Re: [Standards] SASL MTI

2019-01-25 Thread Dave Cridland
On Fri, 25 Jan 2019 at 12:08, Evgeny wrote: > On Fri, Jan 25, 2019 at 1:45 PM, Dave Cridland > wrote: > > I'm hearing "no", here - which is fine - but I do have a design for > > enforced password changes and password resets, too. The former is > > built around SASL2 (XEP-0388) and was actually o

Re: [Standards] SASL MTI

2019-01-25 Thread Sam Whited
On Fri, Jan 25, 2019, at 12:08, Evgeny wrote: > We already have "avalanche problem" caused by server restarts, and > SASL PLAIN + SCRAM'ed passwords only worsen it. Also, if an attacker > harvests enough JIDs it may successfully perform DDoS against the > server forcing it to compute HMACs at a hig

Re: [Standards] SASL MTI

2019-01-25 Thread Evgeny
On Fri, Jan 25, 2019 at 1:45 PM, Dave Cridland wrote: I'm hearing "no", here - which is fine - but I do have a design for enforced password changes and password resets, too. The former is built around SASL2 (XEP-0388) and was actually one of the original design goals. Password resets we built

Re: [Standards] SASL MTI

2019-01-25 Thread Dave Cridland
On Thu, 24 Jan 2019 at 20:03, Evgeny wrote: > On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 9:15 PM, Dave Cridland > wrote: > > XMPP-Grid (that draft) essentially says both servers and clients MUST > > implement EXTERNAL, SCRAM-SHA1, SCRAM-SHA1-PLUS, SCRAM-SHA-256, and > > SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS. > > > > Is there any int

Re: [Standards] SASL MTI

2019-01-25 Thread Evgeny
On Fri, Jan 25, 2019 at 12:39 AM, Jonas Schäfer wrote: My understanding is that Dave talks about Mandatory To Implement, which is something different than Mandatory To Deploy / Mandatory To Offer (at least that’s what I get from reading the relevant section in RFC 6120). I think this is fals