I feel stupid when i see that there's tar.bz2 and tar.gz
So faad2 and faac are fine.
a52dec is still wrong and no official release.
Sorry for my mistake.
/Nille
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SlackBuilds-users@slackbuilds.org
http://lists.slackbuilds
Sorry for the link that not supposed to be there.
New toshiba laptop that i'm not used to so it got it to paste something
where i didn't want it.
I need to make it turn off tuchpad while i write.
Or better sell the crap and get an new thinkpad.
/Nille
___
Well a source should only have one md5sum unless the change is done upstream
and not released as an new version. (it happens but is totally wrong in my
opinion)
Or how should anyone know if it's correct?
And the md5sum should match the official release.
Or do you think otherwise?
/Nille
2011/6/11
On Saturday 11 June 2011 22:59:47 Niklas "Nille" Åkerström wrote:
> We can't have different md5sum for the same source on SBo and we should use
> the official mirrors if possible.
Actually, it's the other way around. We support multiple md5sums per download
link, but only one download link per md
After reading some of this thread (it was a bit much to read all) i checked
the example handbrake.
And i asked myself why doesn't handbrake use the original source mirrors and
why doesn't the source have the same md5sum as the original.
I do maintain a52dec, faac, faad2 and when i saw that the md5
Am 10.06.2011 01:18, schrieb Bradley D. Thornton:
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Hash: RIPEMD160
On 06/09/2011 04:45 AM, Hac Er wrote:
The question remains: How do administrators decide if the links they
post are trustworthy?
Well, since you're asking, I might as well get all socratic o
* Al wrote:
> By reading any further you waive your rights to any and all seriousness.
:-) This thread reminds me of a great quote:
"I refuse to tiptoe through life only to arrive safely at death."
--Tony Campolo
--
left blank, right bald
pgp0NlPtu8TIL.pgp
Description: PGP signature
__
find / -xdev -ctime -1
As root, redirect that command to a file before installing a package.
Correction: "immediately after" installing a package, not before.
But, what's to say that a trojan couldn't alter a file time or time
stamp (which, in turn, would render that find command useless)
__
Not to offend. But to have fun. If you're serious, then stop reading
now!!! (except for the command at #3 below **is an actual command**)
By reading any further you waive your rights to any and all seriousness.
Now I'm starting to worry about the amount of electricity consumption
needed by a
> Third, at some point you're going to have to go to the grocery store.
> I know you wouldn't trust getting there in a Ford Pinto with Firestone
> 500's, but even if you walked, there are one legged crack mamas
> waiting to stab you in the heart for another 20 dollar rock.
You cannot live risk fre
On 06/09/2011 02:19 AM, Hac Er wrote:
snip-
This has made me wonder how secure is in fact the SlackBuild software.
Sure, 99.9% of contributors are honorable people with pure motivations
who work to enchance the whole Slackware comunity, but Black Hats do
exist too out there.
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On 06/09/2011 04:45 AM, Hac Er wrote:
>
> The question remains: How do administrators decide if the links they
> post are trustworthy?
Well, since you're asking, I might as well get all socratic on you too:
"How do you know that the upstream
Eric Hameleers wrote:
> Niels is one of the admins of slackbuilds.org.
>
> If you do not trust his contributions, then there is the door --->
I think this is another version of a piece of wisdom I have already
mentioned...
It seems I did choose a bad example with Snort and Neils. Sorry if
s
\\Greg
On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 1:09 PM, Eric Hameleers (SBo)
wrote:
> Op 9-6-2011 18:02, gmartin schreef:
>
> > Enter Niels (thanks, btw, for lending us your reputation for this
> > discussion). He is part of a much smaller and more well known to me
> > group - the slackbuild contributers.
>
>
Op 9-6-2011 18:02, gmartin schreef:
> Enter Niels (thanks, btw, for lending us your reputation for this
> discussion). He is part of a much smaller and more well known to me
> group - the slackbuild contributers.
Niels is one of the admins of slackbuilds.org.
If you do not trust his contributio
On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 11:11 AM, Klaatu wrote:
> There's no need to follow links from SlackBuilds.org for anything more than
> the SlackBuild itself, which you can audit and verify manually. Proceed to
> your trusted site for the source code, grab the source, edit the SlackBuild
> script as neede
BlackBerry® from Vodafone
-Original Message-
From: Hac Er
Sender: slackbuilds-users-bounces@slackbuilds.orgDate: Thu, 9 Jun 2011 18:01:04
To:
Reply-To: "SlackBuilds.org Users List"
Subject: Re: [Slackbuilds-users] Corcern about sources' procedence
On Thu, 9 Jun 2011 11:11:
On Thu, 9 Jun 2011 11:11:08 -0400
Klaatu wrote:
> There's no need to follow links from SlackBuilds.org for anything
> more than the SlackBuild itself, which you can audit and verify
> manually. Proceed to your trusted site for the source code, grab the
> source, edit the SlackBuild script as need
There's no need to follow links from SlackBuilds.org for anything more than
the SlackBuild itself, which you can audit and verify manually. Proceed to
your trusted site for the source code, grab the source, edit the SlackBuild
script as needed, and build.
I guess the larger issue, really, as
On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 8:40 AM, Bradley D. Thornton
wrote:
>
> I don't think a black hat would have bothered me as much as a *red* one
> Niels ;)
>
Red Hat? No I'd never use such a thing... :-)
--
Niels
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What procedure is taken in order to avoid this nightmare?
Because, knowing SlackBuild.org has a very good reputation and its
software works flawlessly most of the times, I asume you have some
method to prevent Niel and his friends from taking over Slackware
Universe.
From: slackbuilds-users-bo
> I get your point. Anyways, even being true that you can track the source
> by yourself, or modifiy the SlackBuild if necessary, the backgroud
> question remains unanswered.
>
> SlackBuilds.org does not host the sources itself, but provides links
> to them. I wouldn't trust some of these links if
I'm sorry, but this is really nothing new.
More wisdom from the ancients: http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html
On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 5:19 AM, Hac Er wrote:
> Hello.
>
> I have discovered this piece of wisdom in the SlackBuilds site:
>
> "If you don't trust us to check the scripts for ma
On Thu, 9 Jun 2011 12:20:32 +0100
David Woodfall wrote:
>
> I understand the OP's point, but then someone could hack the server of
> whoever provides the source and we have the same problem. I doubt
> there is any realistic way of checking source, apart being vigilant
> and watchful when using s
On Thu, 9 Jun 2011 16:36:00 +0700
Willy Sudiarto Raharjo wrote:
> That's why in SBo, they never give any source in the repository
> you have to download the source by yourself
>
> if you don't believe the script, you can check whether it tries to
> patch or do something malicious and you can alw
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On 06/09/2011 04:04 AM, Niels Horn wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 8:00 AM, Rob McGee wrote:
>> On Thu, Jun 09, 2011 at 11:19:25AM +0200, Hac Er wrote:
>>> I have discovered this piece of wisdom in the SlackBuilds site:
>>>
>>> "If you don't tr
On (08:04 09/06/11), Niels Horn put forth the
proposition:
On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 8:00 AM, Rob McGee wrote:
On Thu, Jun 09, 2011 at 11:19:25AM +0200, Hac Er wrote:
I have discovered this piece of wisdom in the SlackBuilds site:
"If you don't trust us to check the scripts for malicious
activ
On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 8:00 AM, Rob McGee wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 09, 2011 at 11:19:25AM +0200, Hac Er wrote:
>> I have discovered this piece of wisdom in the SlackBuilds site:
>>
>> "If you don't trust us to check the scripts for malicious
>> activity, then please move along."
>
> Wise words indeed.
On Thu, Jun 09, 2011 at 11:19:25AM +0200, Hac Er wrote:
> I have discovered this piece of wisdom in the SlackBuilds site:
>
> "If you don't trust us to check the scripts for malicious
> activity, then please move along."
Wise words indeed.
> I trust SlackBuild's statement of them checking the sc
> I trust SlackBuild's statement of them checking the scripts for evil
> contents. In fact, many scripts are so simple that you can check them
> quickly in a few minutes. However... what happens if Niels Horn is one
> of those Black Hats who live in the shadows, slowly infecting computers
> all aro
Hello.
I have discovered this piece of wisdom in the SlackBuilds site:
"If you don't trust us to check the scripts for malicious activity,
then please move along."
This has made me wonder how secure is in fact the SlackBuild software.
Sure, 99.9% of contributors are honorable people with pure mo
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