Hi Thomas,
We encountered the same issue and suggested something similar in [1] --
although not at the same level of detail as you below.
I like your proposal, but I'm not convinced that overloading the semantics
of an already existing extension when used in combination with a specific
version of
Hello,
I know that I am a bit late to the party, but I have a suggestion for
the upcoming TLS 1.3.
Context: I am interested in TLS support in constrained architectures,
specifically those which have very little RAM. I recently published a
first version of an implementation of TLS 1.0 to 1.2, that
A) OpenSSL does not measure the actual TLS performance (including nonce
construction, additional data, etc), but rather just the speed of the main
encryption loop.
B) Still, I agree with Yoav. From my experience, the difference in TPT between
16K records and 64K records is negligible, as well
On Wed, Nov 23, 2016 at 10:44 PM, Christian Huitema
wrote:
> On Wednesday, November 23, 2016 7:20 PM, Colm MacCárthaigh wrote:
> >
> > Prior to TLS1.3, replay is not possible, so the risks are new, but the
> end-to-end designers
> > may not realize to update their threat model and just what is r
> On 24 Nov 2016, at 15:47, Hubert Kario wrote:
>
> On Wednesday, 23 November 2016 10:50:37 CET Yoav Nir wrote:
>> On 23 Nov 2016, at 10:30, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote:
>>> On Wed, 2016-11-23 at 10:05 +0200, Yoav Nir wrote:
Hi, Nikos
On 23 Nov 2016, at 9:06, Nikos Mavrogianno
On Wednesday, 23 November 2016 10:50:37 CET Yoav Nir wrote:
> On 23 Nov 2016, at 10:30, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote:
> > On Wed, 2016-11-23 at 10:05 +0200, Yoav Nir wrote:
> >> Hi, Nikos
> >>
> >> On 23 Nov 2016, at 9:06, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
> > That to my understanding is a way to reduce
The following errata report has been verified for RFC5288,
"AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS".
--
You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=5288&eid=4694
--
St
