On Thu, Nov 22, 2012 at 6:19 PM, Shea Levy wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> rngd currently supports three sources of randomness to increase the kernel's
> entropy pool: The hwrng device, the trusted platform module device, and the
> RdRand x86 instruction. We don't want to start the daemon when none of the
>
On Thu, 22.11.12 11:19, Shea Levy (s...@shealevy.com) wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> rngd currently supports three sources of randomness to increase the
> kernel's entropy pool: The hwrng device, the trusted platform module
> device, and the RdRand x86 instruction. We don't want to start the
> daemon when
El 23/11/12 11:38, Lennart Poettering escribió:
That said, what's the reason for having a userspace component for this
at all? Why isn't all of this done inside the kernel? I mean, the kernel
/dev/random stuff already has hooks into various subsystems to get
entropy, it sounds trivial to also ho
Hi Mantas,
Thanks for the advice. One question:
On 11/22/2012 12:49 PM, Mantas Mikulėnas wrote:
On Thu, Nov 22, 2012 at 6:19 PM, Shea Levy wrote:
Hi all,
rngd currently supports three sources of randomness to increase the kernel's
entropy pool: The hwrng device, the trusted platform module d
