> How long is too long for a replay attack to go unnoticed? I'd bet that
> a lot of the folks worried about this would answer in minutes, while
> those concerned primarily with the hardware in their routers would
> answer in hours...
from the bgpsec-ops docco
As beaconing places a load on the
-Original Message-
From: sidr-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:sidr-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Jeffrey
Haas
Sent: Friday, April 01, 2011 9:12 AM
To: sidr@ietf.org
Subject: [sidr] IETF 80 - suggestions related to expiry time and BGP
implementation
2. Short expiry times are an attack on the
> 1. Text should be added to strongly recommend that when a route that is
> about to expire is having an update of the expiration advertised that
> receiving peers should treat the reception of an update with no other
> changes to the reachability than the expiration time and signatures as a
> ref
Per the microphone at SIDR on Friday:
1. Text should be added to strongly recommend that when a route that is
about to expire is having an update of the expiration advertised that
receiving peers should treat the reception of an update with no other
changes to the reachability than the expiration
