The security of Firefox/Iceweasel is important for the security of Tails.
I therefore suggest to have a look at this old unresolved Firefox issue
and vote for it. Years ago people working for RedHat spent a lot of time
to create a patch which does not yet seem to have been applied.
Resolving the
adrelanos wrote (22 Oct 2013 04:24:06 GMT) :
I think it won't leave anyone's wishes for features open, even has a .d
config folder - unless you'd like to see a rewrite in something other
than bash.
So if you like my implementation or have any feature requests, I may be
able to polish it and
On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 02:19:13PM +0200, intrigeri wrote:
Hi,
* branch: bugfix/world-readable-persistence-state-file, both in the
tails-greeter and main Git repositories (+ APT)
* ticket: https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/6374
This branch fixes #6374, that was discovered while
Hi,
Merged, building on lizard. Actually, the branch as proposed for
merging was basically a no-op, as merging testing in it brought in
a revert of the interesting code (as that branch had been merged by
mistake, then reverted, in the 0.20 cycle IIRC). So I had to revert
the revert, woo!
This
Hi Mike, hi Pearl Crescent team!
Mike Perry wrote (02 Apr 2013 08:52:56 GMT) :
Thus spake intrigeri (intrig...@boum.org):
1. Any obvious showstopper, off the top of your head, regarding how
the Tor Launcher could be usable for Tails?
I think you guys mostly won't use it.
Back in April, I
Hi Thibault,
intrig...@debian.org wrote (08 Oct 2013 09:27:56 GMT) :
as you are surely aware of, it's been known [1] since 2006 that
clients supporting both OTRv1 and v2 (such as libotr 3.x) are subject
to protocol downgrade attacks clients. It's also been known for
a while that OTRv1 has
On 22 oct. 2013, at 20:17, intrigeri intrig...@debian.org wrote:
Hi Thibault,
Hi,
intrig...@debian.org wrote (08 Oct 2013 09:27:56 GMT) :
as you are surely aware of, it's been known [1] since 2006 that
clients supporting both OTRv1 and v2 (such as libotr 3.x) are subject
to protocol
On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 12:35:09AM +0200, Thibaut Varène wrote:
intrig...@debian.org wrote (08 Oct 2013 09:27:56 GMT) :
as you are surely aware of, it's been known [1] since 2006 that
clients supporting both OTRv1 and v2 (such as libotr 3.x) are subject
to protocol downgrade attacks
On 23 oct. 2013, at 01:53, Ian Goldberg i...@cypherpunks.ca wrote:
To be explicit, removing support for OTRv1 from libotr 3.x is totally
fine (and indeed libotr 4.x has already done it).
Ian, thanks a lot for the input.
I guess it's all good then, no objection for an NMU and thanks in advance
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Hash: SHA512
Thank you for starting this discussion!
intrigeri:
Also, it would be really awesome if all major ways of using Tor
(TBB, Tails, etc.) could provide the same interface for configuring
how Tor should access the network.
This would be interesting
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