Hi Srinam,
Thanks for your questions - let me try and answer them as best I can...
> I went through your -01 draft and the SIDR presentation slides from last week
> once again,
> and have the following questions:
>
> (1) An update with prefix-origin pair {5.0.0.0/24, AS64511} is received.
>
I went through your -01 draft and the SIDR presentation slides from last week
once again,
and have the following questions:
(1) An update with prefix-origin pair {5.0.0.0/24, AS64511} is received.
There is a ROA: {5.0.0.0/22, maxLength = 24; AS64511} in the RPKI.
However, it is signed using a
Sandy
In the meeting materials for IETF89 for SIDR, 'Rsync considered harmful'
appears twice - probably about right! - but other presentations are
lacking. Can you fix, please?
Tom Petch
- Original Message -
From: "Murphy, Sandra"
To:
Sent: Friday, March 07, 2014 3:07 AM
/listinfo/sid
On Tue, Mar 11, 2014 at 10:34 AM, Stephen Kent wrote:
> Chris,
>
>
>> It was pointed out in passing (hallway/table conversation) that in:
>>draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-05 (at least 05)
>>
>> there's this text in section 2:
>>
>> "NOTE: The exception to the above hashing algorithm is the use of
Chris,
It was pointed out in passing (hallway/table conversation) that in:
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-05 (at least 05)
there's this text in section 2:
"NOTE: The exception to the above hashing algorithm is the use of
SHA-1 [SHS] when CAs generate authority and subject key
The router needs the router - AS mappings for the bgpsec path validation to
work, so the rpki-rtr protocol needs to provide that info to the routers. That
means a new rpki-rtr PDU needs to be provided. The chairs have decided this
need is clear and a new version of RFC6810 is needed with the
The comment from me about "to provide that new draft" was a comment about a new
version of the router certs draft (draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles), so
your comment applies.
The minutes note your comment during the discussion with Rob suggesting the
need for more than one AS in the route
