On 2015-08-11 15:48, Stephen Kent wrote:
> Sean,
>
>> ...
>> Okay so I want to agree. But, I’m still trying to grok something
>> you sent in an earlier msg
>> (https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidr/9vVsAheeeZMj7GI00nyGBDHBqPI)
>> that I think is related when you said:
>>
>> RPs would not h
Sean,
...
Okay so I want to agree. But, I’m still trying to grok something you sent in
an earlier msg
(https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidr/9vVsAheeeZMj7GI00nyGBDHBqPI) that I
think is related when you said:
RPs would not have to calculate/validate the SKI value; they would only
On 2015-08-11 13:09, Sean Turner wrote:
> Saw you’re earlier msg, but figured I’d just reply to this one.
>
> On Aug 07, 2015, at 12:07, Richard Hansen wrote:
>
>> On 2015-08-07 06:35, Randy Bush wrote:
This change would require certificates to be re-issued (or possibly
keys to be roll
Saw you’re earlier msg, but figured I’d just reply to this one.
On Aug 07, 2015, at 12:07, Richard Hansen wrote:
> On 2015-08-07 06:35, Randy Bush wrote:
>>> This change would require certificates to be re-issued (or possibly
>>> keys to be rolled) all the way down from Trust Anchors. When the
>
(I see there’s been some more mail on this thread so hopefully I won’t
contradict myself later :/ )
No fear about harming SHA256 deployment! We’re already using it for the
hash+sigs of the Manifest, ROAs, RPKI-certs (both for RPKI and BGPsec).
On Aug 06, 2015, at 20:33, George Michaelson wrot
