Re: [TLS] (selection criteria for crypto primitives) Re: sect571r1

2015-07-15 Thread Tony Arcieri
To respond more specifically to your concerns: On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 6:42 PM, Rene Struik rstruik@gmail.com wrote: It seems prudent to keep some diversity of the gene pool and not only have curves defined over prime curves. Similarly, one should perhaps have some diversity of gene pool

Re: [TLS] sect571r1

2015-07-15 Thread Dan Brown
FFDHE with prime field is one big step away from FFDHE with binary field, which has quasipoly time DLP, so that's quite a large risk. ECDHE with binary field is also one big step away from binary FFDHE, but it's a different type of step: hence diversity. I agree that diversity risks weakest

Re: [TLS] sect571r1

2015-07-15 Thread Dave Garrett
On Wednesday, July 15, 2015 09:42:51 pm Dan Brown wrote: What about sect571k1, a Koblitz curve, aka NIST curve K-571? (By the way it has no unexplained constants...). Has it been removed already, or does the question also refer K-571 too? Already dropped. That's obviously not irreversible,

Re: [TLS] sect571r1

2015-07-15 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 11:41:03PM -0400, Jeffrey Walton wrote: Same here, I think in this case less is more. There is no compelling reason for this curve, and needless diversity here is counter-productive. It provides 256-bits of security. Its the only curve I am aware that can

Re: [TLS] sect571r1

2015-07-15 Thread Salz, Rich
Same kind of auditor who tells you that you can’t replace the library with the next version that fixes the buffer overflow because it was the previous version that was certified. In their defense, you do have to prove that this fix was the ONLY change. :)

[TLS] sect571r1

2015-07-15 Thread Dave Garrett
In PR 188 for TLS 1.3, I pruned down the allowed elliptic curves to just the ones actually used. (per Sean's recommendation) One point of discussion between Eric and myself: sect571r1. I'm in favor of keeping it, but not very strongly. Eric suggested removing it. It does get some use, though

Re: [TLS] sect571r1

2015-07-15 Thread Yoav Nir
On Jul 15, 2015, at 9:19 PM, Benjamin Beurdouche benjamin.beurdou...@inria.fr wrote: Hey, Except if someone has a real need for it, I would favour removing p571 and keep secp521r1 as the maximum … +1 It should be noted that I have removed it from RFC4492bis. In terms of real-world

Re: [TLS] sect571r1

2015-07-15 Thread Eric Rescorla
We absolutely should have harmony between 1.3 and 4492bis. Since Uri objected, i'll let the chairs decide if/when we have consensus. -Ekr On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 12:52 PM, Yoav Nir ynir.i...@gmail.com wrote: On Jul 15, 2015, at 9:19 PM, Benjamin Beurdouche benjamin.beurdou...@inria.fr

Re: [TLS] sect571r1

2015-07-15 Thread Adam Langley
On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 1:58 PM, Deirdre Connolly durumcrustu...@gmail.com wrote: So, should it stay or should it go now? Opinions? +1 that sect571r1 be removed. I also believe that it should be removed. Cheers AGL -- Adam Langley a...@imperialviolet.org https://www.imperialviolet.org

Re: [TLS] sect571r1

2015-07-15 Thread Tanja Lange
The main reason I think this warrants discussion is that dropping it would drop the maximum bits here, which whilst obviously not the only factor to take into account, will possibly not be desired by some. The main arguments for ditching is probably that it might not be safely implemented

Re: [TLS] sect571r1

2015-07-15 Thread Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
This I absolutely cannot agree. P521 must stay, as part of the supported NIST standard (which BTW we use). Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Verizon Wireless 4G LTE network. From: Brian Smith‎ Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 19:40 To: Tony Arcieri‎ Cc: tls@ietf.org Subject: Re: [TLS]

Re: [TLS] sect571r1

2015-07-15 Thread Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
I like Tony's recommendation - except that I'd rather not ‎lose the 571 curve. But I'm not going to fight the entire WG over this.  Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Verizon Wireless 4G LTE network. From: Tony Arcieri Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 18:07 To: Dave Garrett‎ Cc:

Re: [TLS] sect571r1

2015-07-15 Thread Dave Garrett
On Wednesday, July 15, 2015 06:06:37 pm Tony Arcieri wrote: On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 2:39 PM, Dave Garrett davemgarr...@gmail.com wrote: It's the most used of the rarely used curves. I think all rarely used curves should be removed from TLS. Specifically, I think it would make sense for TLS

Re: [TLS] sect571r1

2015-07-15 Thread Dave Garrett
On Wednesday, July 15, 2015 05:39:26 pm Dave Garrett wrote: It's the most used of the rarely used curves. This statement is potentially confusing, actually, because in comparison to P256 _everything_ is rarely used when it comes to ECDHE. Dave ___

Re: [TLS] sect571r1

2015-07-15 Thread Rob Stradling
AIUI, OpenSSL's default highest preference curve is sect571r1 (aka B-571). See [1] and [2]. The result of calling OpenSSL's recommended SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1) function is that the highest preference curve is automatically used for ECDH temporary keys used during key exchange. [3]

[TLS] Let's review: draft-ietf-tls-tls13-07 (abridged)

2015-07-15 Thread Ilari Liusvaara
Let's review: draft-ietf-tls-tls13-07 This is abridged version of mail I sent earlier, but was too large for the list due to its sheer size. (Note: I omitted some stuff I saw recently discussed (e.g. pruning unused crypto algorithms) or I remember discussed. I didn't explicitly check issue list