Re: [Tails-dev] Reducing attack surface of kernel and tightening firewall/sysctls

2017-04-12 Thread intrigeri
Hi, [cleaning my INBOX] tl;dr: all the proposed changes were applied in Tails 2.4. Thanks! intrigeri (Thu, 11 Feb 2016): > intrigeri wrote (05 Mar 2015 21:14:50 GMT) : >> intrigeri wrote (18 Jan 2015 21:45:15 GMT) : >>> I see this thread has been quiet for a bit more than a month. >>> Maybe

Re: [Tails-dev] Reducing attack surface of kernel and tightening firewall/sysctls

2016-02-12 Thread sajolida
intrigeri: > intrigeri wrote (05 Mar 2015 21:14:50 GMT) : >> intrigeri wrote (18 Jan 2015 21:45:15 GMT) : >>> I see this thread has been quiet for a bit more than a month. > >>> Maybe it's time for someone to sum up whatever consensus was reached, >>> and whatever disagreement may still be

Re: [Tails-dev] Reducing attack surface of kernel and tightening firewall/sysctls

2016-02-12 Thread intrigeri
sajolida wrote (12 Feb 2016 17:20:16 GMT) : > So I'm just wondering whether we have tickets to track this? We have none, as far I know. Someone volunteered to create them back them, once it was clarified that this was something we wanted, but didn't do it in the end. Feel free to create it if you

Re: [Tails-dev] Reducing attack surface of kernel and tightening firewall/sysctls

2016-02-10 Thread intrigeri
Hi, intrigeri wrote (05 Mar 2015 21:14:50 GMT) : > intrigeri wrote (18 Jan 2015 21:45:15 GMT) : >> I see this thread has been quiet for a bit more than a month. >> Maybe it's time for someone to sum up whatever consensus was reached, >> and whatever disagreement may still be remaining? >> Jake,

Re: [Tails-dev] Reducing attack surface of kernel and tightening firewall/sysctls

2015-01-18 Thread intrigeri
Hi, [disclaimer: I've not read the entire thread yet.] I see this thread has been quiet for a bit more than a month. Maybe it's time for someone to sum up whatever consensus was reached, and whatever disagreement may still be remaining? Jake, maybe? Cheers, -- intrigeri

Re: [Tails-dev] Reducing attack surface of kernel and tightening firewall/sysctls

2014-12-11 Thread anonym
On 04/12/14 21:16, Oliver-Tobias Ripka wrote: According to anonym on Thu, Dec 04 2014: FWIW I experienced no issues during my tests with *only* ESTABLISHED in both the INPUT and OUTPUT chains so neither NEW nor RELATED seems essential for the basic usage I tested. And of course the above

Re: [Tails-dev] Reducing attack surface of kernel and tightening firewall/sysctls

2014-12-11 Thread Oliver-Tobias Ripka
According to anonym on Thu, Dec 11 2014: So, in addition to proto tcp, how does --syn compare to state NEW? Actually, what is it we are trying to defend against here? Is there any conceivable attack vector based on sending non-syn packets for non-ESTABLISHED (i.e. NEW) TCP streams? Ok...

Re: [Tails-dev] Reducing attack surface of kernel and tightening firewall/sysctls

2014-12-09 Thread Oliver-Tobias Ripka
According to Jacob Appelbaum on Thu, Dec 04 2014: On 12/4/14, Oliver-Tobias Ripka o...@bockcay.de wrote: According to anonym on Thu, Dec 04 2014: FWIW I experienced no issues during my tests with *only* ESTABLISHED in both the INPUT and OUTPUT chains so neither NEW nor RELATED seems

Re: [Tails-dev] Reducing attack surface of kernel and tightening firewall/sysctls

2014-12-04 Thread Michael Rogers
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 04/12/14 01:06, Oliver-Tobias Ripka wrote: - DHCP still works. Which is strange, isn't? I configured the firewall to drop everything so DHCP should not work. To debug a little I inserted some code into

Re: [Tails-dev] Reducing attack surface of kernel and tightening firewall/sysctls

2014-12-04 Thread Oliver-Tobias Ripka
Hi, I retried the test but deleted the lease files from the directory you mentioned before reconnecting. I now see a complete DHCP DORA (Discovery, Offer, Request, Ack) on the wire. So nothing gets blocked. I would also expect that just doing a renewal (request, ack) should be blocked as the Ack

Re: [Tails-dev] Reducing attack surface of kernel and tightening firewall/sysctls

2014-12-04 Thread anonym
On 03/12/14 18:22, Jacob Appelbaum wrote: I propose that we change the rule to be: mod state state (NEW ESTABLISHED) ACCEPT; The reason is pretty simple - RELATED makes the kernel do a lot of extra lifting that is not needed by using the conntrack kernel code: While I think we

Re: [Tails-dev] Reducing attack surface of kernel and tightening firewall/sysctls

2014-12-04 Thread Jacob Appelbaum
On 12/4/14, anonym ano...@riseup.net wrote: On 03/12/14 18:22, Jacob Appelbaum wrote: I propose that we change the rule to be: mod state state (NEW ESTABLISHED) ACCEPT; The reason is pretty simple - RELATED makes the kernel do a lot of extra lifting that is not needed by using

Re: [Tails-dev] Reducing attack surface of kernel and tightening firewall/sysctls

2014-12-04 Thread Jacob Appelbaum
On 12/4/14, Oliver-Tobias Ripka o...@bockcay.de wrote: Hi, I retried the test but deleted the lease files from the directory you mentioned before reconnecting. I now see a complete DHCP DORA (Discovery, Offer, Request, Ack) on the wire. So nothing gets blocked. I would also expect that just

Re: [Tails-dev] Reducing attack surface of kernel and tightening firewall/sysctls

2014-12-04 Thread Oliver-Tobias Ripka
According to anonym on Thu, Dec 04 2014: FWIW I experienced no issues during my tests with *only* ESTABLISHED in both the INPUT and OUTPUT chains so neither NEW nor RELATED seems essential for the basic usage I tested. And of course the above exploits didn't work due to the absence of NEW.

Re: [Tails-dev] Reducing attack surface of kernel and tightening firewall/sysctls

2014-12-04 Thread Oliver-Tobias Ripka
Thinking some more about this I think that there might not only be the TCP PATH MTU issue, but also my list of protocols used by Tails was incomplete. While it does not run by default I think I2P is supported within Tails and it seems to have also UDP firewall requirements [1] that need to be

Re: [Tails-dev] Reducing attack surface of kernel and tightening firewall/sysctls

2014-12-04 Thread Jacob Appelbaum
On 12/4/14, Oliver-Tobias Ripka o...@bockcay.de wrote: According to anonym on Thu, Dec 04 2014: FWIW I experienced no issues during my tests with *only* ESTABLISHED in both the INPUT and OUTPUT chains so neither NEW nor RELATED seems essential for the basic usage I tested. And of course the

Re: [Tails-dev] Reducing attack surface of kernel and tightening firewall/sysctls

2014-12-04 Thread Jacob Appelbaum
On 12/4/14, Oliver-Tobias Ripka o...@bockcay.de wrote: Thinking some more about this I think that there might not only be the TCP PATH MTU issue, How should we test this, I wonder? but also my list of protocols used by Tails was incomplete. While it does not run by default I think I2P is

[Tails-dev] Reducing attack surface of kernel and tightening firewall/sysctls

2014-12-03 Thread Jacob Appelbaum
Hi, After talking with a new friend about netfilter and the kernel, we discussed a funny thing that happens to lots of people who use iptables. As a result, I took a look at Tails and sure enough, that funny little issue is present. I think as a result, we should make a reasonable, minimal change

Re: [Tails-dev] Reducing attack surface of kernel and tightening firewall/sysctls

2014-12-03 Thread intrigeri
Hi Jake, Jacob Appelbaum wrote (03 Dec 2014 17:22:30 GMT) : Thoughts? Thanks a lot for this detailed report! :) Were the proposed changes tested in Tails? If yes, then the next steps are: 1. filing a ticket about that 2. proposing a branch that implements the proposed changes 3.

Re: [Tails-dev] Reducing attack surface of kernel and tightening firewall/sysctls

2014-12-03 Thread Jacob Appelbaum
On 12/3/14, intrigeri intrig...@boum.org wrote: Hi Jake, Jacob Appelbaum wrote (03 Dec 2014 17:22:30 GMT) : Thoughts? Thanks a lot for this detailed report! :) Sure - happy to help. :) Were the proposed changes tested in Tails? I've not tested it - I was hoping that someone might

Re: [Tails-dev] Reducing attack surface of kernel and tightening firewall/sysctls

2014-12-03 Thread Oliver-Tobias Ripka
Hey, I agree that removing the attack surface is a good idea. Some thoughts and material for discussion on this...: You make no distinction between the INPUT and OUTPUT chains and suggest that both should be changed to NEW, ESTABLISHED. I understand your argument for the OUTPUT chain but I would