> Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 19:37:54 +0100
> From: Martin Pieuchot
>
> I'd like to import this new MI pseudo-driver and the framework it
> provides to instrument and inspect kernel internals.
>
> It is still under development and all the code is guarded under NDT, so
> it shouldn't impact GENERIC.
On Fri, Jan 10, 2020 at 03:14:42PM +0100, Otto Moerbeek wrote:
> Hi,
>
> THe ntp protocol uses 32-bit unsigned timestamps counting seconds
> since 1900. That means that in 2036 the timestamp field will wrap.
> This difff makes sure ntpd handles that correctly by assuming we are
> in era 0 unless
I'm hunting the hz(9) in ciss_cmd(). To remove it I need to first
untangle the polling code.
To start, I think it's sensible to remove a level of indentation.
I've attached the -w diff to simplify review.
ok?
Index: ic/ciss.c
===
nfs_request() has an exponenential backoff. The timeout is already
in seconds so we just stop converting to ticks.
nfs_sndlock() and nfs_rcvlock() both have no timeout initially and
then switch to a timeout of two seconds under certain circumstances.
Ticks to seconds.
The kqueue polling thread i
This makes the interface setting "type p2p" configurable globally or
per area. ospf(6)d allows this for almost all interface related settings.
As a side-effect of this diff ospf(6)d -nv prints "type p2p" also for
point-to-point interfaces like gif or gre. I think this is an advantage
but I can als
On Sun, Jan 19, 2020 at 11:50:01AM -0700, Theo de Raadt wrote:
> Your text seems somewhat backwards, because if you can't open it, it
> doesn't matter if it is read-only, it is read-not.
It starts with what holds true unconditionally: the fact that you cannot
write; then it describes an additional
Your text seems somewhat backwards, because if you can't open it, it
doesn't matter if it is read-only, it is read-not.
>Neither mem(4) nor securelevel(7) tell exactly which operations are
>allowed on these devices at which security level.
>
>The utility cbmem from the new sysutils/coreboot-utils
Neither mem(4) nor securelevel(7) tell exactly which operations are
allowed on these devices at which security level.
The utility cbmem from the new sysutils/coreboot-utils port opens
/dev/mem read-only and reading is possible at all security levels, as
long as the sysctl kern.allowkmem is non-zer
On 14/01/20(Tue) 17:16, Martin Pieuchot wrote:
> On 13/01/20(Mon) 21:31, Martin Pieuchot wrote:
> > I'd like hardclock() to be free of SCHED_LOCK(), the diff below brings
> > us one step away from that goal. Please test with your favorite
> > benchmark and report any regression :o)
> >
> > The re
On 18/01/20(Sat) 14:16, Martin Pieuchot wrote:
> When futex(2) got imported it didn't return ECANCELED. This was changed
> later with futex-based semaphores.
>
> This modification introduced a behavior change in pthread_cond_*wait(3).
> The diff below restores the previous behavior by treating EC
On 2020/01/19 00:11, Sebastian Benoit wrote:
> chr...@openbsd.org(chr...@openbsd.org) on 2020.01.18 06:18:21 +0100:
> > On Wed, Jan 15, 2020 at 12:47:28PM +0100, Sebastian Benoit wrote:
> > >Christopher Zimmermann(chr...@openbsd.org) on 2020.01.15 11:55:43 +0100:
> > >>Hi,
> > >>
> > >>as far as I
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