[Tails-dev] Tails htpdate - why use time information from neutral and foe pools?

Hi, intrigeri: I believe my complex design is better. You believe your simple design is better. Maybe a more preferable design is the one where the user sets the time manually within the allotted tolerance, e.g., UTC+/-30min. I couldn't locate an accurate tolerance other than the major

Re: [Tails-dev] [RFC] Dropping requirement for OpenPGP communication with HTTP mirror operators?

hi, sajolida wrote (11 Mar 2016 16:40:08 GMT) : > intrigeri: >> I think the main advantages of requiring OpenPGP -enabled >> communication with mirror operators are: >> >> * We can authenticate requests sent to us by mirror operators: e.g. >>"please remove my mirror from the pool", that

Re: [Tails-dev] Detecting hidden partitions?

Hi, (reordered due to top-posting) Austin English wrote: >> I would try to help, but I don't know what you mean with "hidden >> partitions" exactly. Could you please clarify how this translates into >> non-ambiguous technical concepts? > This is for https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/11137,

Re: [Tails-dev] Detecting hidden partitions?

This is for https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/11137, trying to any partitions that are listed in the partition table. I used a hidden FAT32 partition for testing: 1g.img2 206848 227327 20480 10M 1b Hidden W95 FAT32 my other thought was checking the Partition ID, unless someone

Re: [Tails-dev] Testing with openqa?

hi, anonym wrote (05 Oct 2015 15:33:55 GMT) : > On 09/15/2015 11:03 AM, intrigeri wrote: >> I've had a look during DebConf, and indeed the web interface for >> developers is much better than what Jenkins will give us as-is. >> Perhaps at some point we'll need $something that extracts data from >>

Re: [Tails-dev] Tails htpdate - why use time information from neutral and foe pools?

hi, Patrick Schleizer wrote (16 Feb 2016 05:36:08 GMT) : > Patrick Schleizer: >> intrigeri wrote: >> Is the reasoning behind Whonix design decision on this topic summed up >> anywhere? > No. > To make it quick to save time, let's see if the following of the top of > my head sounds already

[Tails-dev] dconf-editor dropped in Tails 2.x [Was: dconf-editor dropped, gedit-plugins, systemd, w32codecs]

hi, [splitting into sub-threads, as mixing 4+ topics in a single thread makes the discussion hard to follow for me.] maddonkeyk...@safe-mail.net wrote (10 Mar 2016 03:20:21 GMT) : > I did some research on this and yes the 'dconf-editor' program was installed, > but not > directly. The package

Re: [Tails-dev] [RFC] WhisperBack for frontdesk

hi, sajolida wrote (11 Mar 2016 16:13:18 GMT) : > intrigeri: >> The disadvantage is, of course, that any email in the thread after the >> initial reply will lack these headers. So, depending on how email >> filtering is done exactly, these threads may be broken (for example, >> the initial report

[Tails-dev] w32codecs [Was: dconf-editor dropped, gedit-plugins, systemd, w32codecs]

Hi, (splitting into a dedicated subthread, and reordering top-posted reply.) Austin English wrote: > On Mon, Mar 7, 2016 at 4:38 AM, intrigeri wrote: >> Austin English wrote (07 Mar 2016 03:05:46 GMT) : >>> That said, including win32 codecs is probably worthwhile. >> >>

Re: [Tails-dev] [Freepto] Let's share username, /etc/hostname and /etc/host among all anonymity distributions

Patrick Schleizer wrote (25 Feb 2016 23:00:22 GMT) : > As agreed back then. Thanks! ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to

Re: [Tails-dev] Detecting hidden partitions?

Austin English wrote (12 Mar 2016 04:58:54 GMT) : > So, when it comes to detecting hidden partitions, is it as simple as > doing $(fdisk -l | grep -i hidden)? I'm afraid this is too brittle: this can return true for various reasons even if there is no "hidden" partition, e.g. a LV whose name

Re: [Tails-dev] Tails on compromised hardware

Hi, sajolida wrote (12 Mar 2016 15:04:05 GMT) : > See also the FAQ we have on this topic: > https://tails.boum.org/support/faq#compromised_system It looks like this FAQ entry exposes the problem sycamoreone is trying to solve here: "if the computer has only been compromised by software, running

Re: [Tails-dev] Tails on compromised hardware

sycamoreone: > In https://github.com/rootkovska/x86_harmful/blob/master/x86_harmful.md > Joanna Rutkowska remarked that: > >> Tails has long been (falsely) advertised as being capable of >> providing security even on a previously compromised laptop^[E.g. a >> laptop which used to run e.g.

[Tails-dev] Fwd: 2.2 tails-signing-key differs from version before

(forwarding to the user support mailing-list) --- Begin Message --- Dear Tails-Developers,   I use tails since version 1.8 and I repeatedly downloaded the tails-signing-key for verification. Now I recognized that the tails-signing-key with version 2.2 differs from all the keys I download

Re: [Tails-dev] Tails on compromised hardware

BitingBird: > Has someone checked the warning page recently? We worked on it 6 months > ago, and it starts with "Tails does not protect against compromised > hardware", then "Tails can be compromised if installed or plugged in > untrusted systems" and "Tails does not protect against BIOS or