uit."
What is it that thing which, so to speak, moves or compels a rational mind
to accept a position not previously held? It's useful here I think to
speak of the so-called 'force of logic' but I'm open to other suggestions.
-gts
-
This list is sponsored
nvalid, for example if modus ponens
does not always hold, then that which we normally consider intelligent
discourse becomes meaningless gibberish.
Beyond that, I will follow John's excellent advice: "it's a mistake to
think you must answer the skeptic on his own terms."
at you try so often to persuade
me that your arguments are true.
-gts
-
This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email
To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to:
http://v2.listbox.com/member/?list_id=11983
be debated whether platonists were idealists. There is no
philosophy more idealistic than platonism! It was Plato who concocted the
idea of idealism in the first place. :)
-gts
-
This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email
To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to
to be holding tight to
belief in absolutes.
If we can't trust modus ponens then we might just as well close our email
accounts.
-gts
-
This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email
To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to:
http://v2.listbox.com/member/?list_id=11983
rned to live with the dark cloud of Humean skepticism hanging over
my head, but criticisms of deduction strike me as assaults on sanity
itself. :)
-gts
-
This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email
To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to:
http://v2.listbox.com/member/?list_id=11983
all the
same as "p, therefore q". The Tortoise in Carroll's story failed to make
this important distinction, confounding poor Achilles.
The Principles of Mathematics by Bertrand Russell
http://fair-use.org/bertrand-russell/the-principles-of-mathematics/s.38
-gts
-
T
e the allegedly
metaphysical notions of 'objective probability' and 'independence' to his
equivalent notions of 'subjective probability' and 'exchangeability'.
Nothing there as far as I know about the sort of maximum-entropy
randomness that I think incompressib
