> So, since TLS is not adding anything critical, and creates some
> operational issues, I propose that we remove TLS from the protocol.
This seems quite reasonable to me.
Russ
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On 27/04/10 12:24 PM, "Rob Austein" wrote:
> I'm writing to propose that we remove all use and mention of TLS from
> the RPKI "up-down" protocol described in the (expired) draft
> draft-ietf-sidr-rescerts-provisioning.
>
I second this given my observations from October last year
(http://www.
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Hi
> As one of the participants in the testbed, I'd like to chime in here
> --getting the TLS config correct is really hard, and troubleshooting
> that various failure modes is seriously non-trivial.
I'll admit that I'm one of the testbed participant
On Apr 26, 2010, at 10:24 PM, Rob Austein wrote:
I'm writing to propose that we remove all use and mention of TLS from
the RPKI "up-down" protocol described in the (expired) draft
draft-ietf-sidr-rescerts-provisioning.
I would like to second this.
Background: In June 2007 we had a team of
I'm writing to propose that we remove all use and mention of TLS from
the RPKI "up-down" protocol described in the (expired) draft
draft-ietf-sidr-rescerts-provisioning.
Background: In June 2007 we had a team of security reviewers (Steve
Bellovin, Steve Kent, and Russ Housley) examine the "up-down
