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On 11/09/12 21:57, Brian Warner wrote:
> Padding isn't too hard to explain ("we expose 8*ceil(len/8)"), but
> the privacy value it provides is dubious: an active attacker can
> still detect single-byte variations if they can get you to start
> close to
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On 08/08/12 08:57, Tony Arcieri wrote:
> These are the only two options. For those who desire
> "reliability", these are the only buckets that reliability can be
> segmented into. So far I have not heard *any* good arguments
> towards strong consistenc
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I don't think there would be any lost data if you followed erpo41's
suggestion and set H higher than half the number of storage nodes. In
the event of a partition there would be at most one component with H
or more nodes, where writes would succeed; al
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On 14/07/12 00:11, Brian Warner wrote:
> I'm most interested in using the invitation code to also
> *establish* a channel, since for things like Tahoe, there's nothing
> to bootstrap from. If the Tahoe client were also an IRC client, or
> an MUA, then
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On 12/07/12 01:54, erp...@gmail.com wrote:
> Could Bob choose his own node as the rendezvous point, totally
> eliminating the load on the tor network?
I guess that could be useful in situations where Bob can receive
incoming TCP connections, Alice ca
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Hi Brian,
Thanks for the links to Hoepman, Payrin and Vaudenay - very useful!
On 02/07/12 03:35, Brian wrote:
> So, I'm looking for some compromise.. something that is generally
> secure enough, but usable enough to actually get used (which, in my
>
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On 11/07/12 14:02, James A. Donald wrote:
>> It seems people are only aware of the last feature because of
>> the poorly chosen name. IMO, the "hidden" aspect is one of the
>> less interesting features. I've heard a rumor that there's a
>> proposal t
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On 13/06/12 07:59, Brian Warner wrote:
> Assuming that Alice and Bob have some way to transfer 16 bytes
> securely is part practicality and part pragmatism. The practical
> part is that a targeted attacker (one who knows Alice and Bob and
> specificall
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Hi Brian,
You assume the invitation code remains secret until Alice and Bob have
completed the protocol, but may be discovered later. Is that a safe
assumption for email, IM, postcards, etc? Later, in the attacks
section, you assume Mallory can eavesd
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Hi David-Sarah,
Thanks for the quick reply - responses inline.
On 14/05/12 02:35, David-Sarah Hopwood wrote:
> On 13/05/12 08:55, Michael Rogers wrote:
>> Hi all,
>>
>> Here are a few notes I made while trying out version 1.8.2
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Hi all,
Here are a few notes I made while trying out version 1.8.2 of
Tahoe-LAFS. I thought a newbie's perspective on the setup process
might be useful. I apologise if any of these are out of date, they're
from last September.
1. On Ubuntu, 'python s
On 28/03/12 21:54, Brian Warner wrote:
> Yes, the math in our provisioning/reliability tool describes a somewhat
> unrealistic model with the usual because-it-makes-the-math-easier
> assumptions (Poisson processes, independent identically-distributed
> failures). Should we get rid of it? No, I thin
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