Re: [Tails-dev] ISO verification

2015-07-07 Thread intrigeri
Hi, sajolida wrote (03 Jul 2015 08:38:25 GMT) : > intrigeri: >> sajolida wrote (04 Mar 2015 17:43:01 GMT) : > You're answering here a quite old message of mine Yep, sorry about that. Your reply makes it clear that I should have re-read the blueprint and relevant threads more carefully before both

Re: [Tails-dev] ISO verification

2015-07-07 Thread Giorgio Maone
On 07/07/2015 18:06, intrigeri wrote: Are you saying that any other website that's been loaded in the current session could alter the result of this verification? That sounds very bad... >>> That is what I would assume until some experts in this field tell me >>> that browsers are sa

Re: [Tails-dev] ISO verification

2015-07-07 Thread intrigeri
Hi, Giorgio Maone wrote (07 Jul 2015 23:24:07 GMT) : > So, just to be clear, *web pages cannot interfere in any way* with the > result of the verification performed by the browser add-on, except if > there are bugs in the add-on itself (very unlikely, since its code is > gonna be relatively simpl

Re: [Tails-dev] ISO verification

2015-07-09 Thread Giorgio Maone
> Can a web page (and scripts it may be running) loaded in a given > browser tab interfere in any way with the content of another tab? Only if it's same origin with that tab, or the content of the other tab opts-in for some form of cross-domain communication, or it's been opened with window.open()

Re: [Tails-dev] ISO verification

2015-07-09 Thread sajolida
intrigeri: > Hi, > > sajolida wrote (03 Jul 2015 08:38:25 GMT) : >> intrigeri: >>> sajolida wrote (04 Mar 2015 17:43:01 GMT) : >> You're answering here a quite old message of mine > > Yep, sorry about that. Your reply makes it clear that I should have > re-read the blueprint and relevant threads

Re: [Tails-dev] ISO verification

2015-07-17 Thread intrigeri
Hi, Giorgio Maone wrote (09 Jul 2015 07:22:52 GMT) : >> Can a web page (and scripts it may be running) loaded in a given >> browser tab interfere in any way with the content of another tab? > Only if it's same origin with that tab, or [...] Thanks a lot for these explanations! This addresses my r

Re: [Tails-dev] ISO verification

2015-08-01 Thread sajolida
intrigeri: > Giorgio Maone wrote (09 Jul 2015 07:22:52 GMT) : >>> Can a web page (and scripts it may be running) loaded in a given >>> browser tab interfere in any way with the content of another tab? >> Only if it's same origin with that tab, or [...] > > Thanks a lot for these explanations! This

Re: [Tails-dev] ISO verification

2015-08-04 Thread intrigeri
sajolida wrote (31 Jul 2015 14:14:28 GMT) : > intrigeri: >> Giorgio Maone wrote (09 Jul 2015 07:22:52 GMT) : Can a web page (and scripts it may be running) loaded in a given browser tab interfere in any way with the content of another tab? >>> Only if it's same origin with that tab, or [.

Re: [Tails-dev] ISO verification

2015-09-16 Thread sajolida
sajolida: > Giorgio Maone: >> On 04/03/2015 19:46, sajolida wrote: >>> I tried to interrupt a download of the ISO with Tor Browser and, >>> indeed, it's not possible to continue it. >> >> This seems due to a misconfiguration of your mirrors setup. >> Specifically, I've tried to manually resume an i

Re: [Tails-dev] ISO verification [Was: [RFC] UX for ISO verification + Tails Installer + full upgrades]

2015-03-03 Thread intrigeri
Hi, [@dkg: I know you read the last, but in this email there's one question for you, and I would be sad if you missed it, so Cc'ing you explicitly. Look for your handle below.] sajolida wrote (07 Feb 2015 14:03:15 GMT) : > ISO verification > I'm only commenting on that part for

Re: [Tails-dev] ISO verification [Was: [RFC] UX for ISO verification + Tails Installer + full upgrades]

2015-03-03 Thread Giorgio Maone
Hi, On 03/03/2015 21:01, intrigeri wrote: >> - #8849: Technical specifications for ISO verification extension >> (me, Giorgio, and probably intrigeri). More on that in a bit. > Now switching to this, since I think my deadline for reviewing this > was... yesterday. I'll assume that > https://tail

Re: [Tails-dev] ISO verification [Was: [RFC] UX for ISO verification + Tails Installer + full upgrades]

2015-03-03 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
On Tue 2015-03-03 21:01:55 +0100, intrigeri wrote: > [@dkg: I know you read the last, but in this email there's one > question for you, and I would be sad if you missed it, so Cc'ing you > explicitly. Look for your handle below.] thanks for the explicit callout, this thread has been mostly off my

Re: [Tails-dev] ISO verification [Was: [RFC] UX for ISO verification + Tails Installer + full upgrades]

2015-03-04 Thread sajolida
intrigeri: > I have a suggestion regarding the Seahorse Nautilus doc: > > * we could advise users to set up something to automatically refresh > they GnuPG keyring (the OpenPGP best practices has several > suggestions iirc, and not just parcimonie). This addresses the > revocation handling p

Re: [Tails-dev] ISO verification [Was: [RFC] UX for ISO verification + Tails Installer + full upgrades]

2015-03-04 Thread sajolida
Giorgio Maone: >> The Goals section doesn't address interrupted / paused / retried >> downloads. Is dealing with that a goal or a non-goal? Thanks for joining this thread Giorgio! > Considering the size of the ISO and the download speeds many Tor users > may experience I'd consider it a goal (and

Re: [Tails-dev] ISO verification [Was: [RFC] UX for ISO verification + Tails Installer + full upgrades]

2015-03-04 Thread sajolida
Daniel Kahn Gillmor: > thanks for the explicit callout, this thread has been mostly off my > radar, and i might not have noticed it otherwise. Thanks for joining in! As explained to intrigeri earlier on, I planned to send you an explicit request about that after a first validity check by him (whic

Re: [Tails-dev] ISO verification [Was: [RFC] UX for ISO verification + Tails Installer + full upgrades]

2015-03-04 Thread Giorgio Maone
On 04/03/2015 19:46, sajolida wrote: > I tried to interrupt a download of the ISO with Tor Browser and, > indeed, it's not possible to continue it. This seems due to a misconfiguration of your mirrors setup. Specifically, I've tried to manually resume an interrupted download from Firefox's downloa

Re: [Tails-dev] ISO verification [Was: [RFC] UX for ISO verification + Tails Installer + full upgrades]

2015-03-06 Thread sajolida
Giorgio Maone: > On 04/03/2015 19:46, sajolida wrote: >> I tried to interrupt a download of the ISO with Tor Browser and, >> indeed, it's not possible to continue it. > > This seems due to a misconfiguration of your mirrors setup. > Specifically, I've tried to manually resume an interrupted downloa

Re: [Tails-dev] ISO verification [Was: [RFC] UX for ISO verification + Tails Installer + full upgrades]

2015-03-10 Thread sajolida
I did a bunch of commits on the extension blueprint (7f21644..d61d155) and consider this security discussion pretty much closed. I still need to: #8855: Design data source for ISO verification extension #9028: Check whether Tor Browser disables automatic updates #9043: Check whether BitTorrent cl

Re: [Tails-dev] ISO verification [Was: [RFC] UX for ISO verification + Tails Installer + full upgrades]

2015-07-01 Thread intrigeri
FYI, the only email dkg answered from this thread was when I explicitly Cc'd him, so I bet he missed this one: sajolida wrote (04 Mar 2015 19:44:22 GMT) : > Daniel Kahn Gillmor: >> thanks for the explicit callout, this thread has been mostly off my >> radar, and i might not have noticed it otherwi

Re: [Tails-dev] ISO verification [Was: [RFC] UX for ISO verification + Tails Installer + full upgrades]

2015-07-01 Thread intrigeri
sajolida wrote (04 Mar 2015 17:43:01 GMT) : > intrigeri: >> The Goals section doesn't address interrupted / paused / retried >> downloads. Is dealing with that a goal or a non-goal? [...] > Still, our goals make it clear that we want to be able to distinguish > between corrupter and interrupted dow

Re: [Tails-dev] ISO verification [Was: [RFC] UX for ISO verification + Tails Installer + full upgrades]

2015-07-03 Thread sajolida
intrigeri: > sajolida wrote (04 Mar 2015 17:43:01 GMT) : >> intrigeri: Allow users who are downloading using BitTorrent to do the same level of verification as people downloading through their browser. >>> >>> IMO that could be demoted to a "bonus" goal, if time resources become >>> scarc