On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 11:37 AM, intrigeri wrote:
> Austin English wrote (18 Feb 2016 16:56:29 GMT) :
>> I'm not sure what action we should suggest.
>
> Re-installing from scratch is perhaps the only safe option we can
> provide in the current state of our tools.
+1
I filed
Austin English wrote (18 Feb 2016 16:56:29 GMT) :
> I'm not sure what action we should suggest.
Re-installing from scratch is perhaps the only safe option we can
provide in the current state of our tools.
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> I'm not sure how the user could detect / verify that
> (realistically, you probably can't..). Running a rootkit checker from
> another *nix OS may be helpful, but of unknown effectiveness.
That's work in progress: https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/7496
I implemented a prototype that's
On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 10:51 AM, intrigeri wrote:
>> I was thinking about this last night, it likely wouldn't be too hard
>> to write a wrapper for the greeter to detect if those files (or other
>> similar files/directories, like __MACOSX) are present. It should then
>> be
Hi,
Yuval Adam wrote (16 Feb 2016 09:26:54 GMT) :
> Please ignore last patch and use this updated one
> From 65a2b31fa89ff27251ae30ad3bb3a22d4ef6dff0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Yuval Adam
> Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2016 23:08:00 +0200
> Subject: [PATCH] Add additional syslinux
> I was thinking about this last night, it likely wouldn't be too hard
> to write a wrapper for the greeter to detect if those files (or other
> similar files/directories, like __MACOSX) are present. It should then
> be possible to pop up a very big warning in the greeter, ideally
> before the
Hi,
This is an on-going investigation. Indeed, applications using the Tor
socks port for name resolution are not vulnerable for this attack.
An automated test was ran trying to determine (using the public proof of
concept) whether any application was vulnerable, so far, we're on the
safe side
Hi,
my understanding is that clients that use Tor SOCKS port for name
resolution are fine.
For clients who use the DNSPort, it's not clear to me if an
attacker-controlled payload can make it's way from the exit node being
used for the name resolution to the client. Has anyone looked
into this?