Re: [Sks-devel] quality of keyservers offering hkps

2014-08-14 Thread Matthias Schreiber
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 14. August 2014 05:31:40 MESZ, Phil Pennock sks-devel-p...@spodhuis.org wrote: What is the threat model which you are trying to protect against? As the public keys themselves are of cause nothing which needs to be secured, I see these two

Re: [Sks-devel] quality of keyservers offering hkps

2014-08-14 Thread Kiss Gabor (Bitman)
As the public keys themselves are of cause nothing which needs to be secured, I see these two possible aspects: - meta data like 'who up-/downloaded which keys' could be revealed yes - mitm attacks may manipulate up-/downloaded keys no Every uploaded key can be manipulated legally by

Re: [Sks-devel] quality of keyservers offering hkps

2014-08-14 Thread Christoph Egger
Kiss Gabor (Bitman) ki...@ssg.ki.iif.hu writes: - mitm attacks may manipulate up-/downloaded keys no Every uploaded key can be manipulated legally by anyone. (I.e. you attach a new signature to your friend's key and you send back to the key servers.) Moreover anybody can send a totally

Re: [Sks-devel] quality of keyservers offering hkps

2014-08-14 Thread Gabor Kiss
You can still block certain pakets from up/downloads (i.e. not providing signature pakets for some key -- kind of a DoS when checking a trust path) We spoke about information leakage and manipulation so far. DoS is a quite other topic. SKS network is quite vulnerable from this point of view. A

Re: [Sks-devel] quality of keyservers offering hkps

2014-08-14 Thread Kristian Fiskerstrand
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On 08/14/2014 02:12 PM, Christoph Egger wrote: Kiss Gabor (Bitman) ki...@ssg.ki.iif.hu writes: - mitm attacks may manipulate up-/downloaded keys no Every uploaded key can be manipulated legally by anyone. (I.e. you attach a new signature

Re: [Sks-devel] quality of keyservers offering hkps

2014-08-14 Thread Pete Stephenson
On 8/14/2014 2:23 PM, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote: On 08/14/2014 02:12 PM, Christoph Egger wrote: Kiss Gabor (Bitman) ki...@ssg.ki.iif.hu writes: - mitm attacks may manipulate up-/downloaded keys no Every uploaded key can be manipulated legally by anyone. (I.e. you attach a new signature

Re: [Sks-devel] quality of keyservers offering hkps

2014-08-14 Thread Kristian Fiskerstrand
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On 08/14/2014 04:04 PM, Pete Stephenson wrote: On 8/14/2014 2:23 PM, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote: On 08/14/2014 02:12 PM, Christoph Egger wrote: Kiss Gabor (Bitman) ki...@ssg.ki.iif.hu writes: - mitm attacks may manipulate up-/downloaded keys

Re: [Sks-devel] quality of keyservers offering hkps

2014-08-14 Thread Kristian Fiskerstrand
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On 08/14/2014 04:36 PM, Pete Stephenson wrote: On 8/14/2014 4:06 PM, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote: On 08/14/2014 04:04 PM, Pete Stephenson wrote: My (albeit limited) understanding is that SKS is an append-only system, and that it is not possible

Re: [Sks-devel] quality of keyservers offering hkps

2014-08-14 Thread Phil Pennock
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 2014-08-14 at 13:30 +0200, Matthias Schreiber wrote: On 14. August 2014 05:31:40 MESZ, Phil Pennock sks-devel-p...@spodhuis.org wrote: What is the threat model which you are trying to protect against? As the public keys themselves are of

[Sks-devel] Problem with SKS on Ubuntu

2014-08-14 Thread Anthony Papillion
Hello Everyone, I've installed sks on Ubuntu 14.04 from the repositories and I'm getting an error when trying to import keys to do the initial seeding. When I run ./sks_build.sh and select fastbuild I am told that the KeyDB directory already exists and the script. Problem is, I can't actually

[Sks-devel] SKS peering request [pgp.cajuntechie.org]

2014-08-14 Thread Anthony Papillion
Hi All, I have a new keyserver running and would like to peer with other servers. Please add me to your 'membership' file with the following entry and provide your details in return so I can do the same: pgp.cajuntechie.org 11370 # Anthony Papillion 0x53B04B15 Thanks, Anthony