-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On 11/09/12 21:57, Brian Warner wrote:
> Padding isn't too hard to explain ("we expose 8*ceil(len/8)"), but
> the privacy value it provides is dubious: an active attacker can
> still detect single-byte variations if they can get you to start
> close to
On 9/11/12 9:59 AM, Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
> • topic: The compression attack on HTTPS.
> The drewp defense -- the Added Convergence Secret -- is exactly the
> thing that creates independent compression contexts in order to limit
> the scope for attack.
Nope. Drewp's defense increases the to
On 11/09/12 20:54, David-Sarah Hopwood wrote:
> On 11/09/12 17:59, Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
>> There is still the question of how to handle hyperlinks into
>> https://tahoe-lafs.org that point at darcs patches and history.
>
> I think that the darcs history should be retained as read-only, but
On 11/09/12 17:59, Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
> • topic: The compression attack on HTTPS.
>
> (Not really relevant to Tahoe-LAFS, but interesting.)
>
> Brian says one possible defense against this is to move your secrets from
> cookies to the URL. This makes the attack impossible unless your sec
Folks:
As usual, I'm not taking the time to contextualize and vet all these
notes. Caveat lector! Also, I've maintained my tradition of adding
some of my own thoughts that weren't actually expressed out loud in
the discussion. (In particular the advocacy for adding padding and the
ideas about how
