RE: [Syslog] Charter comments from IESG Review

2006-01-09 Thread Rainer Gerhards
Hi Sam WG, I understand the reasoning behind requiring a security mechanism. I just want to remind everyone that a major drawback in Vancouver was that we had lost some backwards-compatibility to existing syslog implementations. The weeks after Vancouver we worked hard to find a minimum

RE: [Syslog] Charter comments from IESG Review

2006-01-09 Thread Rainer Gerhards
Tom, If so, yes, both S/MIME and OpenPGP support this model. However I'll point oun that it is not a requirement that syslog work that way; for example RFC 3195 certainly has connections. I'll look at those, thanks. I agree syslog could be, perhaps should be for meaningful

Re: [Syslog] Charter comments from IESG Review

2006-01-09 Thread Sam Hartman
Rainer == Rainer Gerhards [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Rainer Hi Sam WG, I understand the reasoning behind requiring a Rainer security mechanism. I just want to remind everyone that a Rainer major drawback in Vancouver was that we had lost some Rainer backwards-compatibility to

Re: [Syslog] Charter comments from IESG Review

2006-01-09 Thread Sam Hartman
Rainer == Rainer Gerhards [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Rainer Tom, If so, yes, both S/MIME and OpenPGP support this model. However I'll point oun that it is not a requirement that syslog work that way; for example RFC 3195 certainly has connections. I'll look

RE: [Syslog] Charter comments from IESG Review

2006-01-09 Thread Rainer Gerhards
-Original Message- From: Sam Hartman [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, January 09, 2006 1:08 PM To: Rainer Gerhards Cc: Tom Petch; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [Syslog] Charter comments from IESG Review Rainer == Rainer Gerhards [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Rainer

Re: [Syslog] Charter comments from IESG Review

2006-01-09 Thread Sam Hartman
Rainer == Rainer Gerhards [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Rainer Sorry, yes, I was totally wrong in my wording. What I Rainer intended to say was that the keys are exchanged on a Rainer medium different then the current session (e.g. key Rainer servers). This is not typically how

RE: [Syslog] Charter comments from IESG Review

2006-01-09 Thread Rainer Gerhards
Sam, Rainer Why? Simply Rainer because any transport-layer requirement (DTSL, SSL, SSH, Rainer whatever) would NOT be compatible with currently existing Rainer syslog implementations. So due to this requirement, we can Rainer not create a backwards-compatible spec (not

Re: [Syslog] Charter comments from IESG Review

2006-01-09 Thread Sam Hartman
Rainer == Rainer Gerhards [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Rainer This looks like I misunderstood your intension. I thought Rainer that unsecured UDP should no longer be supported. That was not my intent. Rainer So what Rainer you actually said is that we can go ahead with the

RE: [Syslog] Sec 6.1: Truncation

2006-01-09 Thread Rainer Gerhards
Rainer: I agree - this is better than a convoluted rule. I think we only have any business in defining truncation for relays. For collectors, we have tried to stay away from describing how messages are stored. For relays, I think it would be useful to state that relay can't

RE: [Syslog] Sec 6.1: Truncation

2006-01-09 Thread Anton Okmianski \(aokmians\)
Rainer: I agree - this is better than a convoluted rule. I think we only have any business in defining truncation for relays. For collectors, we have tried to stay away from describing how messages are stored. For relays, I think it would be useful to state that relay can't just drop

Re: [Syslog] Charter comments from IESG Review

2006-01-09 Thread Tom Petch
Sam I was about to say that we were getting into useful detail but that we could sort out the charter without it, but you seem to saying not. That is, I was hoping that where the charter says The goal of this working group is to address the security and integrity problems it might say

Re: [Syslog] Charter comments from IESG Review

2006-01-09 Thread Sam Hartman
Tom == Tom Petch [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Tom without committing us to either a -sign or a secure transport Tom approach (and yes, we did start the transport wars, some time Tom ago, with SSH v TLS:-( I really think that you need to identify your deliverables in the charter.