On Oct 18, 2015 9:31 PM, "Yoav Nir" wrote:
>
>
> > On 19 Oct 2015, at 6:24 AM, Martin Thomson
wrote:
> > I can't think of any situation in which a compliant, valid ServerHello
> > would induce that behaviour. It would have to be busted somehow, I
> > guess.
>
> I was thinking some extension miss
> On 19 Oct 2015, at 6:24 AM, Martin Thomson wrote:
>
> On 18 October 2015 at 16:59, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>> Yeah, I am starting to think I was getting too clever here and it would be
>> better
>> to just say "tear down the connection"
>
>
> I can't think of any situation in which a compliant
On 18 October 2015 at 16:59, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> Yeah, I am starting to think I was getting too clever here and it would be
> better
> to just say "tear down the connection"
I can't think of any situation in which a compliant, valid ServerHello
would induce that behaviour. It would have to b
On Sun, Oct 18, 2015 at 8:59 AM, Yoav Nir wrote:
> Hi
>
> Two things that bothered me that I think have not been mentioned by either
> Mirja or David:
>
> Section 2 says: "If the TLS handshake fails for non-cryptographic reasons
> … endpoints SHOULD behave as if the the TCP-TLS option was not pre
On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 3:43 AM, Markus Stenberg
wrote:
> (Not on the list; hopefully this goes through the approval at some point.)
>
> Heya,
>
Thanks for the review.
> I have considered implementing this at some point, but hadn’t really read
> through it (or the ENO draft) before. I got pro
(Not on the list; hopefully this goes through the approval at some point.)
Heya,
I have considered implementing this at some point, but hadn’t really read
through it (or the ENO draft) before. I got prompted to (by two parties, no
less), so here’s few comments:
[1] is there binding to the ENOs
Eric Rescorla writes:
> I wonder if the WG needs to have some non-normative discussion about
> ways to bootstrap up from unauthenticated modes to authentication.
I think the informational API document should include examples of this.
We made a preliminary stab at it here:
https://datatr
Hi
Two things that bothered me that I think have not been mentioned by either
Mirja or David:
Section 2 says: "If the TLS handshake fails for non-cryptographic reasons …
endpoints SHOULD behave as if the the TCP-TLS option was not present.”
I’m missing what counts as “cryptographic” vs not. So
> Hi Ekr,
>
> I did a quick review of draft-rescorla-tcpinc-tls-option-04, as an
individual (not as chair).
>
> Thanks for putting all the explanational text in there; at least for me
that was very helpful. I have a few comments and (potentially stupid)
questions:
>
> 1) Section 2 say that if there
This is my review of draft-rescorla-tcpinc-tls-option-04.txt.
Circumstances were such that I had to print it out and review it on
paper. Given the tight dependency on TLS1.3, this means my review is
light on the question of integration with TLS, and more geared towards
interaction with sockets and
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