Re: [Tails-dev] [Secure Desktops] MAC changer "blend into the crowd" by only using common manufacturer MAC (OUI part) addresses broken by design?

Patrick Schleizer: > Tails' current implementation... > > only spoof the NIC part: yes [1] > OUI part unchanged: yes [2] > > quu9ohch [1]: >> [...] It is not possible to "blend into the crowd" with a > "typical-looking" mac address when so many users allow themselves to be > uniquely

Re: [Tails-dev] Windows 10 theme for Tails/Jessie

Hi Christian, Any update on this? Tails 2.0 (jessie) has entered beta. On Tue, Oct 27, 2015 at 2:59 PM, Christian Medel wrote: > I got it to work shortly, and this is the result : > > > > 2015-10-27 15:36 GMT-04:00 Christian Medel : >> >> I get

[Tails-dev] Please test Tails 2.0~beta1

Hi, [please drop tails-dev@ from the list of recipients when replying -- thanks!] Please consider answering the call for testing there: https://tails.boum.org/news/test_2.0-beta1/ Your help will be very much appreciated :) Cheers! -- intrigeri

Re: [Tails-dev] [Secure Desktops] Avoiding real MAC address in Tails macchanger being harmful?

[Sorry for the delay :S] Patrick Schleizer: > Tails does verify, that randomly chosen MAC does not equal the real MAC > by chance. > > From tails-spoof-mac [1] (code: [A]) > >> # There is a 1/2^24 chance macchanger will randomly pick the real MAC >> # address. We try to making it really

Re: [Tails-dev] [Secure Desktops] Tails' MAC 'leak prevention' question

[Sorry for the delay :S] Patrick Schleizer: > I understand Tails' MAC 'leak prevention' [1] [2] as this... Without > 'leak prevention', things would happen like this: > > a) > > 1) system boots > 2) kernel module loaded > 3) MAC leaked > 4) macchanger started > 5) MAC changed > 6)

Re: [Tails-dev] Update Electrum documentation for Tails 1.8 upgrade to version 2.5.4

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hello I have reviewed the branch - very nice work; plain and simple. From my point of view it's perfect, explicit and also in reasonable length. I just have one single addition to make sure we avoid confusion and panic among the less techy users.

Re: [Tails-dev] [Secure Desktops] Tails: Protect against fingerprinting via active Wi-Fi networks probing implemented?

Patrick Schleizer: > Active probe fingerprinting > https://tails.boum.org/contribute/design/MAC_address/#index6h1 > > says, No - "No protection against this is implemented yet". This is still the case. > but https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/6453 says "yes", 100 % done. That's just Redmine's