Updated security section to reflect SecDir and AD review.
--John
> On Nov 30, 2016, at 12:32 PM, internet-dra...@ietf.org wrote:
>
>
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories.
> This draft is a work item of the Secure Inter-Domain Routing of the IETF.
On Nov 30, 2016, at 9:18 AM, Randy Bush wrote:
> section 4.5 of 4593 is relevant, or all of sec 4
Thanks, used in the text below.
> i am kinda sad that 7132 is not too good on this
I looked there first but it's a *path* security threat model so can't really be
blamed for not
On Nov 30, 2016, at 8:37 AM, Randy Bush wrote:
> the point is the tcp 'stream' does not have to be hacked in any way.
> the hack is at a layer above.
I agree. I also agree with your earlier
On Nov 29, 2016, at 8:40 PM, Randy Bush wrote:
> none of this is new.
I
On Nov 29, 2016, at 9:02 PM, Chris Morrow wrote:
> Of course, just wiping out the prefixes in flight
Right, exactly. The OV "attack" is just a baroque version of underclaiming,
only it's an inferior version because there's a greater audit trail.
> and stitching back
>
On Nov 13, 2016, at 1:40 AM, Alvaro Retana (aretana) wrote:
> C1. The reference to rfc7607 should be Informative.
Done (in -10 candidate source).
> C2. [Major] Security Considerations. I think that there is one consideration
> that should be mentioned in this section:
All,
Thanks to Geoff and Tom for pointing out that we do have definitions of what PS
and Experimental mean. If those definitions are wrong (c.f. some of the
comments relating to whether some designation does or doesn't advance some
greater good or agenda) is not a question for SIDR to decide
Hi Everybody,
Just when we thought we were completely done with this draft, we were
approached by Thomas King who pointed out a use case that can be enabled by
validation signaling, which benefits from a minor revision in the language of
the draft. Here's the revision:
OLD:
By default,
Hi Everyone,
This is a revision to address the comments that arose on the IDR list as part
of the SIDR WGLC for this document. I summarized those comments back at
IETF-90, see https://tools.ietf.org/agenda/90/slides/slides-90-sidr-5.pdf.
The authors believe the document is ready to advance
Hi Wes,
I believe -05 should work for you -- we updated it to say 'don't leak across AS
boundaries unless configured to do so'. Presumably in your case you would do
that configuration.
Thanks,
--John
> On Jun 14, 2014, at 12:25 AM, George, Wes wrote:
>
>
> On
Hi Robert,
I didn't see any specific change requests in your followups to this thread and
indeed the changes in -05 are (I believe) consistent with the positions you
took, but in any case you might like to take a look at the update.
Thanks,
--John
> On Jun 12, 2014, at 5:06 PM, Robert Raszuk
If you don't mind uploading a new new one to reflect the current plan for
Friday, it would be helpful. Thanks!
--John
> On Nov 3, 2015, at 7:48 AM, Sandra Murphy wrote:
>
> A new agenda was uploaded.
>
> Thanks to Tim to catching an error in the header, a holdover from a
On Oct 20, 2014, at 12:50 PM, John Scudder j...@juniper.net wrote:
...
We will also be holding a joint meeting with SIDR on November 9 from 9:00 to
11:30.
...
Not sure how I came up with November 9. The correct date for the joint meeting
is Friday, November 14, 9:00 to 11:30.
Thanks,
On Oct 23, 2012, at 12:13 PM, Jakob Heitz jakob.he...@ericsson.com wrote:
origin does not seem to be an attribute subject to change.
In theory you're right, if the attribute were being used as originally
envisioned. In practice, as Warren points out, you're not because it's not.
People do set
On Aug 3, 2012, at 1:51 PM, Sriram, Kotikalapudi
kotikalapudi.sri...@nist.gov wrote:
Let us consider this example:
(B1B2)(B3B4)(B5B6)
-AS1AS2AS3
where AS1, AS2 and AS3 form a confed, and
the update is propagating from
On Aug 3, 2012, at 2:12 PM, John G. Scudder j...@juniper.net wrote:
One other option does occur to me however, and I'm not sure why I didn't
think of it before: for *every* crossing of a confederation member border,
set the flag, so it has the semantics of this is a confederation hop rather
Randy, Sandy and I realized there is a problem with confeds. As written right
now, the entering-the-confed marker is applied by the first router sending the
route across an internal-to-the-confed boundary (let's call this router R). It
can't be applied by the external peer router sending it to
In addition to Wes and Randy's observations about trust boundaries, it's also
the case that mechanically, the confederation embeds its loop prevention
information in the AS path, so we have to have *some* way of dealing with it
since bgpsec is monkeying with the AS path. The same problem
True in the context of bgpsec. But this is just pfx-validate. Nonetheless, I am
OK with leaving it as an exercise for the implementor -- as Hannes notes, this
is how it ends up working anyway.
--John
On Jun 12, 2012, at 12:48 PM, Murphy, Sandra wrote:
Speaking as regular ol' member:
wrt:
Missed one:
On May 29, 2012, at 2:24 PM, John G. Scudder wrote:
Philosophically, the thing that makes me worry the most is that we're
cutting out one of BGP's fundamental elements and replacing it with one
which provides only a subset of its semantics. Specific things missing
include
On May 30, 2012, at 8:02 PM, Sriram, Kotikalapudi wrote:
Right, and agreed (see formally an attack above). But to repeat my further
point, if the AS_PATH is present (even if not secured): at least there's
scope for a
network operator on the receiving end to tolerate the validation failure
[Sigh. Again with the right source email address.]
Missed one:
On May 29, 2012, at 2:24 PM, John G. Scudder wrote:
Philosophically, the thing that makes me worry the most is that we're
cutting out one of BGP's fundamental elements and replacing it with one
which provides only a subset
[added IDR to cc]
On May 30, 2012, at 12:10 PM, Murphy, Sandra wrote:
...
About extensibility - as you say, any new segment type not built into
implementations would result in fatal errors. So any new segment type would
need to be built into implementations before use. The question then
On May 22, 2012, at 5:46 PM, Matt Lepinski wrote:
Other than confeds are there any other potentially open issues related to the
removal of AS_Path?
(I think this just recapitulates what I said at the interim, but maybe it's
worth saying again for the list.)
Philosophically, the thing that
represent a fairly major change to the protocol, I wanted to
make sure those not following SIDR were aware of it. Please cross-post any
comments to sidr@ietf.org.
(See http://tools.ietf.org/html/ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-03 Section 3.)
--John
Begin forwarded message:
From: John G. Scudder j
On May 29, 2012, at 2:24 PM, John G. Scudder wrote:
It's also worth noting that leaving AS_PATH in would not be without cost. In
the cases where the content of AS_PATH is isomorphic to that of
BGPSEC_Path_Signatures, there's no problem -- but in those cases AS_PATH
clearly could have been
[Once more from proper account, sigh.]
On May 29, 2012, at 2:24 PM, John G. Scudder wrote:
It's also worth noting that leaving AS_PATH in would not be without cost. In
the cases where the content of AS_PATH is isomorphic to that of
BGPSEC_Path_Signatures, there's no problem -- but in those
Wes,
On May 23, 2012, at 9:22 PM, Wes Hardaker wrote:
Bittorrent works well for sharing the load, but either requires a lot of
bittorrent start files (whatever they're called), which then becomes
hard to syncronize; or a small number of bittorrent files (one per
aggregation point) that
A few things in addition to what others have said:
On May 3, 2012, at 12:08 AM, Chris Morrow wrote:
o shared slides prior to the meeting (no slides, no slot. potentially)
We covered a fair amount of ground at the interim without using slides at all.
Based on that, I'm not sure where this
Support.
--John
On Jan 20, 2012, at 4:19 PM, Murphy, Sandra wrote:
The working group has been requested to adopt draft-ymbk-rpki-rtr-impl-01.txt
as a working group draft.
The draft is available at http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ymbk-rpki-rtr-impl.
Please respond to the list to say
Retro-support.
--John
On Oct 14, 2011, at 10:50 AM, Sandra Murphy wrote:
This call for adoption did not get sufficient support to judge the wg as
willing to adopt this draft.
--Sandy, speaking as wg chair with wg ceremonial garb donned
On Tue, 9 Aug 2011, Sandra Murphy wrote:
The
On Mar 4, 2011, at 5:39 AM, Christopher Morrow wrote:
...
A few folks noted that perhaps 'route' was not the right word here,
perhaps NLRI is. Using a wikipedia definition:
I love Wikipedia, but the quoted definition is wrong, at least with respect to
the definitions given in RFC 4271:
1.1.
On Feb 24, 2011, at 10:00 PM, Russ White wrote:
Can you explain the difference in some other way that doesn't mix the
two ideas?
Since after reading your message carefully three times I don't understand your
question, I'm unable to answer it. Sorry.
--John
Andrew,
On Feb 24, 2011, at 1:17 AM, Andrew Lange wrote:
Given the thread, I can understand your frustration. And, I could have made
myself more clear. I'll try: given the policies that AS_B might be
implementing, we cannot know for certain, without AS_B publishing their
policies, if
On Feb 16, 2011, at 7:53 PM, Christopher Morrow wrote:
[...]
The purpose of the SIDR working group is to reduce vulnerabilities in
the inter-domain routing system. The two vulnerabilities that will be
addressed are:
* Is an Autonomous System (AS) authorized to originate an IP prefix
*
George and Geoff --
Some comments, questions, and nits for you (in that order).
Comment: I think this text, from S 4.1, is not quite right:
This approach to route object origination validation uses a model of
positive security attestations, where information that cannot be
validated
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