ukraine-the-west-must-be-ready-to-respond/2014/03/03/25b3f928-a2f5-11e3-84d4-e59b1709222c_story.html>
 Washington Post, while managing to compare Putin with Hitler, Mussolini and a 
Mafia gangster, he called for full Western support for the self-appointed 
government in Kiev; while the West should not “threaten war”, it should assure 
Kiev that the “Ukrainian army can count on immediate and direct Western aid”. 
Apart from the fact that there is no Ukrainian Army any more, such assurances 
are, in fact, exactly how wars get started9. Notable in this piece is his 
complete disregard of the existential problem of Ukraine: namely that lots of 
citizens of Last Summer's Ukraine would rather be in Russia. No doubt this 
First Rule of Ukraine escaped his attention in his eagerness to block Putin's 
imagined desire to create a “Eurasian empire”. But, nonetheless his equation 
that Russia+Ukraine=Empire while Russia-Ukraine=something else (but evidently a 
something else no less threatening) is having an influence in Washington these 
days.

If Victoria Nuland and her bosses had in mind to deny Ukraine to Russia, they 
have completely failed. A peaceful, non-aligned, prosperous Ukraine would have 
been all the “barrier” they imagined Russia needed – as well as having suited 
Moscow perfectly. But that is gone. Russia now has Crimea (and NATO does not 
get the port of Sevastopol10). By the end of the year it is probable that much 
of Novorossiya will have seceded from Kiev; whether these bits become part of 
the Russian Federation is Moscow's decision to make and Rump Ukraine will be a 
nightmare that the West will be expected to pay for. But the West can't afford 
to prop it up. If their dream was to have Ukraine in NATO, or the EU, they are 
welcome to Rump Ukraine; but it will be no asset. It's rare to hear a coup 
d'état plotted live so it is worth refreshing one's memory with the  
<http://www.bing.com/videos/search?q=nuland%20ukraine%20phone&qs=n&form=QBVR&pq=nuland%20ukraine%20phone&sc=0-15&sp=-1&sk=#view=detail&mid=6B58E645D80875E3E9B76B58E645D80875E3E9B7>
 Nuland-Pyatt phone call in which everything had to “stick together” and “gain 
altitude” before the Russians “torpedoed it”. Well, everything came unstuck and 
crashed to the ground without the need for a Russian torpedo. And the reason is 
simple: Nuland & Co ignored Ukraine 101: they wanted one half to swallow 
something that only the other half wanted. If the EU had allowed Ukraine, as it 
allows Canada, to have a trade agreement with another bloc, and had Washington 
kept out of it, we wouldn't be where we are today and Last Summer's Ukraine 
would still exist. There was no need for Moscow to “torpedo” anything: Nuland's 
mix blew up on its own.

So what for the future? It's already clear that Crimea is and will remain part 
of Russia. Lugansk and Donetsk will be independent or part of Russia (although 
it is not yet completely impossible that they could be in Ukraine but with real 
autonomy). Other eastern and southern oblasts of Last Summer's Ukraine will 
join them. Rump Ukraine will be a terrible place to live, even if Pravy Sektor 
and Svoboda aren't ruling it. Europe and Washington are not going to spend the 
money to make it anything else11. NATO is not as powerful as it likes to think: 
the participating European members could not bring down so insignificant an 
opponent as Gadaffi without American support. Who expects Washington to start a 
new military adventure in Ukraine? With its deficit? After so many years of war 
elsewhere? And Russia is not an opponent to be dealt with off stage by a few 
drones or aircraft sorties. There is nothing to suggest that anyone in Rump 
Ukraine has the stomach for real fighting: it's one thing to murder civilians 
in Odessa12, quite another to take on Russian Spetsnaz. And, at that, it's not 
as if Kiev's forces are doing very well in eastern Ukraine against the local 
militias: while  <http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_05_17/272479000/> 650 
casualties seems improbable, the note of triumph is not misplaced. After a 
month,  
<http://darussophile.com/2014/05/the-anti-terrorist-operation-in-the-ukraine-has-been-a-disaster/>
 Kiev's effort to gain control has been a complete failure.

It will not be easy for Washington and Brussels to back themselves out of this 
mess they have created. Too much has been said to suddenly “discover” that the 
Kiev government is riddled with unpleasant characters. Or that worshippers of 
Stepan Bandera don't really “share Western values”. The issue has been made 
into a light show of good and evil and the compliant Western media has been 
shouting out its assigned lines without pause13. Ukraine is too big and too 
close to home to forget as Libya, Kosovo and other catastrophic results of 
Western “humanitarian interventions” have been forgotten. Its a serious 
problem. And so casually started.

There is possibly one way that that Washington and Brussels can get out of this 
mess. If the election this week is vaguely credible, (and we may be confident 
that, despite the fact that one candidate has  
<http://ukraine-english-news.com/forum/index.php?topic=17358.0> pulled out 
because he kept getting  
<http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/video/ukrainian-prorussia-presidential-candidate-is-beaten/3470373023001>
 beaten up by  
<http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117505/ukraines-only-hope-nationalism> Anne 
Applebaum's “patriots” and another has  <http://en.itar-tass.com/world/731986> 
dropped out because he sees the election as illegitimate, that the east and 
south have no candidate and that their political party has effectively been 
banned, that many areas in the east won't vote at all and that they are under 
attack, that one of the two likely winners, neither of  
<http://ukrainianweek.com/Politics/110202> whom could be called “new”, says, if 
not elected, there will be a “ <http://en.itar-tass.com/world/730688> third 
round of revolution”; despite all that, we may be confident that the USA, the 
OSCE, EU and so on will say the election was perfectly acceptable) then the 
winner, if it is  <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petro_Poroshenko> Poroshenko, 
could take the only possible way out. This is, as Moscow has been saying from 
the beginning, a united Ukraine (minus Crimea of course – that is too late) 
which is not in NATO (or the Russian equivalent) and is not exclusively 
attached to the EU (or to the Russian equivalent). In short, a Ukraine that, as 
this paper began, hews to the First Rule of Ukraine: neither the one nor the 
other but something of each. Then – another if – if the neo-nazis can be reined 
in, then possibly things can get back to some sort of cautious coexistence. But 
– another if – the regions must be given a good deal of real autonomy14. And 
the final if, the most important one – Washington shuts its mouth and keeps out 
of the whole tortuous process of reconstructing Ukraine. A lot of ifs here and 
therefore a small probability but not completely impossible. Otherwise it's 
more secessions – especially as the economic disasters bite – and Rump Ukraine 
sinking into chaos and misery.

1 It is interesting to see a prominent American think tank finally (finally) 
getting it:  
<http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2014/05/21-ukraine-prize-russia-west-ukraine-gaddy-ickes>
 Ukraine: A Prize Neither Russia Nor the West Can Afford to Win. Of course, the 
point is that it's really the West that can't afford it.

2 Were they actually trying to tear Ukraine apart? Who can say; the First Rule 
of Ukraine is so plain to see that it is hard to believe that anyone can be 
that stupid.

3 But there was something in the lengthy document about “ 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/pdf/3_ua_title_ii_pol_dialogue_reform_pol_assoc_coop_convergence_in_fsp_en.pdf>
 gradual convergence on foreign and security matters”. So the first was not 
forgotten.

4 Not utterly impossible; see last paragraph; but a lot of ifs, not least that 
Washington steps back completely.

5 The fact that the Acting President immediately vetoed it does not mean that 
the message was not received and understood.

6 I challenge the reader to find, anywhere in this BBC report, the blunt 
admission that Russia sent enough gas westwards to fulfil its obligations to 
its European customers but Ukraine “took it”. Which is what the BBC now says 
happened.

7 Unless, of course, Pravy Sektor blows up the pipeline as its leader  
<http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/ukraine-neo-fascist-leader-dmitry-yarosh-vows-destroy-russias-gas-pipelines-stop-world-war-1440620>
 threatensto do. (Typical of the Western selective and intentionally misleading 
coverage of the actual reality in Kiev, search this piece for any mention that 
Yarosh is Deputy Secretary of National Security.)

8 The  
<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russia-considers-un-vote-on-crimea-annexation-a-victory/497027.html>
 UN General Assembly vote of 27 March is revealing. Despite the widespread 
assertion of the Western media that Russia was “isolated” when the condemnation 
of its annexation of Crimea passed 100-11 it is more significant that 82 
countries either abstained or didn't do anything.  
<http://www.jpost.com/International/US-surprised-Israel-did-support-UN-vote-on-Ukraines-territorial-integrity-348564>
 Israel being one of the latter to Washington's “surprise”. Not so condemnatory.

9 A host of assurances, Russia for Serbia, Germany for Austria, Britain for 
France, were instrumental in transforming another Balkan squabble into the 
First World War.

10 Did the US military have plans for Sevastopol?  
<http://futuristrendcast.wordpress.com/2014/04/24/breaking-us-planned-to-turn-crimea-into-military-base-against-russia/>
 This writer thinks so.  <http://en.itar-tass.com/world/729468> EUCOM denies it 
but does admit to a “humanitarian facilitation project”. “Humanitarian” of 
course has acquired some interesting meanings of late  
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68233/stewart-patrick/libya-and-the-future-of-humanitarian-intervention>
 in places like Libya.

11  
<http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2014/05/21-ukraine-prize-russia-west-ukraine-gaddy-ickes>
 $276 billion is the authors' starting bid.

12 Since the Western media carefully avoids discussing the slaughter in Odessa 
on 2 May , we must rely on other sources for “ 
<http://www.voltairenet.org/article183807.html> Bloodbath in Odessa guided by 
interim rulers of Ukraine”.

13 The New York Times set some sort of record: 20 April  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/21/world/europe/photos-link-masked-men-in-east-ukraine-to-russia.html?_r=1>
 “Photos Link Masked Men in East Ukraine to Russia”; 24 April  
<http://publiceditor.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/24/aftermath-of-ukraine-photo-story-shows-need-for-more-caution/?_php=true&_type=blogs&ref=thepubliceditor&_r=0>
 “Aftermath of Ukraine Photo Story Shows Need for More Caution”. As often in 
these cases, the readers' comments are illuminating.

14 No more governors of regions appointed by Kiev. Something, that when Russia 
did it was much condemned by the West, but not even mentioned in the case of 
Ukraine.

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