You could certainly argue it, I have no objection, SSL seems the obvious
choice for several reasons
1. Cheap (now free from Several Cas)
2. Well Supported (the code I looked at was running over HTTP so it would be
a VERY minor change to do https)
3. Identity validation is done by the CA.
Are a fe
May I argue that a secure end-to-end encrypted channel does not always equal
SSL? I know that PKI is pervasive, but wouldn't want to rule out the potential
of using identity-based encryption (IBE)...
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2007 20:23:46 -0600
From: "Alaric Dailey" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: RE: HTT
On Thu, Mar 01, 2007 at 10:53:02AM -0500, Rowan Kerr wrote:
> On 3/1/07, Tomi Pieviläinen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > I don't see how different keys could work but a
> > delimiter would be fine. There needs to be a reasonable way to
> > negotiate common capabilities between the RP and OP.
>
> F
On 3/1/07, Tomi Pieviläinen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I don't see how different keys could work but a
> delimiter would be fine. There needs to be a reasonable way to
> negotiate common capabilities between the RP and OP.
For assoc_type, I thought the idea was that the RP tries its preferred
me
Hi,
here is a first RDF Schema draft for OpenID 2.0 authentication. *If*
the provider/local_id terms are equivalent to server/delegate, we
could add some additional OWL bits to explicitly state this. Using
OWL's equivalence axioms would mean that every v2-OP is also a v1-IdP
and vice-versa, not s
Hi David,
I've had another look at the 1.1 spec, tweaked the schema, and
incorporated some feedback I received from the SemWeb IG (SWIG).
The new schema also includes "identifier" which - although just
a single property - allows RDFers to easily connect OpenID with
the rest of the RDF world. The
